Sorry, duplicate sent

Abelard,

thank you so much for these interesting messages. I had the same Paillole interview as yours, placed on Passion Histoire, but it ended, due to the link, before the end of the interview. And now I have it here in full.
See you this evening.


Kind regards from Paul.

Abelard,

saw it now entirely. The video from the interview with Paillole, I see now, is the same I put on my message on Passion Histoire and it stops also on the same crucial moment when he will reveal like something more. I will seek the thread on Passion Histoire back to show it to you.
The one about the enigma machine is very interesting, as it speaks also about what Phil from New Caledonia said about the push trhough the Ardennes.
I put here the https for Meles meles, who understands French and perhaps Triceratops can see it with a French speaking next to him, while indeed most direct translations are bad.
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6but5b
And I see it is from the French Le cinq, which was the predecessor of the French-German Arte. I saw there in the time: the first years of Histoire Parallele by Marc Ferro.
Indeed very interesting film. If I have your permission to reopen the thread on Passion Histoire with that film and I will seek to obtain the book from Paillole. I have the impression that they on Passion Histoire aren't that persuaded if Paillole don't exaggerate it all.


The mentioning of the case Pierre Taittinger is also very interesting. I don't know if Frieser is that well seen in France I read during vitriolic discussions. And it is the first time I read about that case.

In any case many thanks, Abelard, for these "revelations"

Kind regards, Paul.

Dear PaulRickier,
It's very fair of you to ask my permission to export a video I posted on another forum.
But you don't need my permission, it's not my video and you're free, like other members, to do what you want with it.
About Frieser, for me, Blitzkrieg Legend is one of the best books ever written on this subject.
I wish you a lot of success on Passion et Histoire.
I also deleted a sequel to the first message because I want to limit myself to the only question of Paillole and intelligence.
I will add, a little later on, an addendum on the GQG, just to bring my two cents on the warlike subject of the Westfeldzug on which I don't want to dwell because I am interested in other matters.
Kind regards,
Abelard

Abelard, I now see that the French message about Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the push through the Ardennes was already mentioned in this thread on 12 Sept. 2017. And the moderator Pierma mentioned in the French thread a certain Pierre Nord, qui travaillait pour Paillole, qui contredit ce que Paillole dit...
http://passion-histoire.net/viewtopic.php?f=49&t=39405

Kind regards, Paul.

Dear PaulRyckier,
I don't think that the testimony of Nord mentioned by the guy from passion et histoire is very important in itself since the fact that many French staff officers took a long time to realize "the Ardennes danger" doesn't invalidate that others didn't make the same mistake.
If I were you and wanted to refute, I would do the following:

-Ask for the source and precise quotation of Nord,  you point to sources that can be read or viewed, the guy of passion et histoire doesn't produce any.
Maybe Nord's testimony is out of context.
Perhaps Pierre Nord makes a general comment on the failure of the GQG to identify the attack of 7 Panzers in the Ardennes before May 16, 1940; Prior that date there are only 3 panzers divisions identified.
It is possible that Pierre Nord refers to the systematic denials of the 3rd Bureau concerning this eventuality for months.

- In the wikipedia Pierre Nord is mentioned as a former military novelist assigned as head of the 2nd bureau of the 9th Army in 1940.
He is not under the direct orders of Paillole, who is an officer in a different service; moreover, the secret services are by definition compartmentalized, which means that what some know, others do not know.
What Nord didn't know, Paillole did, and Nord didn't work directly for Paillole.

-We know that Corap was the leader of the 9th Army as early as 1939 and we know that he has been warning of the risk of a strong German attack in this area for several months according to the wikipedia and even several years according to his biography.
So Corap doesn't "take time" to consider an attack in this area.
And this is even if Corap is not kept informed by Gamelin of the information he receives and therefore even if he does not know Hans Thilo-Schmidt's warnings.
This contradicts the objection since the commander of the army in which Nord is assigned fears an attack in this sector.

In conclusion, I would affirm that the testimony of Nord is limited or out of context and is not sufficient in itself to call into question Paillole's testimony, which is mentioned and studied and which seems to me to be quite credible.
I think it would be absurd to imagine that Paillole would have lied to advertise his book and run the risk of being discredited.
Especially since at the time of the first publication of his book, several direct witnesses were still alive, such as, for example, his hierarchical superior, Colonel Rivet.
kind regards,
Abelard

Cher Abelard,

thank you so much for your information about Pierre Nord.

I spent nearly the whole evening with searching to whom Paul Paillole reported was it to Daladier as PM, to Reynaud as PM from 23 March on  and then Daladier minister of war or was it directly to Gamelin...
It seems more and more that our man from New Caledonia has a point, when Paillole reports to I don't yet know to whom, and Gamelin is informed it is perhaps "human" that Gamelin can't alter his Breda-Dijle plan anymore, because of loosing face and a Paul Reynaud seeking to fire him and only a Daladier to preserve him and perhaps a LeBrun? On 22 March they had still the time to make a large reserve in the middle to be directed towards the Meuse if the information was confirmed of the deployment of the tank colums in the Ardennes?
I have already put this thread in the thread of dupuydumazeldan (a Frenchman with a carreer in the "archives") on Historum. may I introduce again this thread with your comments about Nord on Passion Histoire again for Pierma (it seems he understand English)?
With my research on google with: "Paul Reynaud""Paul Paillole" I came in the first results with a second thread on Passion Histoire where I interfered about the question:
http://www.passion-histoire.net/viewtopic.php?f=49&t=39581&start=30


And according to this link for what the link is worth: Paillole informed Reynaud the 22th of march...
http://lhistoireenrafale.lunion.fr/2016/03/21/22-mars-1940-les-deductions-du-colonel-paillole/
"Le colonel Paul Paillole, membre de du contre espionnage français, rapporte, le 22 mars 1940, que les Allemands étudient avec beaucoup de soins et une recherche particulière du détail, les routes allant de Sedan dans les Ardennes à Abbeville dans la Somme. Il en conclut qu’une attaque des forces armées du Reich au travers de la Belgique, pour gagner les côtes de la mer du Nord et de la Manche est imminente. Aussi en informe-t-il le gouvernement de Paul Reynaud qui vient d’être investi par l’Assemblée."

Kind regards, Paul.

Abelard,

And the about us about the Paul Paillole source:
http://lhistoireenrafale.lunion.fr/a-propos/
And the author:
https://www.lecteurs.com/auteur/herve-chabaud/4341049

Kind regards, Paul.

PS With all those Paul's, it is a "miracle" that Saint Paul isn't mingled in it all...

Dear PaulRickier,
I read that this story of warnings seemed important to you and that you were talking about it on other forums by mentioning my posts.
It doesn't matter, it's okay!
I am not too interested in military history and unfortunately I do not have too much time.
However, I had promised an addendum to the post of 27 March last.
Here it is, it gives of course on a point of view of a pseudo-historian amateur.

The problem of rivalries
It must be known that there were different rival factions in the army including two clans that were almost in " war of salon ", the clan of George's staff officers and those of Gamelin.
Huntzinger was one of the highest ranking generals, administratively likely to become "number 2" in Georges' place and had made "allegiance" to Gamelin before turning his back to him when he was ousted and getting closer to Pétain and Weygand at the period of the armistice.
That likely  played a role in the outcome about this other ignored warning on the Ardennes sector -Taittinger's warning-.
Of course General Huntzinger will say to Gamelin that everything is planned except for a weakness in air defence, and the case will be buried.
As for Corap's 9th army, without being consulted, it received the insignificant reinforcement of a cavalry brigade, theoretically 1,700 men and a battalion of 1,000 men, which did not change the weakness of the strength of an army that was to hold a 126 kms frontline with only 7 divisions of unequal quality.
It should also be noted that the 9th army had to move towards Dinant, a move of 150 kms for some units, with only one motorised transport group, whereas the 2nd army, which had a static mission, had two motorised transport groups at its disposal.

It seems that Gamelin  preferred to favour those he liked and who supported him.
We know that Corap did not get along at all with Gamelin and was rather close to Georges,  logically Gamelin seems to have done a lot to minimize his influence.

General André Georges Corap is a dangerous and talented rival for Gamelin.
He correctly predicted where the main German attack would be located.
He was curiously blamed by Gamelin, supported by Paul Reynaud, for the German breakthrough in the Ardennes.
He was rehabilitated a few months later by the militaries who did not want to make too much of a buzz on this affair.

credit wikimaginot

I have some of the informations quoted  from Max Schiavon's Book, Corap, Scapegoat for the 1940 defeat, published by Perrin in 2017.
Schiavon is a respected specialist in the unknown aspects of what some call the strange defeat without going into the eccentric conspiracy thesis of Annie Lacroix Riz's "Choice of Defeat", 2000.

Does the GQG's organization have a heavy responsibility for the Allied military disaster?
Organization of the GQG
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Quartier_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_fran%C3%A7ais#Organisation

Quote :

The staff itself includes four offices:
the 1st bureau manages the situation of the units in terms of staff and their equipment allocations, as well as administrative relations with the civil authorities;
the 2nd bureau is responsible for operational planning, as well as intelligence on the enemy;
the 3rd bureau is responsible for directing operations, it translates the will of the command into specific orders for the units concerned;
the 4th bureau is responsible for transport, supplies, cartographic matters, traffic plans, infrastructure, barracks and means of communication.

The inaction of the military hierarchy - especially supported by reports of the 3éme Bureau- reinforces the theory of the " ignored warning " because the organization of the GQG may seem odd and could have been partially "diluted" in the bureaucracy.
There were more than 6 500 staff officers in numerous general staffs!
If my memory serves, Marc Bloch in his book The Strange Defeat, 1940 mentions that  important informations concerning the location of German gasoline stocks located in the Ardennes  are pointlessly archived without being used.

In fact, we don't  know who really commands the French army because several plethoric headquarters are in some way superposed.
Gamelin standing back and leaving it to others to lead the fighting.
That may be seen as a practical attitudes of a bureaucrat general because in case of defeat there is a scapegoat and in case of victory all the credit is given to him.
This way of organizing things  will have catastrophic consequences later on and it corresponds well to the example stated by your friend on Gamelin's attitude on 19th May 1940, when he says  

Quote :

poor Georges is not getting away with it, it's time for me to see what I can do .

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Gamelin#La_d%C3%A9faite

Quote :

The poor organization of the highest level of the army, characterized by a dilution of responsibilities on a crucial front; in Belgium, it was not clear who commanded the inter-allied coalition: was it General Billotte, leader of the 1st group of armies, General Georges, commander of the North-East front, or the generalissimo himself? The dispatch of a liaison officer to the Belgian King Leopold III on 10 May could only be too late to allow effective coordination between Belgians and Allies. However, in his 1946 memoir book Serving in 1946, he pointed out that he had wanted to prevent a fatal outcome to the events of the 1940 campaign by maintaining secret relations with King Leopold III, Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian army, which had revealed to him the German plan for offensive by the Ardennes known to the Belgian counter-intelligence services.

Quote :

He is a bishop, a prefect but not a warlord

Paul Raynaud about Gamelin .


An interesting testimony on Maurice Gustave Gamelin's psychology
The testimony of the captain and future general Beaufre on General Gamelin's "last meal" on May 19, 1940.
What is in brackets has been added by me.
The information quoted in this source is taken from a box set of DVDs - The Great Battles -Jean-Louis Guillaud, Henri de Turenne and Daniel Costelle

http://www.livresdeguerre.net/forum/contribution.php?index=13299

Quote :

While the Germans were penetrating the country, General Georges decided to go and get "manu militari" Gamelin in Versailles so that he could finally give precise orders. It was there that Gamelin began his statement with this incredible formula in the mouth of a commander-in-chief when part of his armies were in complete chaos, physically and morally:
- Without wishing to interfere in the conduct of the battle, I suggest.... (!!!!!) ("that  the armies in the south counter-attack to the north and the armies in the north counter-attack to the south" -dixit Gamelin-).

In a funeral atmosphere, Beaufre testifies that Gamelin made guardroom jokes that sounded terribly false.
During the meal, the Commander-in-Chief, visibly satisfied with himself, honoured the meal. Dessert was brought. It was "an enormous saint-honoré (a stuffed choux pastry cake) at the top of which the chief pastry chef, whose patriotic ardour had undoubtedly been whipped by the announcement of Gamelin's presence, had planted a French flag and angel hair (caramel filaments)". -Beaufre dixit-
And Beaufre ends his testimony by saying that he would have liked the ceiling to collapse on the table at that moment to put an end to this grotesque and pitiful situation.

Here it is, I would be happy  if this amateur post could help you in your quest.

Kind regards,
Abelard

Dear Abelard,

thank you for your reply and I will read it in depth when I have finished the two threads on Historum, the one related to the push through the Ardennes
https://historum.com/threads/the-rapid-victory-of-hitler-against-france-and-uk-1940.177459/page-4
And I see that "Sparky" subscribed overhere today. Perhaps I will put a reaction overhere too.
and the one about the "cultures" or "culture" in Belgium
https://historum.com/threads/what-are-your-thoughts-on-the-fact-that-a-lot-of-different-ethnic-groups-in-europe-have-their-own-state-s-right-now.177580/page-3


Kind regards from Paul.

Dear Abelard, I nearly finished my comments on the Historum thread, as you can check on the link on Historum I mentioned above. And if Sparky want to comment he can it do overhere too as he subscribed here also.
Kind regards from Paul.

Dear Abelard,

I read now in  depth your last comments. Indeed all interesting and pointing in the same direction.
I am still reading the book of Robert Doughty that I yesterday mentioned to Sparky: "Breaking point. Sedan and the fall of France 1940." And overthere the mentioned mess is directly correlated whit all what you mentioned overhere.
https://mxdoc.com/queue/stackpole-the-breaking-point-sedan-and-the-fall-of-france-19.html

Seemingly I am not be able anymore to put pictures on this board as you and MM do on the "tree" thread...I will try here again.

Kind regards from Paul.

Dear Abelard,

I have now read your interesting reply in depth and it seems to confirm the essay of Robert Doughty that I yesterday mentioned to Sparky on the Historum and that I am still reading:
https://mxdoc.com/queue/stackpole-the-breaking-point-sedan-and-the-fall-of-france-19.html
"Breaking point.Sedan and the fall of France 1940"
It explains exactly the mess on the French side during the three breaktroughs from the German army at the Meuse...
Seemingly I am not able to put images on this board anymore as you and MM did on the "tree" thread.
Will try with a map here, but as I lost already this message I will do it in an addendum...

Kind regards from Paul.

Addendum.



And the book that I mentioned on Amazon
https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Point-Stackpole-Military-History-ebook/dp/B00Q5GYPBI


Kind regards from Paul.

"Nou breekt mijn klomp" would the Dutch now say (now breaks my clog). They translate on the internet with "Christ on a bicycle"...
Why can I place here a picture and not on the tumbleweed suite?

Regards to all from Paul.