Meles Meles said, "If you ever visit the on-line comment sections of national newspapers you will see that they have largely just become echo chambers for the viewpoint of the respective newspapers' editorial teams. The Guardian’s readers just repeat to each other how stupid and damaging brexit is … while those of the Telegraph chime the exact opposite. And if you visit the Daily Mail you will see real stupidity and ignorance repeatedly displayed. The DM itself cleverly miss-reports, omits factual information, and uses emotive language to support its pro-brexit, anti-EU agenda (EU plans are described as EU plots etc) … while the attached comments all to often repeat ‘facts’ that have clearly and repeatedly been shown to be untrue, sometimes even in the article they are commenting on. To repeatedly spout untruths in the face of solid evidence to the contrary, is either wilful ignorance, malicious lying … or yes, idiocy."

I wonder if the papers in question delete comments that have a contrary point of view.  I seem to be becoming increasingly sceptical as times go on.

I too read ferval and MM's posts with interest - thank you for posting the links. But MM's use of the expression "democracy of the mob" disturbs me. How do we define "mob"? Who are the "mob" exactly? The term originally, I believe, referred to the dangerously fickle nature of a crowd rather than its lack of intelligence.

Ochlocracy, or mob rule, is often incorrectly equated with tyranny of the majority; however, ochlocracy involves illegal action and does not necessitate a majority.

The people who voted leave were not a "mob"; they were acting legally and, it could be argued, were showing a rather touching belief that they and their votes still mattered. Such a belief is still good - at least in my book. Surely we need to worry when people such as those who live in Blackenhall Heath go out looting and burning and lynching rather than exercising their democratic rights in a free country. I think it would be a good idea not to insult them by calling them "idiots" or a "mob".

These people - who did after all actually bother to vote in the referendum - were lied to and misled by members of a privileged, articulate, educated élite - so who are the people we should actually despise?

I've been thinking today about the caste system in Huxley's Brave New World. The author of that novel (it was published in 1932) showed remarkable prescience: perhaps Paxman - obviously an Alpha+ - should have referred to the epsilon semi-morons, the "village idiots" of the future. The well-heeled crowd listening to him would no doubt have laughed louder at that. Urban dictionary gives a chilling definition of this unfortunate class:

epsilon

One who belongs to the lowest caste in Aldous Huxley's book "Brave New World". Known for stunted growth, inferior intelligence, yet indispensability. After death, they play a crucial role in phosphate reclamation. In short, a useful idiot.

Also known as "Epsilon-minus semi-moron"

I think the "democracy of the mob" works as an analogy on this occasion - while the original term certainly infers a level of illegality on the mob's activity it also places as much if not higher emphasis on the abandon of reason, intelligence and foresight that a mob in full flight exhibits, and this is certainly the case in last year's "referendum".

However I would not restrict the "mob" definition in this analogy purely to those who voted to leave the EU, or who at least assumed that this is what they were doing. Britain survives without a written constitution purely because it has, rather anachronistically in real-politik terms, superficially retained a very old structure of governmental authority based on medieval monarchy, historically speaking. Though many well known phases of political evolution in the UK have amended this chain-of-command over the years so that it now resembles a parliamentary democracy with power invested purely in the people, it has retained the essential components of the old monarchical power structure so that, in the real sense of the term, power percolates still from only one direction - down from on high. This may sound like a truism, and that this basically defines political power structures everywhere, but in fact it is one very unique in global politics in that the one crucial safeguard which constitutional democracies insist on assuming in order to stem the potential for abuse or neglect of the use of this power by the executive elite - however that elite is formed - is absent.

Expression of the "will of the people" can be looked at in two quite different ways in a democracy. In a constitutional democracy this will is enshrined in a document - often not very verbose at all - which basically defines how the citizens expect their society to function at the most profound levels. No law can be drafted, no executive activity condoned, no erosion of whatever rights have been established in this document, and no fundamental change to the governmental structure and representational system also defined in the document can be effected without at least a need to amend this expression of the people's will, or in some extraordinary circumstances, redefining this document in completely new terms. In this way the "will of the people" is something rather more than just an opportunity to incidentally express an opinion through the plebiscite - it is the fundament upon which their entire society is based. A "mob" of citizens intent on disrupting this finely balanced and strictly defined basis of where power ultimately resides is treading very dangerous water indeed, and in fact history supports the theory that most societies structured in this way restrict their involvement in constitutional reform to tortuously negotiated article amendments or, quite diametrically opposed with regard to effect, total ideological revolution in which the entire document is scrapped. The latter option rarely ends well for anyone involved.

The other definition of the "will of the people", and in fact the only one that really matters in Britain, is that of the general public as consultants, their views required periodically to see who will make up parliament (though not all parliament and none of several other parties to the ruling elite), and very occasionally to advise a policy that parliament is not prepared to decide for itself. Note the word "advise" there - despite what transpired last year regarding Brexit there is still no legal compunction whatsoever for anyone in government to act on this advice unless they also have decided to make a law for the purpose, which is exactly what they think they have done, or at least pretend as much to the public.

Which brings us back to this "mob" and who was in it. Well, there was certainly a huge element of short-sighted and ignorant resentment and protest fuelling much of the debate (and still is in fact), and which played its role in the outcome of the vote on the day. But, as you say, this in itself is not illegal - in a country where the role of the ballot box has no constitutionally defined function it was in fact neither legal nor illegal. There was an almost comparable level of ignorance and even resentment evident in fact in the "other side's" utterances and standard of comprehension of the issues actually at stake - glaringly evident to many outside onlookers at the time but seemingly completely invisible to the "mob" to which this bone had been cast.

All mobs have within their natural matrix, or at least develop, their own loose coterie of "leaders" who, for reasons which at least tend to have some better definition than those of the "led", will eventually orchestrate that mob's activities to ends of which the mob was probably not even aware at the outset. And, if my assumption above holds water that it was the entire UK voting public which had been reduced to a "mob", then it is extremely interesting to see where this coterie emerged and who was in it. The directors of the "mob", the ones with least regard for the legality of their actions, the ones who - on both sides of the apparent debate - lied to the mob, goaded the mob, aggravated the mob, excited the mob into a frenzy, steered the mob on its analogical rampage through the streets of reason, intelligence and common sense, were in fact members of the very elite who in a normally aligned constitutional democracy are the ones charged by the people to protect the law, protect truth in public discourse, and apply intelligence, expertise, and common sense in keeping the "will of the people" as enshrined in that constitution intact.

Which is why I think Paxman's comment as reported above is terribly short-sighted, as is in fact any post-Brexit referendum assessment of one side or the other as "stupid". Idiocy certainly played a role, and a very destructive role when one actually analyses the real implications of what "they" have done. But "they" are not the "people", at least not as such. "The people" have merely been recruited into the mob, and not for the first time either, and will revert to their traditionally imposed bystander role in time - in fact I think they already have. "They" - the real "mob" in my view - are those very few who, with the completely legal freedom from responsibility that Britain's "unwritten constitution" allows, with its reliance on dangerously unconstitutional terms such as "prerogative" and "Acts as Principles" used just to keep the system of power devolved from a monarch working at any level resembling actual democracy, then proceeded through self-interest, misjudgement, and in many cases plain and simple idiocy, to undermine whatever vestige of legality the democratic process in the UK had managed to retain in recent times as the facade of democracy has been crumbling along with the economic and social system it once fronted and from which this elite derived its wealth and power in the past. And in fact the same elite is continuing to do exactly this as they now try to engineer some desperate residue of advantage (their own of course) from all this idiocy.

So there you have it - a "mob" behaving exactly as defined by you earlier, with fickleness, idiocy and illegality abounding at every turn of this whole sad and sorry spectacle, and a mob whose rampage hasn't even begun to run its course.

That's a pretty decent bit of political analysis, nordmann, beautifully written. You almost persuade me: in fact you do persuade me.

Lord, how I hate admitting that.

Then there's this:

nordmann wrote:

"The people" have merely been recruited into the mob, and not for the first time either, and will revert to their traditionally imposed bystander role in time - in fact I think they already have. "They" - the real "mob" in my view - are those very few who, with the completely legal freedom from responsibility that Britain's "unwritten constitution" allows, with its reliance on dangerously unconstitutional terms such as "prerogative" and "Acts as Principles" used just to keep the system of power devolved from a monarch working at any level resembling actual democracy, then proceeded through self-interest, misjudgement, and in many cases plain and simple idiocy, to undermine whatever vestige of legality the democratic process in the UK had managed to retain in recent times as the facade of democracy has been crumbling along with the economic and social system it once fronted and from which this elite derived its wealth and power in the past. And in fact the same elite is continuing to do exactly this as they now try to engineer some desperate residue of advantage (their own of course) from all this idiocy.

So there you have it - a "mob" behaving exactly as defined by you earlier, with fickleness, idiocy and illegality abounding at every turn of this whole sad and sorry spectacle, and a mob whose rampage hasn't even begun to run its course.

Yes very well expressed.

Actually I did not mean my use of "the mob" to refer just to the mass of the people at the exclusion of the ring leaders. As I said, the effect of all the rhetoric and spin has been to make the views, of all sides, appear like religious beliefs rather than be based on any facts, logic or sense. As such I include the ring leaders as part of the mob: the likes of Johnson, Mogg, Farage ... and the media bosses and tycoons such as Dacre and Murdoch, are every bit part of the baying gang .... only they, like schoolyard bullies, are standing aside to avoid getting dirty, while the rest of the school fights it out in the mud. And, regardless of which side wins, they will not be personally disadvantaged. It's all sadly rather like 'Lord of the Flies' and a rather depressing reminder of how fragile society is.


PS : And we should never let it be forgotten that this whole brexit malarky was started in an attempt to heal a rift amongst the public-school-and-oxbridge echelons in the Tory party. Most people, although I admit not all, in the country, barring occasional grumbles about funny forriners and bent bananas, barely gave the EU a second thought as they nipped across on the booze run to Calais, went on stag nights to Magaluf, or happily paid their cheap and puntual Polish plumber in cash, ... and generally congratulated themselves on how their lives were not at all bad compared to the 1970s when Britain was 'the sick man of Europe'.

nordmann,

"Expression of the "will of the people" can be looked at in two quite different ways in a democracy. In a constitutional democracy this will is enshrined in a document - often not very verbose at all - which basically defines how the citizens expect their society to function at the most profound levels. No law can be drafted, no executive activity condoned, no erosion of whatever rights have been established in this document, and no fundamental change to the governmental structure and representational system also defined in the document can be effected without at least a need to amend this expression of the people's will, or in some extraordinary circumstances, redefining this document in completely new terms. In this way the "will of the people" is something rather more than just an opportunity to incidentally express an opinion through the plebiscite - it is the fundament upon which their entire society is based. A "mob" of citizens intent on disrupting this finely balanced and strictly defined basis of where power ultimately resides is treading very dangerous water indeed, and in fact history supports the theory that most societies structured in this way restrict their involvement in constitutional reform to tortuously negotiated article amendments or, quite diametrically opposed with regard to effect, total ideological revolution in which the entire document is scrapped. The latter option rarely ends well for anyone involved."


Amendments to the constitution are changing the foundation of that constitution and need in my opinion, because they are that essential, a two thirds majority because if the representants of the population reach a two thirds majority it is perhaps possible that this is the real wish of the population (although I said in a former message: Hitler came to power with the Entmächtigungsgezetz with a two thirds majority).
From the wiki on the first sight:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_amendment#Belgium

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, US, South Africa: 2/3, Italy: 2/3? Czechia: 3/5

Kind regards, Paul.

And not just 'the will of the people', what about the other daft cliche currently being spouted by pro independence Catalans 'the universal right to self determination'. As with the 'the will of the people' in the Brexit context I'm not sure what this 'universal right to self determination' means either.

What is it in a world built around constraints and all the way down to the minor constraints of every day life? And what if one person's universal right to self determination' infringes on my own universal right to self determination?

The problem with citing a "universal right to self-determination" is that it does not define either "self" or "determination".

The Irish experience at the time of their final press for independence exposed a huge problem with the first term if it was to be applied to the second. In 1918 the population of the island by a huge majority returned Sinn Féin candidates as their chosen Westminster MPs, and this was taken as the logical cue by those MPs to finally break with British parliamentary control, citing this right as expressed above as the primary justification for their action. In direct comparison to Catalonia, one could even argue that the Irish MPs at the time had even more demographic and historical support for such a move.

However there were two flaws with this simple reliance on a proven majority to define "self".

It did not account for a demographic anomaly in which the minority who did not condone this action were largely concentrated in the most industrialised and profit-oriented part of the island. This of course had been known beforehand, as was the certainty that this minority would actively resist the proposed form of independence, as blatant a challenge to the notion of all Irish inhabitants sharing a common notion of "self" as one could ask for. The response to this by members of the majority who most actively sought independence for the entire island from British rule was by no means uniform in tone - ranging from pleas, conciliatory and often platitudinal promises, cajoling, and totally unrealistic offers of "deals" on the one hand to outright genocidal threat on the other. In between these extremes was the "majority of the majority" who - like the Brexit voters - found themselves torn between a wish the whole thing would just go away and a knowledge that this was a moment in which they had to participate or face uncertain consequences. Acceptance of the treaty by which the island was partitioned and this "uncooperative" minority were transformed into a majority within a highly controversially and extremely artificially established territory in terms of boundary came largely from certain nationalist politicians recognising that this island-wide "majority within the majority" actually represented a number which would in fact be the main constituency of any new state, whatever the territorial boundary that eventually was imposed upon it. Pragmatic versus idealistic political philosophy, not for the first time historically in such scenarios, became the main battleground on which pursuance of "self-determination" would be fought, and the very notion of "self" inevitably became this battle's primary hostage.

What all this did to an Irish definition of "self" in fact was very interesting. Irish nationalism had developed along rather stuttering politically philosophical lines over the centuries. Though it pretended throughout to be as continuous a concept in its application as it was continuous an ideology in its interpretation by "the Irish" in fact it had, like everything else in the world, developed in response to existing political realities. The "Britain" that ruled Ireland in 1918 was not the "England" which had first laid sovereign claim, and nor were the inhabitants of the island the same either. Along the way various famous concerted efforts to acquire autonomy had been staged by various parties, two of the more notable ones in fact having been led first by ultra-royalists and later by Ulster Potestants, and each effort - though employing much the same language as its predecessor - in fact represented a largely different constituency to that which had been cited as "Irish" before. Historically this had led ultimately to the second huge problem with the term "self" by 1918 - exactly who was it going to be this time? And to this there was no clear answer - two die-hard comrades in arms fighting side by side for the nationalist cause in the war that ensued after that 1918 election might give up their life for the other in the cause of establishing independence for the Irish people, but neither when asked to elaborate on this definition might ever be in complete agreement just who these "people" were. In fact it was even probable that they had widely different interpretations of the historical political definitions which had previously been applied to identify these "people", by whom, and why.

Which then of course called into question the right of these people to determine anything, at least as a right which might even be called "universal". If identity cannot be completely determined, how can anything pursuant to that definition be determined either?

The result, as we all know, was to no one's true satisfaction in the end. A level of autonomy was wrested from British rule which itself proved divisive - lethally so - for those who had attained it. And even when this was pragmatically accommodated in order for life to go on there remained, in the background, all of those unanswered questions and unfulfilled ambitions which, as they do to this day in many states which have secured independence from previous rule by a larger neighbour or empire, seriously interfere with the ability of anyone to determine their future in the sense that the original nationalist platitudes had once baldly declared as not only possible but certain once this "universal right" had been achieved.

The Irish Republic, admittedly in a very stop-start manner now almost a century in progress, has demonstrated that the pragmatic exigency of starting with a set territory, a constitution, and a relatively stable means of representation, probably holds out the greatest hope of ever prosecuting such a "universal right" in the long run, though the outcome will inevitably include political, demographic, economic and societal realities never envisaged by those who established this framework. Northern Ireland has proven what happens when one or more of these elements is intentionally left absent for existing political reasons - an absence of stable representation and an anti-constitutional political entity succeeded only in prolonging and even intensifying the social stresses working against self-determination that the creation of this "state" had been designed to resolve, or at least circumvent, while the majority that had been created within it got on with living in the style and standard that it at least within this new semi-autonomous state had been promised by its leaders.

"Self", as far as I can see in Ireland, has now started upon a new phase of redefinition - in which the old nationalistic interpretations have been rightly left behind as over-simplistic and not reflective of modern economic and political reality. Who knows, it may even one day encompass and encourage voluntarily an active participation from almost everyone on that island despite their shared politically divisive past? Probably not any day soon, or maybe not even ever, but what the process will still demonstrate - as history also has demonstrated for anyone interested enough to review it - is that autonomy brings with it an insistent and unavoidable requirement to define "self" which will almost inevitably prove intangible and impossible to apply in any sense which automatically leads to a method of "determination" in the long run. The result will be a workaround, as people say these days, and in fact history also demonstrates that this is almost always the most successful model for any new autonomous state, one that actually places an ultimate definition of "self" on the long finger in real political terms. If anything, I suppose, the platitude quoted above should always read "a universal right to impose any form of workaround it takes to proceed as if we have defined 'self-determination' sufficiently to govern those within whatever territorial dominion 'we' have deemed 'ours'".

Note: Up until recently the present Irish constitution (Ireland has had two stabs at this) actually had, from its first acceptance by the majority in the then "Free State", an article that stated almost exactly this! Interestingly, even this has now been jettisoned (by referendum) as having less pragmatic political application than simply 'getting on with life'.

Paul wrote:

Amendments to the constitution are changing the foundation of that constitution and need in my opinion, because they are that essential, a two thirds majority because if the representants of the population reach a two thirds majority it is perhaps possible that this is the real wish of the population

In Ireland a simple majority is sufficient, and there is no minimum turnout requirement. This may sound crazy (a turnout of three people - or even one person - could theoretically alter the country's constitution) but in practice it has worked. It is based on an eminently pragmatic approach to real politics in that an article deemed suitable for amendment, deletion or addition has already undergone a process whereby it has been debated and processed through two chambers of parliament, has been approved by the supreme court regarding its applicability, and throughout this there will have been a critically sufficient level of public debate, education and awareness. Even if a proposed amendment is still relatively equally supported and objected to in terms of public support after all this it has still nevertheless undergone sufficient judicial and political review to be deemed suitable to be put to the same public's vote. Brexit mimicked this logic and process, without of course the huge caveat present in Ireland that the supreme court can in fact deem the attempt to educate and inform the public insufficient to allow the process to proceed, or that the proposed legislation pursuant to the amendment has been too vaguely presented or proposed to be considered good reason to alter the constitution just on that basis. This has happened twice that I can recall, both times in relation to adoption of European Treaties (once after the public had initially rejected a proposed amendment related to the same issue expressly because it had not as yet received enough information from the government regarding its implications - proof that the public in general is au-fait with its role in a constitutional democracy). Either of these measures, had they been available to serve the public cause in Britain, would have stopped the whole sham in its tracks well before it became what ranks as one of the most potentially catastrophic blunders an otherwise reasonably well-functioning country has inflicted on itself in recent times.

In Ireland this logic and process has only let the people down once - the controversial "abortion amendment" has led to a nightmare, not just for those people whose welfare in every important respect has been so drastically affected, but also one of legal constitutional angst regarding the implications of having allowed what was essentially a non-constitutional clause into a constitutional document. The narrow majority which placed that clause there subjected the country to decades (so far) of risking their constitution losing all validity in serving its prime purpose, which would be catastrophic indeed. However removing it is also now a nightmare, as this carries an equal risk of inferring illegitimacy to the entire document - the fundamental weakness in any democracy is if the people's ability to incorporate self-contradictory policy into their nation's basic ethos is facilitated by the most basic of democratic processes. Compared to the Brexit blunder however a level of damage limitation which itself is constitutionally grounded has been possible in that the Irish have subsequently imposed changes to the clause's wording which renders it almost impossible to derive meaningful law from it as it stands - a make-shift "solution" which at least allows the constitution to continue to function in all its other very important ways, one of which is keeping that country clear of ever walking into such a monumental embarrassment as Brexit has led Britain. In time the clause's proven inability to frame law (and it must be proven) will eventually be grounds for its removal, again by referendum.

The real failure in the process in Ireland at that time in the mid-80's rested with the highest court, which should have identified this problem and insisted that the wording be revised or even abandoned before any referendum could be called. However once referred to the public for decision it was no less binding for that, even with a simple majority. The UK government is presently behaving as if this applies in their case too, however in fact there is nothing "binding" at all as no actual constitution was there to be altered. Whereas the Irish know in these situations they are not just expressing a point of view but fundamentally changing the legal framework of the land (and generally respond to the demand in large numbers and with reasonable levels of responsibility as a result), the UK voters had no constitutional reason to make any such distinction or apply any such level of responsibility to their own actions, just as their leaders had no constitutional duty to inform them properly beforehand of the implications of their actions, and just as there was no constitutionally appointed judicial body with authority enough to stop proceedings on any pre-defined constitutional grounds related to these serious omissions in a democratic process, let alone one classed as a "referendum". By extension however, there is now no constitutional reason why the voters' "decision" should ever automatically translate into any form of legislation - and that would be as true even if one side had achieved a 99% majority in what they believed was a "referendum", though one which, besides the name and the fact that a ballot box was present, does not actually conform to the concept as normally understood in countries like yours or mine, Paul.

nordmann,

thank you very much for your erudite essay, as usual, about self-determination with the example of Ireland.

"but what the process will still demonstrate - as history also has demonstrated for anyone interested enough to review it - is that autonomy brings with it an insistent and unavoidable requirement to define "self" which will almost inevitably prove intangible and impossible to apply in any sense which automatically leads to a method of "determination" in the long run. The result will be a workaround, as people say these days, and in fact history also demonstrates that this is almost always the most successful model for any new autonomous state, one that actually places an ultimate definition of "self" on the long finger in real political terms. If anything, I suppose, the platitude quoted above should always read "a universal right to impose any form of workaround it takes to proceed as if we have defined 'self-determination' sufficiently to govern those within whatever territorial dominion 'we' have deemed 'ours'."

First: did you mean with "platitude" the self-determination? And the word "platitude" is that to understand in the same sense as the French "platitude"?
Second: are you describing here: the "national narration, story"? The French have a splendid word for it: "le roman national" with "roman" in my humble opinion saying  : "the fictive novel"
Everybody did it in the 19th century...as I understand it from you, constructing a glorified story of the "nation" from the so called origin to the present (the 19th century). A bit a postponed "ab urbe condita"?
And it seems to be alive and kicking as the French extreme right use it again to ignite the national fervour again.
A light humoured film as only the French can make, but where it  is all said...




In the North of Belgium we had the same in the 19th century, when they constructed a Flemish nationalistic story starting from the former County of Flanders to the extension of the former Duchy of Brabant and Limburg (part of the former Prince Bishopry of Liège)... and the highlight was Courtrai 1302 with the battle against the French (and yes the same as in France the extreme right...)

"Note: Up until recently the present Irish constitution (Ireland has had two stabs at this) actually had, from its first acceptance by the majority in the then "Free State", an article that stated almost exactly this! Interestingly, even this has now been jettisoned (by referendum) as having less pragmatic political application than simply 'getting on with life'."

Perhaps because I am not that knowledgeable about Irish history I don't understand it at all.

Kind regards, Paul.

The light humoured film don't appears:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ShSxadR8u1Q

Grr. half and hour trying to put as usual the youtube on the preview with he usual method and now it don't work
Is it because it is in French?

nordmann wrote:

Paul wrote:

Amendments to the constitution are changing the foundation of that constitution and need in my opinion, because they are that essential, a two thirds majority because if the representants of the population reach a two thirds majority it is perhaps possible that this is the real wish of the population

In Ireland a simple majority is sufficient, and there is no minimum turnout requirement. This may sound crazy (a turnout of three people - or even one person - could theoretically alter the country's constitution) but in practice it has worked. It is based on an eminently pragmatic approach to real politics in that an article deemed suitable for amendment, deletion or addition has already undergone a process whereby it has been debated and processed through two chambers of parliament, has been approved by the supreme court regarding its applicability, and throughout this there will have been a critically sufficient level of public debate, education and awareness. Even if a proposed amendment is still relatively equally supported and objected to in terms of public support after all this it has still nevertheless undergone sufficient judicial and political review to be deemed suitable to be put to the same public's vote. Brexit mimicked this logic and process, without of course the huge caveat present in Ireland that the supreme court can in fact deem the attempt to educate and inform the public insufficient to allow the process to proceed, or that the proposed legislation pursuant to the amendment has been too vaguely presented or proposed to be considered good reason to alter the constitution just on that basis. This has happened twice that I can recall, both times in relation to adoption of European Treaties (once after the public had initially rejected a proposed amendment related to the same issue expressly because it had not as yet received enough information from the government regarding its implications - proof that the public in general is au-fait with its role in a constitutional democracy). Either of these measures, had they been available to serve the public cause in Britain, would have stopped the whole sham in its tracks well before it became what ranks as one of the most potentially catastrophic blunders an otherwise reasonably well-functioning country has inflicted on itself in recent times.

In Ireland this logic and process has only let the people down once - the controversial "abortion amendment" has led to a nightmare, not just for those people whose welfare in every important respect has been so drastically affected, but also one of legal constitutional angst regarding the implications of having allowed what was essentially a non-constitutional clause into a constitutional document. The narrow majority which placed that clause there subjected the country to decades (so far) of risking their constitution losing all validity in serving its prime purpose, which would be catastrophic indeed. However removing it is also now a nightmare, as this carries an equal risk of inferring illegitimacy to the entire document - the fundamental weakness in any democracy is if the people's ability to incorporate self-contradictory policy into their nation's basic ethos is facilitated by the most basic of democratic processes. Compared to the Brexit blunder however a level of damage limitation which itself is constitutionally grounded has been possible in that the Irish have subsequently imposed changes to the clause's wording which renders it almost impossible to derive meaningful law from it as it stands - a make-shift "solution" which at least allows the constitution to continue to function in all its other very important ways, one of which is keeping that country clear of ever walking into such a monumental embarrassment as Brexit has led Britain. In time the clause's proven inability to frame law (and it must be proven) will eventually be grounds for its removal, again by referendum.

The real failure in the process in Ireland at that time in the mid-80's rested with the highest court, which should have identified this problem and insisted that the wording be revised or even abandoned before any referendum could be called. However once referred to the public for decision it was no less binding for that, even with a simple majority. The UK government is presently behaving as if this applies in their case too, however in fact there is nothing "binding" at all as no actual constitution was there to be altered. Whereas the Irish know in these situations they are not just expressing a point of view but fundamentally changing the legal framework of the land (and generally respond to the demand in large numbers and with reasonable levels of responsibility as a result), the UK voters had no constitutional reason to make any such distinction or apply any such level of responsibility to their own actions, just as their leaders had no constitutional duty to inform them properly beforehand of the implications of their actions, and just as there was no constitutionally appointed judicial body with authority enough to stop proceedings on any pre-defined constitutional grounds related to these serious omissions in a democratic process, let alone one classed as a "referendum". By extension however, there is now no constitutional reason why the voters' "decision" should ever automatically translate into any form of legislation - and that would be as true even if one side had achieved a 99% majority in what they believed was a "referendum", though one which, besides the name and the fact that a ballot box was present, does not actually conform to the concept as normally understood in countries like yours or mine, Paul.

nordmann,

thank you very much for this knowledgeable and insightful reply. I read it all!

Kind regards, Paul.

PaulRyckier wrote:

First: did you mean with "platitude" the self-determination? And the word "platitude" is that to understand in the same sense as the French "platitude"?
Second: are you describing here: the "national narration, story"? The French have a splendid word for it: "le roman national" with "roman" in my humble opinion saying  : "the fictive novel"

A platitude in English means any apparently moralistic or highly principled statement which, upon examination, reveals little or no moral purpose or principle at all, either because it is trite (lost meaning through repetition) or because it was never semantically sound to begin with. The entire term "universal right of self-determination" falls within this definition.

Ireland's "roman national" is of course an obvious feature of the struggle to identify an idea of national "self" to which everyone can subscribe, yes. In Ireland's case however - and I am sure it must be true in many such cases - examination of the history of the actual "roman" over the centuries reveals that it too has had to be changed, sometimes drastically, to the extent that the characters, plot and tone of the story have all been revised so many times that it is now difficult to view it even as one story in continuous development, but rather a series of narratives which simply borrow elements from their predecessors while telling a completely different story each time. The fictional narrative of Irish history and "Irishness" that attracted revolutionary leaders such as the Protestant Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet in the late 18th century, for example, might be totally unrecognisable to more modern nationalist activists whose version of the narrative now actually includes these previous figures, though now serving a very different function than the one they might have envisaged they would play in any future version of the narrative when they chose to fight for autonomy for their "people".

PaulRyckier wrote:

"Note: Up until recently the present Irish constitution (Ireland has had two stabs at this) actually had, from its first acceptance by the majority in the then "Free State", an article that stated almost exactly this! Interestingly, even this has now been jettisoned (by referendum) as having less pragmatic political application than simply 'getting on with life'."

Perhaps because I am not that knowledgeable about Irish history I don't understand it at all.

The Irish constitution contained two articles which were little more than a revanchist claim on the state of Northern Ireland, or a bold statement of noble national aspiration, depending on who you spoke to - stating in defiance of political reality that the Free State of Ireland (later becoming a republic in the 1940s) referred to the entire island and that its right to (interpreted by many as actual "power of") jurisdiction extended to this entire territory. In 1999 this was thrown out by referendum and replaced with articles which dropped this assertion and simply stated that all those upon the island could describe themselves as members of an Irish Nation if they so wished, but only those within the border of the Republic were subject to that country's jurisdiction. This reflects the political reality of the divided island, and also accommodates those with aspirations to one day unite the two elements politically, but crucially no longer makes any territorial claim or asserts right of jurisdiction over any area or anyone not currently within that jurisdiction.

The present Irish Constitution was voted into existence in 1937. It replaced an earlier and quite unsatisfactory constitution adopted hastily by the original Free State government (and people by referendum) which emphasised only Ireland's right to draft its own laws, collect its own revenues etc, but contained little or no framework of principles within which just laws could be defined and guaranteed or, crucially at that particular time, no reference to Ireland's right to militarily defend its territory and prosecute foreign policy independent of Britain. It mirrored almost exactly a similar document adopted by Stormont as its basis, or "charter", of government (though never promoted within Northern Ireland to the status of a constitution). In fact, if Britain's current "unwritten constitution" was ever actually written down this is more or less what it would look like, a concentration on the assumed or delegated rights of its parliament within a broader power structure, with notable omission of reference to crucial policy areas decided by non-parliamentary or extra-parliamentary agencies of the state who have no responsibility to refer to or be accountable to the people at all, excepting of course the monarch who would most certainly be mentioned as retaining all these rights simply through the fact that they are the monarch and everyone else is their subject, including members of "her" or "his" parliament.

Without the 1937 constitution Ireland would have had difficulty adopting a position of neutrality, for example, during WWII - a contentious policy even today but one which probably did most to preserve Irish independence during the young state's early existence, one still very much defined in contrast to its earlier rulers who were satisfied that this "free state" was actually subject to dominion status all the same. Many formed the view at the time and since that de Valera's main motive in drafting and implementing a new constitution was simply to break all the last existing holds Britain had over crucial elements of the Free State's internal polity (which included, for example, an agreed continued use of naval bases within the Free State over which the Irish government still held no control at all), and this is partly correct. Its specific mention of the Catholic Church as the main source of religious morality is also highlighted as a dead give-away concerning the man's true intentions. However it is also true that his constitution was a vast improvement on that which it replaced and has been used on several occasions to curb the power and influence of certain groups within Irish society over policy which would work to the detriment of people's welfare, including it must be said the Catholic Church itself in more recent times.

On balance therefore it has proven its worth, one proof of its effectiveness being how little within it required to be altered to allow Ireland join the EEC and later adopt European Court rulings within its existing legislation. A constitution's job is not to legislate per se, but to state the bounds beyond which legislation should not extend and within which a procedure whereby legislation is enacted must adhere, and in this the Irish version has stood up well when tested against sometimes radical legal reform that has been required on occasion. A good recent example was the insertion of an article to allow same-sex marriage which required no removal of any other article to allow it to stand within the document - it simply defined marriage as a legal union between two people, regardless of their sex. This allowed an immediate review of marriage law based on previous constitutionality which would now be now unconstitutional (where law had specified gender in its wording), and hastened the introduction of a law allowing same-sex partners to get married.

de Valera might never have envisaged his document so readily accommodating such a development, which I am sure would have appalled the man. But it speaks volumes for the man's intelligence in insisting the constitution of which he was chief architect should always refrain from defining law itself.

A friend who has studied law has given me this in answer to 'the right to self determination' question. Rather interesting, and really does not apply to the Catalunya situation, it being an autonomous state, not being persecuted and not a colony.

There’s no doubt about the right to self-determination but the ignoramuses seem to know nothing about it. For a start, the “self-” means “not another country”. So we can see that the whole idea developed in modern international law out of colonialism, and it meant that the colony, and not the colonising state, had the right to decide what future it wanted. It has been applied post-1945 to mean just that. In other words, the principle of self-determination provides that the people of the colonially-defined territorial unit in question may freely determine their own political status. (Example: the Belgian Congo, and not Belgium, decided their own future in 1960.)

So the fundamental question is: is Catalonia a colony? According to the U.N.; no, absolutely not. Your answer may differ depending on your political perspective, but under international law there is only one possible answer.

So can self-determination be applied in other cases? Where else could it apply, if not in the case of a colony?

Does it apply to secession? The U.N. is crystal clear on this, and has always strenuously opposed any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country. The position is that (apart from for colonies) there is no right of self-determination that would justify secession. (Of course, there is no international legal duty to refrain from attempts at secession, but then the question is one of domestic law, rather than international law. Only when such a secession has proved successful does international law come into it.)

Could the break-up of a federal state, or a state with more than one recognised “nation” or “people” within that state, be considered valid with self-determination as a factor? Although pre-U.N. days, this was a supposed rationale behind the more or less forced dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example. Post-1945, we have the Soviet Union, which was a kind of consensual break-up, and Czechoslovakia, which definitely was. No problems there. Yugoslavia is more problematic, as “self-determination” was one of the reasons given by the EU for recognition. But by that time, certainly Slovenia had established itself as independent. Croatia is trickier.

Other interesting examples are East Timor and Quebec. The former was recognised as a distinct nation and entitled to self-determination, as it had been a colony and it was considered that it was then illegally occupied by Indonesia. On Quebec, we shall see, although any break-up is likely to be consensual, unlike in the Spanish case.

Further considerations by international and domestic courts have clearly come to the judgement that self-determination applies only to colonial situations (and situations of occupation etc.) and can only be applied to cases of secession where the nation or people in question is subject to “extreme and unremitting persecution” coupled with the “lack of any reasonable prospect for reasonable challenge”, but even this is controversial not least in view of difficulties of definition. In this case, we must ask whether the Catalans a nation, whether there is persecution, and whether there is no chance of change. All in all, we can say that the situation of secession is probably best dealt with in international law within the framework of a process of claim, effective control of territory and international recognition. Leave self-determination out of it.

Thank you, ID, I've had thoughts on the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, especially of when Kosovo was being broken away from Serbia. 
Realizing that I know too little, I just seem to remember that some of the arguments used now in favour of Catalonian independence were then used in favour of what became Kosovo.
The situation was quite different then, as armed fighting were taking place, with NATO being involved heavy on one side, and EU alledgedly being neutral observers.

Are arguments valid when used then, then valid now, and what consequences are possible?

What the answer ID received from her law-study acquaintance basically says, if I'm reading it right, is that "self" is problematic as a principal element in a legal justification for any claim to autonomy. Even in the case where ex-colonial territories have had their boundaries decided for them by previous masters, something at least recognised in international law as a starting point in deciding the extent of autonomy, its presence is a very thorny one regarding its level of contribution to the concept of establishing said autonomy legally and to a standard deserving of international recognition. I agree.

Ireland, for example, most definitely did not revert to what even its British rulers had traditionally decided constituted "Ireland", or for that matter what most people on the island also had always generally assumed, as we all know, and that was an instance where the concept of "self" - right up to when Unionists voiced their opposition to where the notion was taking them in no uncertain terms - had been considered synonymous with the island and its general population by practically everyone else. But there are more extreme examples of how spurious a yardstick colonial determination of borders can be in deciding such matters. For example Iraq - a country whose boundary was decided by a foreign power acting as colonist in all but name for reasons nothing to do with demography, ethnic or religious breakdown, historical regions of control, local feelings on the matter, or in fact anything except control of oil fields - is on very spurious ground indeed should it choose to adopt its present ex-colonial extent as indicative of "self" at all, no matter what the UN says. It will actually find it almost impossible to sell the concept even to the people within its apparent jurisdiction, and its post-Saddam governments' struggle to do so - despite almost universal support from the international community - has already caused untold misery and carnage within that artificially contrived "community".

The addition of "extreme and unremitting persecution" as a legal qualifier in terms of secession also serves only to further obfuscate any universal legal definition of the term. While blatant examples of this occur, there are even more examples of where this definition has been highly subjectively applied by secessionists within a state, often with only the most tenuous association with the reality of their situation, and even examples of where those doing the actual persecuting wish to employ that definition with themselves portrayed as the "victims" in effect to carve out an autonomous state in which they can actually pursue that activity even more.

For me the text ID quoted simply reaffirms what I said earlier - the term is a platitude with little or no application legally, most noticeably in relation to international law (which was once famously derided in the UN itself by a certain US secretary of state as the biggest "contradiction in terms" ever devised by mankind), but also within domestic and constitutional law itself when employed by one wannabe state to define its assumed "right" to govern itself.

In answer to your question, Nielsen, I would say that any argument predicated on a "universal right of self-determination" is a non-argument until it is then followed up with concrete assertions of territorial extent and the utilisation of very real means - politically or militarily - by which those assertions are then to be converted into reality. Not a valid argument in itself, in other words, and therefore not valid later either, no matter how many times it's asserted or repeated as justification for the ambition to declare autonomy or then to pursue it . And therefore with no consequences either as such per se, on exactly the same basis.

The actual methods whereby this vague platitudinous ideal is then put into practice however, regardless of what arguments were used to justify them, have very profound consequences indeed.

We have come very far away from our idiot and his village, I feel. However we have not departed too far from that idiot's logic perhaps - it abounds in any forced reasoning that uses the term "inalienable" when asserting matters of "determination", both of which run counter to observable reality, and neither of which have a place in international law concerning a right to self-governance, even when the "self" portion of the platitude has been accepted as a given and adopted as a matter of political expedience.

As the res idiot of Res Hist who comes and goes and  to whom as much as the immediate above is really interesting, I feel bound to proffer my latest can of worms. 
A baying mob is always of interest- and always alarming. Had, long ago a certain mob  not bayed for the release of Barabas then there would have been no  Jexit and perhaps no spread of his one piece of advice about loving one's neighbour. Not that many heeded such a difficult concept, of course, but the mob's choice had quite an impact. 
Of course nord will have a denouncing fit flutter here about that - but even if used as a literary device using the mob effect had impact that still resounds. Just thoughts.......

So now I had better get me coat and go travelling again. Regards. P.

Quasi-historical literary mobs seem to always behave "on cue" and help their surrounding narrative into a vital plot twist. Your example is a good one, as is the mob who allegedly insisted that Mark Antony put the crown on Caesar's noggin according to Plutarch, right back to Euripides' frequent use of the "ochlos" as an off-stage mob device who warned his quasi-historical heroes and heroines of the folly of pursuing their course of action (and were more often ignored than heeded, making one wonder why on earth they bothered).

In reality mobs are much scarier things entirely - even without the casual violence and complete idiocy which seems to be a hallmark of when human beings act spontaneously in unison, their sheer unpredictability and resistance to even elementary control by an authority acting with intelligence and reason seems to spark a very deep and instinctive dread in those who witness such an event in action, or worse, get caught up in one. The mob in full flight is the negation of every human tendency we know to be vital to our maintenance of the idea that we are empathetic, intelligent, reasonable beings when at our best. The real "mob" in action (such as around Seven Sisters after a North London derby) is a much more dynamic, viscerally terrifying primeval reliance on the medulla oblangata than any assembled rabble from literature answering simple multiple choice questions could hope to emulate. In fact they weren't even much of a mob in the story, were they? More of a rather crude audience survey sample organised by Pilate which - as these groups often do - let the producer down something rotten, though no doubt had a great day out all the same. Another one Monty Python got right, I'd say.

Nielsen, I have an acquaintance here from Kosovo whose remark one time on the subject of Kosovan nationality went something like: "We first became known to everyone outside of ourselves and our enemies when we became the Enclave of Kosovo according to the rest of the world. When we became targets of genocide then we became Kosovan nationals according to the rest of the world. Am I proud to be a Kosovan? I am at any rate glad not to be a dead Enclavian."

And yet what are we to make of a central character in a drama who prays for the vicious and stupid mob which has condemned him: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do"?

An enormous risk  the writer took with that ridiculous line - but it still echoes down the centuries. For some reason I'm reminded of Dostoevsky's The Grand Inquisitor and the mention in the preamble to the clip (below) of the crowd who are "confused by hope". Hope is perhaps a dangerous thing to offer to a mob. Not as funny as Life of Brian this, but worth watching if one is in reflective mood.



But getting back to the real world, or rather a film version of it - the Queen had to face down the London mob after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. Those of us who lived through the events of 1997 realised just how dangerous a time it was for the monarchy. This scene from the film, The Queen, was deleted, but Tony Blair's comment to his wife as they watch Elizabeth II's address to the nation - "That's how to survive" - is interesting I think.

A mob thread could be a good topic.

Temp wrote:

An enormous risk  the writer took with that ridiculous line - but it still echoes down the centuries.

Not as much of a risk as the same writers took with other chunks of that narrative. It is a pity however that it is this snappy one-liner which has tended to be remembered "down the centuries", mainly I assume due to some rather extensive plugging of the book over the years, and not rather better written examples of the same Stoic sentiment in less Twitter format. Marcus Aurelius, for example (no slouch when it came to writing things worth remembering down the centuries), addressed much the same issue in terms that referred to people interacting with people, rather than demigods taking a stand on the issue. His take on it referred to why he would be sad should the leader of his opponents in a civil war be killed or commit suicide before he could meet him, as then he would be deprived of ... " ... a great prize both of war and of victory, a prize such as no human being has ever yet obtained. And what is this prize? To forgive a man who has wronged one, to remain a friend to one who has transgressed friendship, to continue faithful to one who has broken faith."

He went on to explain why this was a prize, and not even a matter of choice for the virtuous person. And with no requirement that anyone worship him thereafter, or even in fact believe him, and certainly no sly or patronising inference that the other lad didn't really know what he was doing anyway so could be forgiven on that basis. But that's the difference between MA and JC, I've always found (besides one being real) - humility (and a great ability to keep his advice grounded in the real world).

But you see I don't believe Jesus of Nazareth ever did "demand" that people "worship" him. I remember something you said ages ago - can't remember the thread - about a friend of yours who declared to you that he would do anything to show his devotion to the Christ. You commented that your reply to your young friend was that Christ would probably advise immediate circumcision - in other words suggest that your friend become a good and devout Jewish man as he, Jesus of Nazareth, himself was. I've thought a lot about what you said and I think you were right.

As for Marcus Aurelius I am, as you know, a sincere and devoted fan of this great Roman. I have mentioned this before, but of M.A.'s equestrian statue in the Piazza Campidoglio in Rome Henry James has written that "in the capital of Christendom, the portrait most suggestive of a Christian conscience is that of a pagan emperor".

It is possible to admire both men, you know.

PS The "Twitter" etc. jibes are not worthy of you - and Oscar Wilde would disagree with you. Check out De Profundis.

Glad you're a fan of MA. He needs all the fans he can get these days - especially these days. He lacks a powerful organisation plugging his memoirs - that's the problem. Keep up the good work!

I get you on the "worship" thing - it really all depends what one means by "worship". The Jesus character is not taking any prisoners however when it comes how much belief and faith he expects his audience to invest in his (slightly wonky) philosophical assertions, and "through him" at that. He definitely goes on a bit more than once about the concept of reward in another dimension for virtue displayed in this one, which is all very well but doesn't really explain the "logos" of virtue at all. For that you have to go back to the original philosophical sentiments which are being expressed through a particularly Jewish filter in this narrative by suspiciously anonymous authors, or indeed to someone who expanded on these original sentiments in an intelligent, equally original and realistic way afterwards, like MA.

I like admire several people at once - and even ones who are in many ways mutually incompatible in terms of attitude, intelligence and even degrees of fictionality. So I've no problem with anyone "liking" "admiring" JC and MA at the same time. I probably have more of a problem with those who find them similar than those who understand the difference, if you know what I mean.

PS: Any sentiment which is distorted in meaning due to an imposed brevity is certainly not being served well by such brevity, except that it is easier to absorb and remember by those with short attention spans and no desire to actually comprehend things anyway. This however is the "Twitter" phenomenon in a nutshell, and is totally "worthy of me" to point out, or whatever. Wilde wouldn't know anyway - he was a Facebook type (read "Dorian Gray").

Priscilla wrote:

As the res idiot of Res Hist who comes and goes and  to whom as much as the immediate above is really interesting, I feel bound to proffer my latest can of worms. 
A baying mob is always of interest- and always alarming. Had, long ago a certain mob  not bayed for the release of Barabas then there would have been no  Jexit and perhaps no spread of his one piece of advice about loving one's neighbour. Not that many heeded such a difficult concept, of course, but the mob's choice had quite an impact. 
Of course nord will have a denouncing fit flutter here about that - but even if used as a literary device using the mob effect had impact that still resounds. Just thoughts.......

So now I had better get me coat and go travelling again. Regards. P.

Priscilla,

"So now I had better get me coat and go travelling again."

Travelling to where...not to there I presume...
http://historum.com/european-history/130703-decline-dechristianization-europe-coincidence.html


Dear Priscilla how much I esteem you for "leven in de brouwerij te brengen" (for bringing life in the brewery) (they translate it with the rather dull:) "living up" these boards, I couldn't resist to bring it up. It was stronger than my self ( than my mind)...
And I already said on this board, if nordmann had such pupils as overthere (not the docile ones from here) they would made him crazy...
Or is he stronger than that?

Kind regards from Paul.

PS: I would be glad that you came more from under your stone.

Paul wrote:

PS: I would be glad that you came more from under your stone.

Oi  - I'm the one with the stone, not Priscilla.

And I'm heading right back there now.

Still drifting away from the lone idiot towards the idocy of the mob ....

Until Pope John Paul II put a stop to it in 1996 it was theoretically possible for a Pope to be elected per acclamationem seu inspirationem, ie "by popular acclamation", ... the mob supposedly being inspired by the Holy Spirit to call out spontaneously and with one voice, the name of God's chosen candidate. It's certainly a quicker method than all that tedious conclave stuff about votes and coloured smoke.

Have there been many Popes elected that way?

Nah - he'd be all over Instagram posing in his natty suits with carnation.

Right, really am scuttling off now.

PS I said "admire" not "like", not that it matters.

EDIT: Apologies, MM - you have tried to get the thread back on track, I know. It's absolutely hopeless me trying to engage with nordmann - I always end up feeling totally idiotic and miserable. Six years here and I still keep on doing it. Stupid or what - and they let me vote.

Temperance wrote:

Paul wrote:

PS: I would be glad that you came more from under your stone.

Oi  - I'm the one with the stone, not Priscilla.

And I'm heading right back there now.

OOPS sorry dear Temperance.

"And I'm heading right back there now."

No Temperance, stay strong, strong as a rock (a stone)...we need you here to stimulate the discussions. Look at the data, it are always "your" discussions which generates the most public and reactions. That is also not nothing...or how the idiom in English may be...

Kind regards from your adherent Paul.

Meles meles wrote:

Have there been many Popes elected that way?

Seven, according to Wikipedia, the last being as recent as 1676 when Innocent XI was elected - however the "acclamation" was basically ordered by the French king of the day who had hitherto vetoed the guy's normal election on a few occasions and then, after striking a tax deal with the lad, decided he wanted him in office after all. Innocent (why are the worst ones always called "Innocent"?) is the one beloved of the more rabid modern day pro-lifers, the guy who first put souls into foetuses and thereby sanctioned the murder of family planning clinic workers to this day.

PS: Even "acclamations" follow a lengthy procedure of candidacy selection and "compromise" (where each candidate's good and bad points are weighed up). So hardly a real "mob", I'd say. Innocent's "acclamation", thanks to Louis sticking his oar in repeatedly, took about four years altogether.

Temp - I'll also change my "like" to "admire" so in my previous post's expressed sentiment  - it will still be true.

nordmann wrote:

PaulRyckier wrote:

First: did you mean with "platitude" the self-determination? And the word "platitude" is that to understand in the same sense as the French "platitude"?
Second: are you describing here: the "national narration, story"? The French have a splendid word for it: "le roman national" with "roman" in my humble opinion saying  : "the fictive novel"

A platitude in English means any apparently moralistic or highly principled statement which, upon examination, reveals little or no moral purpose or principle at all, either because it is trite (lost meaning through repetition) or because it was never semantically sound to begin with. The entire term "universal right of self-determination" falls within this definition.

Ireland's "roman national" is of course an obvious feature of the struggle to identify an idea of national "self" to which everyone can subscribe, yes. In Ireland's case however - and I am sure it must be true in many such cases - examination of the history of the actual "roman" over the centuries reveals that it too has had to be changed, sometimes drastically, to the extent that the characters, plot and tone of the story have all been revised so many times that it is now difficult to view it even as one story in continuous development, but rather a series of narratives which simply borrow elements from their predecessors while telling a completely different story each time. The fictional narrative of Irish history and "Irishness" that attracted revolutionary leaders such as the Protestant Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet in the late 18th century, for example, might be totally unrecognisable to more modern nationalist activists whose version of the narrative now actually includes these previous figures, though now serving a very different function than the one they might have envisaged they would play in any future version of the narrative when they chose to fight for autonomy for their "people".

PaulRyckier wrote:

"Note: Up until recently the present Irish constitution (Ireland has had two stabs at this) actually had, from its first acceptance by the majority in the then "Free State", an article that stated almost exactly this! Interestingly, even this has now been jettisoned (by referendum) as having less pragmatic political application than simply 'getting on with life'."

Perhaps because I am not that knowledgeable about Irish history I don't understand it at all.

The Irish constitution contained two articles which were little more than a revanchist claim on the state of Northern Ireland, or a bold statement of noble national aspiration, depending on who you spoke to - stating in defiance of political reality that the Free State of Ireland (later becoming a republic in the 1940s) referred to the entire island and that its right to (interpreted by many as actual "power of") jurisdiction extended to this entire territory. In 1999 this was thrown out by referendum and replaced with articles which dropped this assertion and simply stated that all those upon the island could describe themselves as members of an Irish Nation if they so wished, but only those within the border of the Republic were subject to that country's jurisdiction. This reflects the political reality of the divided island, and also accommodates those with aspirations to one day unite the two elements politically, but crucially no longer makes any territorial claim or asserts right of jurisdiction over any area or anyone not currently within that jurisdiction.

The present Irish Constitution was voted into existence in 1937. It replaced an earlier and quite unsatisfactory constitution adopted hastily by the original Free State government (and people by referendum) which emphasised only Ireland's right to draft its own laws, collect its own revenues etc, but contained little or no framework of principles within which just laws could be defined and guaranteed or, crucially at that particular time, no reference to Ireland's right to militarily defend its territory and prosecute foreign policy independent of Britain. It mirrored almost exactly a similar document adopted by Stormont as its basis, or "charter", of government (though never promoted within Northern Ireland to the status of a constitution). In fact, if Britain's current "unwritten constitution" was ever actually written down this is more or less what it would look like, a concentration on the assumed or delegated rights of its parliament within a broader power structure, with notable omission of reference to crucial policy areas decided by non-parliamentary or extra-parliamentary agencies of the state who have no responsibility to refer to or be accountable to the people at all, excepting of course the monarch who would most certainly be mentioned as retaining all these rights simply through the fact that they are the monarch and everyone else is their subject, including members of "her" or "his" parliament.

Without the 1937 constitution Ireland would have had difficulty adopting a position of neutrality, for example, during WWII - a contentious policy even today but one which probably did most to preserve Irish independence during the young state's early existence, one still very much defined in contrast to its earlier rulers who were satisfied that this "free state" was actually subject to dominion status all the same. Many formed the view at the time and since that de Valera's main motive in drafting and implementing a new constitution was simply to break all the last existing holds Britain had over crucial elements of the Free State's internal polity (which included, for example, an agreed continued use of naval bases within the Free State over which the Irish government still held no control at all), and this is partly correct. Its specific mention of the Catholic Church as the main source of religious morality is also highlighted as a dead give-away concerning the man's true intentions. However it is also true that his constitution was a vast improvement on that which it replaced and has been used on several occasions to curb the power and influence of certain groups within Irish society over policy which would work to the detriment of people's welfare, including it must be said the Catholic Church itself in more recent times.

On balance therefore it has proven its worth, one proof of its effectiveness being how little within it required to be altered to allow Ireland join the EEC and later adopt European Court rulings within its existing legislation. A constitution's job is not to legislate per se, but to state the bounds beyond which legislation should not extend and within which a procedure whereby legislation is enacted must adhere, and in this the Irish version has stood up well when tested against sometimes radical legal reform that has been required on occasion. A good recent example was the insertion of an article to allow same-sex marriage which required no removal of any other article to allow it to stand within the document - it simply defined marriage as a legal union between two people, regardless of their sex. This allowed an immediate review of marriage law based on previous constitutionality which would now be now unconstitutional (where law had specified gender in its wording), and hastened the introduction of a law allowing same-sex partners to get married.

de Valera might never have envisaged his document so readily accommodating such a development, which I am sure would have appalled the man. But it speaks volumes for the man's intelligence in insisting the constitution of which he was chief architect should always refrain from defining law itself.

Thank you very much nordmann. It is all clear now. And in the meantime I learned a lot about "constitutions".

Kind regards, Paul.

Islanddawn wrote:

A friend who has studied law has given me this in answer to 'the right to self determination' question. Rather interesting, and really does not apply to the Catalunya situation, it being an autonomous state, not being persecuted and not a colony.

There’s no doubt about the right to self-determination but the ignoramuses seem to know nothing about it. For a start, the “self-” means “not another country”. So we can see that the whole idea developed in modern international law out of colonialism, and it meant that the colony, and not the colonising state, had the right to decide what future it wanted. It has been applied post-1945 to mean just that. In other words, the principle of self-determination provides that the people of the colonially-defined territorial unit in question may freely determine their own political status. (Example: the Belgian Congo, and not Belgium, decided their own future in 1960.)

So the fundamental question is: is Catalonia a colony? According to the U.N.; no, absolutely not. Your answer may differ depending on your political perspective, but under international law there is only one possible answer.

So can self-determination be applied in other cases? Where else could it apply, if not in the case of a colony?

Does it apply to secession? The U.N. is crystal clear on this, and has always strenuously opposed any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country. The position is that (apart from for colonies) there is no right of self-determination that would justify secession. (Of course, there is no international legal duty to refrain from attempts at secession, but then the question is one of domestic law, rather than international law. Only when such a secession has proved successful does international law come into it.)

Could the break-up of a federal state, or a state with more than one recognised “nation” or “people” within that state, be considered valid with self-determination as a factor? Although pre-U.N. days, this was a supposed rationale behind the more or less forced dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example. Post-1945, we have the Soviet Union, which was a kind of consensual break-up, and Czechoslovakia, which definitely was. No problems there. Yugoslavia is more problematic, as “self-determination” was one of the reasons given by the EU for recognition. But by that time, certainly Slovenia had established itself as independent. Croatia is trickier.

Other interesting examples are East Timor and Quebec. The former was recognised as a distinct nation and entitled to self-determination, as it had been a colony and it was considered that it was then illegally occupied by Indonesia. On Quebec, we shall see, although any break-up is likely to be consensual, unlike in the Spanish case.

Further considerations by international and domestic courts have clearly come to the judgement that self-determination applies only to colonial situations (and situations of occupation etc.) and can only be applied to cases of secession where the nation or people in question is subject to “extreme and unremitting persecution” coupled with the “lack of any reasonable prospect for reasonable challenge”, but even this is controversial not least in view of difficulties of definition. In this case, we must ask whether the Catalans a nation, whether there is persecution, and whether there is no chance of change. All in all, we can say that the situation of secession is probably best dealt with in international law within the framework of a process of claim, effective control of territory and international recognition. Leave self-determination out of it.

You started an interesting message Islanddawn, I learned from it. And it sparked interesting comments from Nielsen and nordmann.
If I think now at the three Belgian "regions"...   The "Flemings" have already a "roman national"...is that enough?

Kind regards, Paul.

nordmann wrote:

Upgraded "like" to "admire" so as not to offend Temp.

And that was quite unnecessary too. You do not offend me; you simply exasperate. Priscilla surely made an interesting point, and you switch immediately to your default position of superior, dismissive contempt. I cannot understand your refusal to acknowledge the worth of any of the Jewish writings of the first century, all stuff put together by Jewish men (plus maybe the odd woman) who of course were influenced by Greek thought. Have I ever denied that? These writings, which were so concerned with the common man - all those village idiots and peasants (or mere slaves, as Nietzsche had it) - have arguably had more influence than anything MA - great man and thinker as he was - produced. Most people only know about Marcus Aurelius these days because he was good in Gladiator. I at least have tried to read and understand him. So yes, I will try to "keep up the good work" (as you so sarcastically put it) in my struggles to understand the ideas and viewpoints of many different thinkers. It's not a struggle I intend to give up any day soon.

Village idiots, peasants, slaves - and contempt for those members of society. Things haven't changed much. As least Jesus of Nazareth was prepared to die in his stance against the corrupt and powerful of his day. Madman or fool in his concern for the idiots? Or just a figment, not worth bothering with at all? You tell me. I just wish once in a while you would acknowledge - and respect - the greatness of the writings, even if the anonymous "they" did make it all up. That's why I mentioned Wilde - who described Christ as the "artist-hero" of the Gospels. I put all that on the Elizabeth I and Heirs thread (God knows how we got to discussing Wilde there - you started it, I think) - a point which you simply ignored and the thread promptly died.

Which this one will no doubt now do.

Monday morning, not 9.00am yet, and I'm already fuming and rambling incoherently about it all. Time to take my blood pressure tablet and shut up.

Temp wrote:

Priscilla surely made an interesting point, and you switch immediately to your default position of superior, dismissive contempt.

I think that's a quite self-serving use of the word "contempt" - as the person accused of being contemptuous I can assure you that nothing could be further from my mind or my intentions (contemptible I may be but "contemptuous" rarely).

Besides the philosophical/theological import of Priscilla's interesting point, it unfortunately rested on a definition of the "mob" which up to now in the discussion had been intentionally disregarded as it is quite a distance from the concept you yourself had introduced and which, out of courtesy I might add (hardly the action of a "contemptuous" person), I at least had intended to adhere to.

I am not sure by the way that you are altogether correct in the inference contained within this statement:

Quote :

These writings, which were so concerned with the common man - all those village idiots and peasants (or mere slaves, as Nietzsche had it) - have arguably had more influence than anything MA - great man and thinker as he was - produced.

While I acknowledge you have quite rightly (in my view) inserted a judicious "arguably" in the sentence, when it comes to discussing influence of philosophical thought on subsequent generations it is better to steer clear of assigning too much credit to individual authors, except of course in those very rare cases where an original concept is indisputably assigned to a single innovator. This is not the case with either the philosophical content of the New Testament or indeed of Marcus Aurelius's surviving texts. Both are interpretations of received philosophical concepts and their understood precepts, one very much a religious interpretation (and therefore prone to rather subjective adoption of sometimes quite contradictory concepts and indeed precepts - a fault of theology in every manifestation of the thing) and one very much a structured interpretation closely following the in-built rules of a particular philosophy - in MA's case "stoicism" - the strict adherence to which renders them at the same time more comprehensible to the audience but also therefore easier to disregard based on any contained precept being demonstrably unworkable (stoicism contains several such, as does any strictly defined Greek philosophical "school" of thought). This is the fault within philosophy which renders it easily bowdlerised, redacted regardless of context and basically cherry-picked when adopted within a theology.

If the values you find expressed in both the New Testament and Marcus Aurelius's writings appeal to you (as they often do me), then for my part I would tend to investigate their appeal based on true origin - not just to find out who may have really originated them but to find out why their appeal survives, and indeed survived to the point where either of the sources named above could avail of them to prosecute admittedly quite different intentions in recording them at all.

There is really no reason to feel "exasperated" when a discussion veers off into an interesting aside which itself raises an issue worthy of debate, even if the aside on which you voluntarily venture then produces strong opposition from someone else also joining you on the detour. However the rules of debate and intelligent inquiry should still apply, I reckon. These include not actually contemptuously dismissing anybody as "contemptuously dismissive" for a start, and also in discussions such as this one acknowledging some ground rules which - I suggest - should include how far into fictional narratives we wish to agree to go in order to provide examples of human behaviour, especially when up to that point the discussion had managed to remain within actual historical instances and people as a source of examples etc. When one person suddenly adopts that liberty without warning it does tend to stymie, or at least seriously interrupt, the flow of reason within any discussion. This is when such discussions are inclined to veer into misunderstandings, and when these misunderstandings prompt emotional and often unjustified responses on the part of one or more of those engaged in the discussion.

In rhetoric classes as conducted by Aristotle while teaching Alexander such deviations which broke the rules of debate and threatened descent into disjointed thought and expression were indicated by the teacher with a sharp rap on the student's knuckles, or at least so it was reported (the only person to assault the young brat with impunity, I think is the point of the story). In these more enlightened times I do not suggest we assault each other with rulers in a frenzy of rhetoric correction, but I would request that we refrain from contempt, either as an accusation or in making such an accusation. Wilde would have approved, or at least he would have before the harsh reality of life demonstrated to him that brutish thought and behaviour will always assume it can outrank wit. I choose to stick with the earlier Wilde, not the broken one (though like you I am a great admirer of "De Profundis" for its honesty and - well - profundity, I still prefer the equally deep insights regarding human behaviour more subtly communicated through his plays and prose).

Oh, well done -  that's certainly put me in my place, hasn't it? That reply is worthy of a proper-posh English aristocrat: such a brilliantly icy put-down, couched in exquisitely polite and educated language - and not in the least bit dismissive or contemptuous, of course. But you do bring out the worst in people at times: unfortunately I now feel I would derive enormous satisfaction from bashing you over the head with a large ruler - but that is an admission hardly indicative of an intelligent or rational person, so I had better withdraw from this discussion and go and have a cup of tea and a biscuit.

I have metaphorically removed the tricorn and periwig and await the large ruler, ma'am.

First time I have been compared to an English aristocrat and I am both terrified and discombobulated, I must admit. Even a tea and biscuit sounds posh to the likes of me ...

Which reminds me, I must tell you the story about my polio vaccine when 6 months old some time, you'll be pleasantly surprised (once you get down from the rather lofty dudgeon on which you're precariously perched at the minute).

Temperance,

"Monday morning, not 9.00am yet, and I'm already fuming and rambling incoherently about it all. Time to take my blood pressure tablet and shut up."
"already fuming and rambling incoherently about it all"
Dear Temperance you have to read once this on Historum...
I can't be sure about the consequences if nordmann would be overthere...
http://historum.com/european-history/130703-decline-dechristianization-europe-coincidence.html
And after seven years keep up the good work...
And BTW when nordmann was away you asked urgently for his return to have once a chat again with him about that stuff and all...
I really enjoy the discussions between the two of you...and in the meantime I learn a lot...

Kind regards from Paul, your brother in spirit, mind, soul

Paul wrote:

And BTW when nordmann was away you asked urgently for his return to have once a chat again with him about that stuff and all...

I know; I know; I know. He is our answer to Socrates, after all - although he prefers to see himself as Aristotle, I think.

As the Wise Ones put it:

Yes, Socrates himself is particularly missed; A lovely little thinker, but a bugger when he's pissed.

nordmann,

thank you very much for your aristocratic replies to Temperance.

In the meantime I learn each day some new English words as: bowdleri(z)ed, stymie, periwig...
Also "discombobulate"
It was not in my Collins paperback dictionary...and I found out on internet that it is not English but American...shame on you nordmann for an Irish Norwegian  ...or did you during all your itineraries picked it up in the US somewhere...

Kind regards from Paul.

Despite recent accusations, Paul, I am not a snob and most definitely not an aristo- anything (particularly never an Aristobulus, as Temp will verify). My view is; if the Americanism fits it is never beneath me to wear it, especially if on my head so be it.

PS. I think you will find that in its original American manifestation it was "discombobricate". It had an epiphany of sorts while crossing the Atlantic and ended up transfigured slightly. Temp would probably have been impressed.

nordmann wrote:

Despite recent accusations, Paul, I am not a snob and most definitely not an aristo- anything (particularly never an Aristobulus, as Temp will verify). My view is; if the Americanism fits it is never beneath me to wear it, especially if on my head so be it.

PS. I think you will find that in its original American manifestation it was "discombobricate". It had an epiphany of sorts while crossing the Atlantic and ended up transfigured slightly. Temp would probably have been impressed.

Thank you very much nordmann for your explanation, and as usual I can bring nothing in to your erudite and logical reply.
That of the "aristo" was a bit plotting together with Temperance . And I agree it is not worth of me .

Cheers   from Paul.

nordmann wrote:

 Despite recent accusations, Paul, I am not a snob and most definitely not an aristo- anything (particularly never an Aristobulus, as Temp will verify).

I am now wondering which of the various Aristoboluses (sp?) nordmann isn't.

Aristobulus or Aristoboulos may refer to:

Aristobulus I (died 103 BC), king of the Hebrew Hasmonean Dynasty, 104–103 BC
Aristobulus II (died 49 BC), king of Judea from the Hasmonean Dynasty, 67–63 BC
Aristobulus III of Judea (53 BC–36 BC), last scion of the Hasmonean royal house
Aristobulus IV (31 BC–7 BC), Prince of Judea, son of Herod the Great and Mariamne, married Berenice, father of Agrippa I
Aristobulus Minor, son of the above, brother of Agrippa I
Aristobulus of Chalcis
Aristobulus of Alexandria (c. 160 BC), Hellenistic Jewish philosopher
Aristobulus of Cassandreia (375 BC–301 BC), Greek historian and engineer, accompanied Alexander the Great on his campaigns
Aristobulus of Britannia, one of the Seventy Disciples, brother of Barnabas

This Greek chap is perhaps the most likely to have been nordmann in a previous existence - Aristobulus of Cassandreia (375 BC–301 BC), Greek historian and engineer, accompanied Alexander the Great on his campaigns.

To be serious, I did not call you a snob, and the word "accusation" is also too emotive. Snobs think they are superior when they are not. You clearly are superior in intellect, grasp of current affairs and ability to express yourself. The true snob simply reveals his or her insecurity: such people need to impress. That is not what I was suggesting about you: in fact, if the truth be known, I am probably more of a snob than you are.  "Aristo" is also inappropriate - too Frenchified - and reminds one of the worst excesses of the French revolution (but then again the Frenchified version - see end of post* - is perhaps not so inappropriate). The English upper class, usually educated at Eton and Oxbridge, was really what I meant. These immensely superior folk (the ones who actually deserve to get into Oxford or Cambridge, that is) are not necessarily of the aristocratic caste but, witty and intelligent and confident as they are, can be so horribly and so effectively rude, but always in the politest way - it's an art form for them. Their comments, delivered in their beautifully modulated voices, can be devastating. It's a peculiarly English class thing, so perhaps you and others here will not understand. And, you see, I think all this actually does relate to Paxman and his careless remark about the village idiots of this world - or global village idiots as we are now. Paxman is no aristocrat, but he is public school and Cambridge.

My reaction yesterday was, ironically, exactly that of a member of the unfortunate class (the idiots) with whom I - no doubt foolishly - have identified and sympathised all my life. You see, I had tried to express an opinion, albeit in a disjointed way (disjointed was fair comment), but apparently only succeeded in not only showing my complete ignorance of the rules of polite and intelligent debate, but also - what is possibly worse - apparently also revealed that I simply did not know what I was talking about. This accusation of course may well be true - probably is. But it is never nice to have one's ignorance pointed out by someone of superior intellect - although, in fairness to you, your response could have been unkinder. But I have enough intelligence to appreciate that I was not being intelligent enough, if you see what I mean. Therefore the reply stung. So how did I react? I went into my default mode of laughing at myself (and everyone else), but was sorely tempted - yet again - to give up, shrug my shoulders and abandon further discussion. The other option was, humiliated, to lash out - which is not my style.

But, on reflection, I found my own reaction interesting (well, I would, wouldn't I?), because it revealed where, in my opinion, the likes of Paxman all go terribly wrong with people - and where a very real danger lies. Apathy or violence as a reaction when one's ideas are rejected as being not up to scratch? Most village idiots who feel that their opinions are not valued or listened to and that there is little respect for what they - however clumsily - are trying to express do just go apathetic and give up any further attempt to think or discuss. As long as there is a minimal allowance of bread on offer, and as long as the circuses still get beamed into their living rooms, they will not get too troublesome or turn really nasty on us.

But God help us when the idiots decide they really have had enough of being put down and ignored; and when perhaps an opportunistic and disgruntled wannabe Alexander - but without that young man's education - presents himself as the one to lead the unhappy and resentful idiots towards a happier tomorrow. Not some ageing buffoon playing to the crowd, but a dangerous, clever, charismatic, undisciplined narcissist who is completely without scruple.

There are precedents in history, I think? It is very unwise to upset the nation's idiots too much. Didn't Machiavelli say that, although it is acceptable for a ruler (or ruling élite) to be feared rather than loved (although feared and loved is the best bet), it is political suicide for a ruler - or a leadership class - to make himself/itself simply hated? Calling people idiots - or treating them like idiots - can trigger that ugliest of all emotions. Mobs and Revolutions* would make a good thread.

What we need are leaders of integrity who will offer a genuine vision for the future to all members of our society - one where everyone matters and is valued. But that no doubt is a naïve - childlike - dream. Most definitely the triumph of hope over experience, but surely once we lose that hope we are utterly lost.


EDIT: Paul - very amused by your use of the word "plot" - reminds me of one of my favourite lines from Wolf Hall: the reference to the Plantagenets "plotting in the shrubbery". I'm off to my shrubbery now.

Have modified post above - still not sure it explains what what I'm trying to say - but this version will have to do. I nearly deleted the whole lot, but that would have been cowardly.

Temperance,

now you are really at your best...and what a superb English language...at least in my eyes of a Dutch speaking Belgian...

Kind regards from Paul.

nordmann wrote:

Leaving the EU involved an arbitrary consultation conducted via plebiscite but without any constitutional requirement regarding why and how this should be done, and what should be done as a result of the plebiscite.

The use of the word plebiscite on this thread is significant. It’s a word which seems to have fallen out of favour in recent years to have been replaced by referendum.

The original plebiscita were pieces of legislation which had been passed by the concilium plebis (the plebeian assembly) of ancient Rome and their terms only applied to the plebeian class. The modern concept of a plebiscite as a general public vote on a major issue, however, only really stems from the 1790s and revolutionary France. In order to bolster its credentials, the republican regime in Paris would organise consultative plebiscites on such things as the constitutions of 1795 and 1799 and also border polls in places such as Avignon, Nice, Savoy, Piedmont, Geneva and other Swiss cantons, Alsace, the Rhineland and various states of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). Those polls were essentially organised (or orchestrated) in order to provide an element of de jure validity to their de facto annexation by France.

A series of similar border plebiscites were held in western Europe during the 19th century mainly relating to Italian and German unification during the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s. But there were also some held further afield such the Britain’s ceding of the Ionian Islands to Greece and Denmark’s ceding of the Virgin Islands to the U.S. Similarly Sweden’s ceding of St Bartholomew to France in the 1870s was confirmed by plebiscite as was Chile’s annexation of Arica in the 1880s.

There was a whole flurry of plebiscites held after the First World War mainly relating to settling Germany’s new borders and again a few held following the Second World War on the same issue. Since then the word ‘plebiscite’ has fallen out of use with ‘referendum’ being the preferred substitute. This change of usage, however, is linguistically clumsy and is often imprecise. The 2 words are not necessarily interchangeable. Intriguingly, in Northern Ireland Sinn Fein’s call for a ‘border poll’ (i.e. not a referendum) to be held in Northern Ireland within the next five years (presumably to coincide with the 100th anniversary of partition) shows that there is an awareness in some quarters that the word ‘referendum’ can be problematic.
   
With regard to the UK’s referenda on the European question, then the 1975 referendum was in fact rightly named. In fact it was a case of a plebiscite which was also a referendum. The accession to the European Economic Community was a de facto and de jure done deal as confirmed by parliament and the referendum merely put the accompanying public debate to bed in the form of a plebiscite. This it effectively did for half a generation. When the European question re-emerged in the 1990s (there was even a political party at the time named the Referendum Party) the then UK prime minister John Major rejected the idea of a referendum and characterised such an exercise as ‘the tool of the dictator’. The 2016 ‘referendum’, however, wasn’t a referendum at all. It was a non-binding plebiscite which at best can be described as an official, state-sponsored opinion poll.

Returning to the plebiscites of the 1790s, then those held in Belgium on union with France make for interesting case studies. Of all the territories occupied by French forces at that time, Liège was probably the most sympathetic to the ethos of the republican Convention in Paris. Not only that but Liège did not even feel itself to be an integral part of Belgium as exemplified in the contemporary use of the term ‘la Belgique et le pays de Liège’.
   
The Paris Convention had hoped for results from the Belgian communes (including Liège) for ‘union prononcée sans retour et sans condition’ i.e. unqualified and unconditional union with France.  This, however, turned out not to be the case – not even for the Liègeois. There were in fact plenty of qualifications, clarifications and conditions requested by those eligible to take part in the plebiscites.

The first of these conditions related to the very qualifications under which eligibility to take part in the plebiscite had been established. It had originally been declared by Paris that all officials of the former Austrian regime in Belgium would be excluded from taking part in the plebiscites. This condition alone was deemed unreasonable and even unworkable by many middle-class Belgians (even those sympathetic to the revolution) as it essentially described the generality of them. They were also keenly aware that the urban working class and rural labourers (including village idiots) might well be inclined to be much more conservative minded regarding public affairs than might be lawyers, doctors and other members of the professional classes. This qualification was then changed so that former officials could vote provided they took an oath of liberty and equality and renounced their privileges and prerogatives - ‘sans avoir prêté le serment à la liberté et à l’égalité, et sans avoir renoncé par écrit aux privilèges et prérogatives’. And even this criterion was then dropped.

Another qualification which was requested related to the right to raise local taxes which the Convention had initially wanted to abolish and to centralise in Paris. This too was deemed impractical by the Belgians not least because the pay of many local officials had already been a devolved matter under the Austrians. And then there was the question of currency union. Even the Liègeois had sought clarification on this ‘que le papier monnaye ou assignats de la République française n'aura point d'effet rétroactif’. They basically wanted to ensure that there would be no back-dating of the effect of currency union so as avoid penalising Belgian banks and depositors with a potentially unfavourable exchange rate.

So an almost comical picture emerges. Firstly we get the invading French revolutionaries making all kinds of dramatic and extreme declarations regarding liberté and égalité etc including chilling threats against those who oppose union with France as being guilty of being unfriendly towards the French people ‘ne vouloir être amis du peuple français’ and who would thus be treated accordingly as befitting those who refuse to adopt government based on liberty and equality ‘qui refusent d'adopter ou se donner un gouvernement fondé sur la liberté et l’égalité’. Let’s remember that this was in 1793 when the Terror in France was at its height. And yet the response of the Belgian bourgeoisie is altogether phlegmatic and even patronising. One gets the impression that the French commissioners in Belgium are treated like so many over-excitable adolescents by the Belgians with the latter basically saying “tiens, tiens, mes petits, that’s all very well and rather admirable of you but now let’s discuss the practicalities and the detail.” The commissioners were left sending desperate messages back to Paris unsure of how to proceed with the replies coming back from Georges Danton and Pierre-Joseph Cambon etc in the Convention saying that the commissioners should basically agree to any demands made by the Belgians but just make sure the plebiscites produce the right result. Even under these circumstances there still wasn’t unanimity. In the province of Hainault, for example, 300 communes voted for union with France while 30 communes voted against. Even with 90% voting in favour, the fact that 10% voted against stuck in the craw of the commissioners who sought to massage the figures further by saying that, of those 30 dissenting communes, some had abstained while most dissenters had, nevertheless, stated an adherence to the wishes of the unionist majority leaving only ‘a very small number’ voting against union - ‘un très petit nombre sur les 30 a émis un voeu contraire à la réunion’.
   
It seems that the liberal and republican element among the Belgian bourgeoisie were quick to appreciate that the revolutionary French needed them a lot more than they needed the revolutionary French. As far as union with France was concerned, from a Belgian point of view at that time, it was pretty much a buyers’ market.

I remember Major's comment, Vizzer. He was in fact simply echoing Thatcher before him, who previously had also called referendums "a device of dictators and demagogues", and she in turn was in fact quoting Attlee. All of them will have pointed to fascist use of referendums to apparently endorse seizure of power in the first half of the 20th century to support this rather sweeping summary of what is a concept as understood elsewhere obviously well beyond the intellectual grasp of most British politicians. And this is not surprising - a referendum in Britain does not mean quite the same thing as in constitutional democracies and in fact all three of the above were quite correct to equate one in a British context with earlier misuse of the plebiscite in other countries. These countries at the time were also in the process of dismantling their constitutions to nefarious ends and wished to give their actions the veneer of democracy while they were at it. In a country without a written constitution there is in fact nothing even to dismantle and a referendum is almost by definition whatever anyone wants it to be at any particular moment - which when you think about is not too dissimilar in fact from the earlier fascist interpretation. In that sense all three prime ministers were bang on the money, at least when describing the political milieu in which they themselves operated.

When Major made the comment I recall quite a few eyebrows being raised outside of Britain - not least in Ireland where the same government of John Major was well into a process in which the plebiscite in the form of referendum was about to play a huge role in advancing a permanent peace deal between the antagonistic parties in Northern Ireland. At that point in what was called the "peace process" nothing of any real import with regard to a lasting cessation of violence had been officially agreed, though in the background there was quite a lot of frenetic diplomatic activity which was throwing some rather unlikely combinations of negotiators together in safe houses, back rooms, and - though everyone denied it at the time - even in Whitehall. At one point in one of these clandestine meetings a Sinn Féin delegation (ostensibly representing the Provisional IRA though all involved knew what this really meant) sat across from Major, his NI and Home Secretaries, and several senior civil servants while they patiently explained to them what a plebiscite actually was. According to Martin McGuinness he found himself (a "terrorist" according to those he was facing) in the odd position of having to explain to the British contingent present (all committed democrats) how, if the armalite was to be removed from the picture, it would have to be replaced by something quite a bit more solid in terms of representation and constitutional guarantee than what passed for such in "mainland" Britain - "rule by decree" is a term of contempt often used by republicans to summarise the British political process and it was important that Major & Co understand that anything that smacked of this just wasn't going to be feasible in the context of negotiating a ceasefire and a meaningful political solution. His explanations were falling on deaf ears, British eyes were glazing over, and McGuinness reckoned he was talking to people who distrusted constitutional procedure almost as much as they distrusted him and his fellow negotiators, until he hit upon the idea of recruiting backup for his argument. A call was made to the then deputy leader of the DUP, Peter Robinson - whose party at that time was very much opposed to any British government deal with republicans on any grounds whatsoever and who were even unofficially endorsing a recent UDA "plan" to jettison some areas of the North, "devolve" the remainder as a "Protestant state" and to "expel" or (rather sinisterly) "nullify" any Catholics remaining in the rump state - and McGuinness actually asked his arch enemy to please explain to the British Prime Minister the role of a plebiscite in any democracy, and especially one with such a divided community that required something more than ministerial endorsement to believe any negotiated measure represented progress any longer. Robinson - who also knew full well that further imposition by Westminster of political "solutions", no matter how well meant, could no longer cut the mustard in a Northern Irish context duly obliged, Major acknowledged that both communities in Northern Ireland would require access to plebiscite to advance any initiative (even if he was still very dubious as to why), and so the talking could go on.

Temp wrote:

This Greek chap is perhaps the most likely to have been nordmann in a previous existence - Aristobulus of Cassandreia (375 BC–301 BC), Greek historian and engineer, accompanied Alexander the Great on his campaigns.

I'd forgotten about him! Actually I reckon that particular Aristobulus was an extraordinary lick-arse of the highest order, so maybe I'll pass on your kind offer of including him in my previous incarnations, I reckon.

This from Livius:

Yet, we can be confident that Aristobulus was among Alexander's greatest admirers, because when there is more than one story about the same event, Aristobulus usually gives the kinder version. For example, all authorities agree that Alexander was a heavy drinker, but Aristobulus explains that this was merely because he loved to be with his friends. And when a drunken Alexander killed Clitus, Aristobulus says that it was Clitus' own mistake. Another example: Ptolemy writes that Alexander ordered Callisthenes, who had criticized him in public, to be crucified, and Aristobulus says that the man died in prison.

Sounds like a pretty sensible bloke to me. "Lick-arse" (what a dreadful expression) or canny survivor?

I wonder what happened to him?

PS Just looked him up in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (which must be right) and it says he was eccentric and lived to "old age" - seventy-six - and had a cushy job supervising repairs to old tombs. Also he had time to scribble stuff about history. What could be better?

Temperance wrote:

Sounds like a pretty sensible bloke to me. "Lick-arse" (what a dreadful expression) or canny survivor?

I wonder what happened to him?

PS Just looked him up in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (which must be right) and it says he was eccentric and lived to "old age" - seventy-six - and had a cushy job supervising repairs to old tombs. Also he had time to scribble stuff about history. What could be better?

If Old Ari was around today he would no doubt be writing entries in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, I reckon, so no surprise there. His "histories" - as far as we know from others who quoted them - amounted to a series of "Alexander? A spoiled drunken psychopathic brat? No, no, in fact he was always soooo nice to me ..." statements, which even back then must have raised a wry smile - in fact that's normally why they were ever quoted at all.

More to the point can democracy survive free speech combined with the ignorance, idiocy and gullibility of many people. Or can Facebook for that matter.