I mentioned in the Daily Diaries forum to LiR that I read during vacation:

Seapower States. Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World.
https://www.amazon.com/Seapower-States-Maritime-Continental-Conflict/dp/0300230044
by Andrew Lambert
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Lambert
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/29/book-review-seapower-states-by-andrew-lambert/

I was very interested in the book and learnt a lot, but still have as usual some critical questions. I hope nordmann will join me and put his masterly knowledge behind my attempt to understand the book.

As I understand it Andrew Lambert makes a difference between real seapowers and landward looking powers with an hegemonic nearly dictatorial guiding looking for continental empires.

So the five real seapowers he describes are Athens, Carthago, Venice, the Dutch Republic and England.

Athens declined, again as I understand it, when it sought for territorial hegemony forgetting its trade protection as its first priority?

Carthago was a real seapower, with all the cultural characterisitic, that Andrew Lambert sees as different from Rome etc, the landpowers, even if they had a big fleet.

Venice had the same characteristics as the two before and declined only while it as a relative small power against the combination of the landpowers. Up to then it was able to make a judged alliance once with one and once with another to play the several against each other.
Some forebode of the English policy on the continent? Or was that just keeping the balance of power on the continent?

And yes I recognize in Venice also the history of the Dutch Republic, the fourth example in the book.
I discussed with LiR the brutal murder (Temperance if you speak about the picture you just mentioned) The brothers DeWitt were really mutilated by the mobs.
https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/SK-A-15



But as I perhaps already explained to LiR it was the last stage and hardly needed by the Stadholder William (the later William III of Britain (or was it still England, Vizzer?))

It was the end of the struggle between the Orange dynasty looking for an old fashioned king related power and the stadtholderless period of DeWitt...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Stadtholderless_period

And as I understand it that is the core of the Andrew Lambert thesis:
A real "seapower" has another more liberal structure based on capitalism and merchant's class, where the priority is trade and the gaining of money and protecting the trade routes to keep the trade going and not interested in territorial landgrab.

As Venice, it was the victim of the big landpowers. The greedy Louis XIV, who was not content with that merchant nation, that damaged his own mercantile Colbert trade. In the "year of disaster" of 1672, the Republic was confronted with the agression of the Louis XIV France. With its long landborder and its small land army it was not withstand to the big French armies. and that was the chance for the future King William III of England to play his role and come on the foreground supported by the rather moblike Orangists against the proponents of the seapower and the undogmatic Republic: the brothers DeWitt.
And indeed they had I think underestimated the Louis XIV with a complete other cultural view and neglected the land army. The question is, could they have done both? Seemingly well, as the future William III did it, with creating the new model Dutch army.
I remember from the discussions with Tim of Aclea that to be honest William III had indeed a lot of merits, perhaps not that much for Holland anymore after 1688, as he preferred to act for England. But nevertheless on the period before he was the leading figurehead to protect the Republic.

I will in an apart message comment the fifth seapower England and the in my eyes controversial comments of Andrew Lambert about the role of the US in the decline of Britain. (again if I understood it well. I will reread the chapter).

Kind regards, Paul.

Paul : I suggest that real seapowers also seek to prevent rivals controlling the choke points their tade passes through, and perhaps those places that threaten their trade ()and their ports). It was long a tenet of British (and earlier of English) policy that no hostile power should be allowed to hold the Scheldt estuary. My own suspicion is that rather than "protecting gallant little Belgium" was the main rationale for entering WWI.

And further to George's comment above, it could well be argued that British support for the actual creation of the Belgian state in the first place (in 1831) was also in direct pursuance of this same policy. Belgium on its creation was made a non-aligned state - non-aligned that is other than with Britain, since Belgium's first king, Leopold I, had been a British citizen and originally married to Princess Charlotte, second in line to the British throne after her father the Prince Regent. The formation of Belgium thereby created a British-aligned buffer between France and the Netherlands - thereby blocking any territorial aims those two states might have had over the region - whilst at the same time setting them against each other in their hopes and desires.

Green George wrote:

Paul : I suggest that real seapowers also seek to prevent rivals controlling the choke points their tade passes through, and perhaps those places that threaten their trade ()and their ports). It was long a tenet of British (and earlier of English) policy that no hostile power should be allowed to hold the Scheldt estuary. My own suspicion is that rather than "protecting gallant little Belgium" was the main rationale for entering WWI.

 
Of course every seapower do that in the same way , even the Phoenicians did it, as example Carthago.

https://www.the-map-as-history.com/European-colonization-19th-20th-centuries/British-Empire-construction

And yes the opening of the Scheldt after the seccession of Belgium from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, was quite a dispute for the great powers, where Britain of course played the main role, especially against France and yes a lot of years later again against the German Empire.
The discussion about the toll from Belgium to the Netherlands, was also an item on which the English wanted to keep a close eye.
See from page 251 on:
http://www.vliz.be/nl/open-marien-archief?module=ref&refid=200920&printversion=1&dropIMIStitle=1
 
I see that on the map of the "chokepoints" of the British Empire Antwerp  is not mentioned, but I think in the short youtube, it are more the "colonial" chokepoints that are pointed too. Antwerp was also important for Britain" but Belgium was part of "civilized" countries and in the Sixties (19th C) Belgium was the fourth most powerfull economy of the world. Perhaps had the Brits let it to the French it owuld have been worser?
 
I am perhaps now precomment my next message that I promised. But I think Andrew Lambert is too old-fashioned, when he calls China (if I understood it well?) not a seapower or whatever, as I think that the "connotation" of seapower is passed in the nowadays world.
China has all the characteristics of the former British empire with its maritime strongpoints allover the world and indeed his "silk route" overland. But in my opinion in a world of global trading, the oceans are also "territory" (for instance with the 200 miles zone"). And so China is again the empire of the Middle in the global "territory" "surface" of the world as is the US, Japan, or Bresil or India. or Europe if it once! united...

https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/083964-021-A/le-dessous-des-cartes-mer-de-chine-bataille-navale/
I see each week this interesting quarter of an hour on ARTE.

Kind regards, Paul.

Meles meles wrote:

And further to George's comment above, it could well be argued that British support for the actual creation of the Belgian state in the first place (in 1831) was also in direct pursuance of this same policy. Belgium on its creation was made a non-aligned state - non-aligned that is other than with Britain, since Belgium's first king, Leopold I, had been a British citizen and originally married to Princess Charlotte, second in line to the British throne after her father the Prince Regent. The formation of Belgium thereby created a British-aligned buffer between France and the Netherlands - thereby blocking any territorial aims those two states might have had over the region - whilst at the same time setting them against each other in their hopes and desires.

 
Indeed MM, Britain was on every moment anxious for the influence of France, even if Napoleon had lost the Waterloo battle and be defeated after his 100 days.

It seems as I read it that many Englishman afterwards had still high esteem for him. After all it hadn't been a Hitler. And, and that is perhaps also a prove of what Andrew Lambert calls a seapower, Britain did need  but rest on the continent. If France was contained,still a big power even after the defeat, it would be quiet on the European front.
 
I still wonder, why none of the great powers saw the danger of the Prussian kingdom? Half of the population of the later Kaiserreich of 1871 and militaristic.
With the unification it was nearly only Prussia, which started via Wilhelm II the way to WWI.

And yes the Brits were right. Continuously that defeated France was lurking in the diplomatic arena via the talented and sly Talleyrand to gain again a bit of the former glory. Even the new poor little Belgium was the victim of all that. If it wasn't due to Britain, which as I said was rightly afraid of France.

First the sly Talleyrand  attempted to lurr the great powers into a division of the new Belgium, with some fat chunks for both Britain and Prussia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talleyrand_partition_plan_for_Belgium

And yes that's the tricky wikipedia
"Consequences:
The Talleyrand plan was rejected by European powers, who ultimately approved a unified Belgian state. However, the Talleyrand plan was one of several ideas exploring the concept of partitioning Belgium, which is considered by some as simply a "buffer state" between France and other European nations. Modern proposals include the specific separation of the areas inhabited mainly by French-speakers (Walloons) from those inhabited mainly by (Flemish) Dutch-speakers; but one difficulty in this proposal is that francophone Brussels lies within Flanders, not Wallonia."
 
I see that it is written in American English, but perhaps it can be written by an Englishman writing for an American public?
And yes there is nowadays, you don't believe it, an association for the independence of Wallonia with which I had already trouble. "groupuscules" (I hope that the interested one don' t read my prose   )  as those for a ratachemment with France (here in the Flemish region, we have also such "groupuscules" as the movement for the incorporation of French-Flanders (now in France and in the time "picked" by Louis XIV    )
So far for the above paragraph of the wiki    ...



And yes, once our little Belgium secured by Britain, that francophile Belgian Congress asked for a French duke, the son of the French king. Again Britain had to interfere.

https://www.beyond-history.com/en/english-beyond-history-blog/article/2017/07/21/why-a-german-became-the-first-king-of-the-belgians/


"Afterwards the son of the new French king Louis-Philippe I, Louis, Duke of Nemours, was considered but wouldn’t do either. Great Britain as well as the Belgian prime minister were against it, because they feared that France might take over Belgium."
The Brits pressed Louis, Duke of Nemours...

"A much better fit was Leopold, prince of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld (from 1826 onwards prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha) who was born in Coburg on 16 December 1790. The widower of the British heiress to the throne had family as well as friendly contacts not only to Great Britain but also Russia and France. Furthermore, as a protestant he was able to act as a counterbalance to the Catholic Church. He was asked to be King of Greece in 1830, but declined in favor of the Belgian crown."

Yes that Léopold! Prince of Saxe Coburg Gotha. That pragmatic and turning coats if it fitted, perhaps an example avant-la lettre of the later Belgium.
Colourful figurehead...
In the circle of Napoléon, Courted Napoléon's sister and when Napoléon was not pleased, he had some family linked I think to Russia, while he then fought with the Russians against Napoléon. Uncle of Queen Victoria, after the death of the future queen, his wife, he was a bit of a nuissance for the Brits there in London. And costed a lot of money to the British taxpayer and at the end he got a bit in the way of the British Court. They proposed him first Greece, but the clever Léopold was, when they proposed it, of course more seduced by the potential of Belgium (then making a take off) with that other "kazakkendraaier" (turncoat?) the British Cockerill, first for his profits with Napoleon, then seamless in 1815 with the new king William and after 1830 in Verviers turning to the new Belgian government.

MM, of course this is an aside, but I think nordmann is already used to it. And you started   or was it GG   ...

Kind regards from Paul.

And further to the fifth example of seapower from the book of Andrew Lambert...

My take and it can differ from what Andrew meant...

5: England

Start: Henry VIII free from the European system and the Catholic Church power above that system.
Henry got money from the confiscation of the abbeys and all that...
A new class of merchants based on maritime trade and sollicitors emerged linked to him for fear to lose their status, if the European based Catholic elite came again in power.
And that gave birth to a seapower culture.

During the Elizabeth time there was conflict between the City, which had to provide for the protective marine and the more autocratic Elizabeth. 
Perhaps one can make a comparison with the Dutch Republic between the Orangist Protestant mob and the more universal minded and less dogmatic merchants' class?
See the book of "Wout Troost" "William III
https://www.amazon.com/William-III-Stadholder-King-Political-Biography/dp/0754650715

Under Cromwell the City funded the marine, but asked in return the protection for its merchants on sea.
And from Charled II up to Jacobus II there was a struggle between the monarch and the parliament.  And behind that parliament the City and the merchants, which didn't want to give in if the seatrade was not protected.
With the Dutch William III it changed, as he was perhaps already accustomed to that kind of circumstances as he was used to it in the Dutch Republic.
And so had William III the money and the fleet to fight the absolutist king Louis XIV.  And he transferred a lot of knowledge from Amsterdam to London.
See the book of "Lisa Jardine" "Going Dutch"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisa_Jardine
https://www.amazon.com/Going-Dutch-England-Plundered-Hollands/dp/0060774096

I still think that if the brothers De Witt had lived in Britain with its insular character and not open to invasion as Holland on its landborders on nearly each side and with a bit of bigger population as Britain, it would haven't had the year of disaster of 1672,
https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/rijksstudio/timeline-dutch-history/1672-disaster-year
they wouldn't have been vilifiled by the Orangist press.
If you see that even the continental French empire of Napoléon, couldn't bring the British seapower on its knees...

Kind regards, Paul.

Further on V: England.

The US was not the same as the UK seapower country. Their model of the politicians was more fuelled by the example of the Roman Republic and an immaginated Republican France and after 1871 by the German Empire even culturally and qua organisation.

But in England, was the upcoming more common based democracy, not that much interested in the seapower and their profits, as the City was before, together with the new elite, born from merchants and smootly introduced to a new kind of aristocratic oligarchy.
And yes the power that were tried to promote the myth of the seapower among the common plebs and even some of the elite too and influence them by all kind of cultural propaganda.

From the point of view of seapower strategy it was a mlstake to intervene too much in continental conflicts And before WWI they never did it, as even with Napoleon's Continental System against a military superpower.
And now as they did it and at the end won, it was nevertheless a blow to their global seapower. And contrary to the Dutch seapower they lost their position not to another seapower as the Dutch to the English, but to another "continentall" power that the US was.

So far thinking along the same line as the author (my description is my own and don't fit always exactly the author's book), but now I am further a bit confused as it is all now new to me.

What Andrew says:
The culprit was Wilson, trying to frame the naval power of Britain at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson had the German "militarism" broken and would now break the British "navalism"...
But Lloyd George reacted and Wilson gave in...hence the League of Nations to not let lose Wilson face...
And to be sure the 1922 Washington naval treaty to avoid a worldwide competition.

But then I am even more confused, as Andrew goes further in the Thirties in the vein as if the US was on the way to try to break the power of the last seapower???

Will comment that in a further message and hope that every member of the band here will pull for once at the same string...

Kind regards, Paul.

PaulRyckier wrote:

Further on V: England.

The US was not the same as the UK seapower country. Their model of the politicians was more fuelled by the example of the Roman Republic and an immaginated Republican France and after 1871 by the German Empire even culturally and qua organisation.

But in England, was the upcoming more common based democracy, not that much interested in the seapower and their profits, as the City was before, together with the new elite, born from merchants and smootly introduced to a new kind of aristocratic oligarchy.
And yes the power that were tried to promote the myth of the seapower among the common plebs and even some of the elite too and influence them by all kind of cultural propaganda.

From the point of view of seapower strategy it was a mlstake to intervene too much in continental conflicts And before WWI they never did it, as even with Napoleon's Continental System against a military superpower.
And now as they did it and at the end won, it was nevertheless a blow to their global seapower. And contrary to the Dutch seapower they lost their position not to another seapower as the Dutch to the English, but to another "continentall" power that the US was.

So far thinking along the same line as the author (my description is my own and don't fit always exactly the author's book), but now I am further a bit confused as it is all now new to me.

What Andrew says:
The culprit was Wilson, trying to frame the naval power of Britain at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson had the German "militarism" broken and would now break the British "navalism"...
But Lloyd George reacted and Wilson gave in...hence the League of Nations to not let lose Wilson face...
And to be sure the 1922 Washington naval treaty to avoid a worldwide competition.

But then I am even more confused, as Andrew goes further in the Thirties in the vein as if the US was on the way to try to break the power of the last seapower???

Will comment that in a further message and hope that every member of the band here will pull for once at the same string...

Kind regards, Paul.

Depends on what or who you believe. 

On one hand the RN in one stroke gave up 100 years of dominance, on the other hand the US and Japan were on a building frenzy that the UK would have to respond to. Britain had spent big winning WW1 (much to the US advantage) and there was very much a thought that WW1 was the war to end all wars + the fact that the previous dreadnought race had poured petrol onto an already smouldering fire...

Others say that it was a bluff on the part of the US as their population didn't want to spend vast sums on new battleships either but didn't want to cough to the fact (they bugged the other powers so they new exactly what they could get). Ive read elsewhere that the US were willing to accept Britain building 2 of the 4 'G3" battlecruisers, but the UK never asked and ended up with the Nelson class.
The disaster for the RN was that such was the reduction in dreadnought numbers (40 scrapped in the end) that they never had enough to fulfil their duties. They couldn't "send a fleet" to Singapore without stripping the Atlantic or Mediterranean fleets.

The biggest disaster wasn't immediately obvious. Britain lost a vast amount of experienced men, plant and infrastructure that was needed to build guns, turrets and armour. It wasn't solely the fault of the 1922 Washington treaty,The London Treaty was the one that nailed the coffin closer shut. When Britain went to start rearmament in 1936 they found that instead of being able to design,build and construct a battleship in around 3 years they were looking at nearer 5. Such was lack of armour making facilities the UK had to buy plate from Czechoslovakia for the "Crown Colony" class for instance. The projected "Lion" class were suspended because it would have probably taken 4 years to construct the turrets and guns (a large number of gun pits had also been demolished or were derelict).

Why did the UK go for all these treaties? Well post WW1 she was economically battered. all the insurances of the Victorian age and Edwardian age had been spent. The UK was effectively trying to maintain 1st power status on as little money as possible. The problem was that the British Empire was spread across the globe as was all of her trade.To protect maritime trade you need to ave the ability to protect it and push your interests. When war came along for the second time it didn't look to bad at first. The Germans had a tiny surface fleet, the French could deal with the Italians,and if the Japanese started there might be enough (just) to deter. When the situation changed in 1940 the dynamic was completely different. Germay had multiple access routes to the Atlantic,the Italians could push the Med and the Japanese had a free lunch in S.E Asia.

The cupboard was bare.[/quote]

Virtual Fletch,

I read your comments with great attention, as it is all a bit new to me. I am more accustomed with the preparation for WWII from 1936 on.
IN fact you commented about my Wilson question that I read in the last tome of the mentioned book. But i read it not thorougly as I then was back from vacation on 15 March and then we had Corona time and I neglected then as there was no much interest anymore on the thread, what the author really meant with what I commented at the end with a question mark.

As I see it you can be to the point with your comments, rather than the author Andrew. But with the renewed interest in the thread I wiçll now for the first time read in depth the last tome from the book about Britain and give you in due time an answer to your comments.
As it was all a bit new to me I read the first line aid on the internet: Wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_London_Naval_Treaty

Kind regards from Paul to an old fellow of the BBC board.

PS: I guessed that it had to do with a saying and it is perhaps better on its place on the language forum. As  a no native Anglophone I never heard it before. Are we still allowed to deviate from the subject on this board? Even only a tiny deviation    ?
https://www.bbc.co.uk/teach/school-radio/nursery-rhymes-old-mother-hubbard/zdsmd6f

VF wrote:

Depends on what or who you believe. 

On one hand the RN in one stroke gave up 100 years of dominance, on the other hand the US and Japan were on a building frenzy that the UK would have to respond to. Britain had spent big winning WW1 (much to the US advantage) and there was very much a thought that WW1 was the war to end all wars + the fact that the previous dreadnought race had poured petrol onto an already smouldering fire...

Others say that it was a bluff on the part of the US as their population didn't want to spend vast sums on new battleships either but didn't want to cough to the fact (they bugged the other powers so they new exactly what they could get). Ive read elsewhere that the US were willing to accept Britain building 2 of the 4 'G3" battlecruisers, but the UK never asked and ended up with the Nelson class.
The disaster for the RN was that such was the reduction in dreadnought numbers (40 scrapped in the end) that they never had enough to fulfil their duties. They couldn't "send a fleet" to Singapore without stripping the Atlantic or Mediterranean fleets.

The biggest disaster wasn't immediately obvious. Britain lost a vast amount of experienced men, plant and infrastructure that was needed to build guns, turrets and armour. It wasn't solely the fault of the 1922 Washington treaty,The London Treaty was the one that nailed the coffin closer shut. When Britain went to start rearmament in 1936 they found that instead of being able to design,build and construct a battleship in around 3 years they were looking at nearer 5. Such was lack of armour making facilities the UK had to buy plate from Czechoslovakia for the "Crown Colony" class for instance. The projected "Lion" class were suspended because it would have probably taken 4 years to construct the turrets and guns (a large number of gun pits had also been demolished or were derelict).

Why did the UK go for all these treaties? Well post WW1 she was economically battered. all the insurances of the Victorian age and Edwardian age had been spent. The UK was effectively trying to maintain 1st power status on as little money as possible. The problem was that the British Empire was spread across the globe as was all of her trade.To protect maritime trade you need to ave the ability to protect it and push your interests. When war came along for the second time it didn't look to bad at first. The Germans had a tiny surface fleet, the French could deal with the Italians,and if the Japanese started there might be enough (just) to deter. When the situation changed in 1940 the dynamic was completely different. Germay had multiple access routes to the Atlantic,the Italians could push the Med and the Japanese had a free lunch in S.E Asia.

VF, I read now again the chapter from the book "Seapower states" by Andrew Lambert about England.

I see now with your survey and the wikis that I yesterday read, more clear in the debate. And I find your approach even better than Andrew's. I find that he sees too much everywhere the malicious hand of the Americans to destroy the British naval directed state. 

He takes even the atomic bombs into the equation as the radical and quick reaction of a continental directed state as in contrast of a reaction of a naval state as England as for instance a blocade that could take months.

But I think that the American strategists contrary to what Andrew says didn't worry about that little Britain that already after WWII had had its role in the world. They were already planning for the new Cold War with Russia I suppose.

To take again the Hiroshima bombing. I think that it was overhere that I made a thread, as that the decision to bomb had nothing to do with lifes of the common man, but more with the fact that the Soviets (Russians) would invade Japan and that the US would sit on the border of the place with not strategic power against Russia from Japan out.

Kind regards, Paul.

PaulRyckier wrote:

VF wrote:

Depends on what or who you believe. 

On one hand the RN in one stroke gave up 100 years of dominance, on the other hand the US and Japan were on a building frenzy that the UK would have to respond to. Britain had spent big winning WW1 (much to the US advantage) and there was very much a thought that WW1 was the war to end all wars + the fact that the previous dreadnought race had poured petrol onto an already smouldering fire...

Others say that it was a bluff on the part of the US as their population didn't want to spend vast sums on new battleships either but didn't want to cough to the fact (they bugged the other powers so they new exactly what they could get). Ive read elsewhere that the US were willing to accept Britain building 2 of the 4 'G3" battlecruisers, but the UK never asked and ended up with the Nelson class.
The disaster for the RN was that such was the reduction in dreadnought numbers (40 scrapped in the end) that they never had enough to fulfil their duties. They couldn't "send a fleet" to Singapore without stripping the Atlantic or Mediterranean fleets.

The biggest disaster wasn't immediately obvious. Britain lost a vast amount of experienced men, plant and infrastructure that was needed to build guns, turrets and armour. It wasn't solely the fault of the 1922 Washington treaty,The London Treaty was the one that nailed the coffin closer shut. When Britain went to start rearmament in 1936 they found that instead of being able to design,build and construct a battleship in around 3 years they were looking at nearer 5. Such was lack of armour making facilities the UK had to buy plate from Czechoslovakia for the "Crown Colony" class for instance. The projected "Lion" class were suspended because it would have probably taken 4 years to construct the turrets and guns (a large number of gun pits had also been demolished or were derelict).

Why did the UK go for all these treaties? Well post WW1 she was economically battered. all the insurances of the Victorian age and Edwardian age had been spent. The UK was effectively trying to maintain 1st power status on as little money as possible. The problem was that the British Empire was spread across the globe as was all of her trade.To protect maritime trade you need to ave the ability to protect it and push your interests. When war came along for the second time it didn't look to bad at first. The Germans had a tiny surface fleet, the French could deal with the Italians,and if the Japanese started there might be enough (just) to deter. When the situation changed in 1940 the dynamic was completely different. Germay had multiple access routes to the Atlantic,the Italians could push the Med and the Japanese had a free lunch in S.E Asia.

VF, I read now again the chapter from the book "Seapower states" by Andrew Lambert about England.

I see now with your survey and the wikis that I yesterday read, more clear in the debate. And I find your approach even better than Andrew's. I find that he sees too much everywhere the malicious hand of the Americans to destroy the British naval directed state. 

He takes even the atomic bombs into the equation as the radical and quick reaction of a continental directed state as in contrast of a reaction of a naval state as England as for instance a blocade that could take months.

But I think that the American strategists contrary to what Andrew says didn't worry about that little Britain that already after WWII had had its role in the world. They were already planning for the new Cold War with Russia I suppose.

To take again the Hiroshima bombing. I think that it was overhere that I made a thread, as that the decision to bomb had nothing to do with lifes of the common man, but more with the fact that the Soviets (Russians) would invade Japan and that the US would sit on the border of the place with not strategic power against Russia from Japan out.

Kind regards, Paul.

Hi Paul,nice to converse after all these years!




I have no doubt that the US intentionally set about dismantling Britains premier status in the world. Im not claiming foul over that as its the sort of thing Britain would have done in the 19th century! Indeed the much vaunted loans only came to pass when Britain threatened to stop fighting the communists in Greece. Such was Britain parlous finances that the RN scrapped vast amounts of ships, like in 1919 -1921. The difference was that the economic reality was so dire and the shortages so acute that had nothing to do with treaties. The Rn scrapped all of the "R's (which were obsolete) the Q.E'S (too slow),Renown (supposedly too slow despite being one of the fastest ships in the fleet) and Nelson and Rodney. This really was the end of an era. The RN despite having many ships on paper could only in fact count HMS Triumph as their only fully equipped carrier in the late 40's. The Illustrious class were too manpower intensive to run, the KGV's ditto. There is a great book by Paul Kennedy called "The Rise and Fall of British Seapower" the basic premise (which IMHO is completely sound) is that the RN's fortunes are directly tied to the power of the UK economy. When the economy was strong the RN was strong, when it was weak the RN was weak.

The RN in some ways was enjoyed an "Indian summer" from the late 50's to the late 70's. They were lucky that they had 7 carriers (all commenced in wartime) that managed to maintain a presence east of Suez and elsewhere. This all came to an end IMHO with the cancellation of CVA 01 in 1966 (Healeys defence act) and the commencement of scrapping the carrier arm,starting with HMS Victorious in 1967 (which had suffered a relatively minor fire at the end of a large refit) and ending with his Ark Royal paying off in 1978 (before she fell to pieces).

In regards to the atomic threat...
Up till 1957 the RN had a very large reserve fleet categorised A,B,C - graded by importance, the time it would take to reactivate and the amount of maintenance they received in the interim. All 4 KGV's,the Indefatigable and Implacable carriers and a multitude of other vessels made up this fleet (which would dwarf todays RN several times over). In 1957 Duncan Sandys published the 1957 Defence act that, in a stroke, wrote of hundreds of vessels, helped destroy the British aircraft industry and finally nailed the coffin shut on any ideas of maintaining 1st class defence forces. The argument was that in the event of war none of the above ships could be utilised in a sufficient time frame (which was probably true). The flip side was that it completely ignored the fact that any war could be conventional before the red button was pressed.
However money was short and the ships scrapped.[/quote]

VF, thank you so much for your further enlightenment. After all what I read up to now I still learned from your new addendum.
And so I have more an insight in what Andrew Lambert wrote.

Kind regards from Paul.

Thanks VF for the additional references.

You wrote:
"Andrew Lambert is a great author. Another good one is Andrew Gordon. He wrote a brilliant book on Jutland called “The Rules of the Game. I’d also recommend Friedman,Roberts and Massie." 

That "Massie" that you mentioned, is that the one?

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/books/robert-k-massie-dead.html

I read in the time (some 20 years ago) the work from him about the last czar Nicolas.
https://www.amazon.com/Nicholas-Alexandra-Classic-Account-Romanov/dp/0345438310

We had a thread overhere about the British government refusing extradition of the Russian royal family to Britain in a deal with the Menshevics, when it was still possible, where I mentioned this work.

Kind regards, Paul.

This is from Hansard on the subject in 1999


https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1999/jan/28/hms-glorious

PaulRyckier wrote:

5: England

Start: Henry VIII free from the European system and the Catholic Church power above that system.
Henry got money from the confiscation of the abbeys and all that...
A new class of merchants based on maritime trade and sollicitors emerged linked to him for fear to lose their status, if the European based Catholic elite came again in power.
And that gave birth to a seapower culture.

At the time of the Diamond Jubilee of Britain’s Queen Victoria in 1897, it was popularly promoted (I think by Rudyard Kipling) that England’s royal navy had been founded by Alfred of Wessex in 896. The Spithead naval review of that year was thus considered a fitting way to mark both the queen’s Diamond Jubilee and the millennium of the Royal Navy.

Whether Alfred the Great was indeed the ‘father of the English navy’ is debateable. Kings of the various Saxon and Angle kingdoms had run fleets well before him and before them the Romans and Britons had defended the ‘Saxon shore’ not only with coastal forts but also with ships. What was significant about Alfred, was that his main opponents were the Danes (themselves master seafarers) and that the Saxons with their new ships were now able to match them and prevail both on land and on sea. An engagement on Southampton Water in 896 is pointed to as marking the turning point in this. Anglo-Danish naval rivalry did not end there however. The Danes would return periodically, notably in the form of Canute over 100 years later who not only defeated the English but took the crown of England for himself.

Going back to ancient times, disputes over fisheries and the protection of same were probably the causes of the earliest forms of naval organisation. The Cod Wars of the 1950s, 60s and 70s between Iceland and Britain were merely the 20th Century manifestation of a very old phenomenon. Before 1918, Iceland had been a Danish overseas territory and there had been fishing disputes between Denmark and England dating back to at least the 15th Century. When the Hanseatic League got involved, this became a three-way conflict involving not only fisheries but also other aspects of maritime commerce.



(A 1990s replica of the 15th Century caravel Matthew)
 
1897 was also the 400th anniversary of the voyage of the Matthew, a Bristol ship commanded by Italian navigator John Cabot. The Matthew rediscovered Newfoundland and the plentiful cod fisheries of the north-west Atlantic. This new source of fish took the pressure off Icelandic waters and also altered European fishing and eating habits. On the 500th anniversary of the voyage of the Matthew in 1997, the American writer Mark Kurlansky wrote an excellent book called Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World:  
 
Mark Kurlansky discusses Cod: Fish That Changed the World

In it he purports that the Newfoundland fisheries were already known to Basque fishermen but that their exact location had been a well-kept secret.

Vizzer wrote:

At the time of the Diamond Jubilee of Britain’s Queen Victoria in 1897, it was popularly promoted (I think by Rudyard Kipling) that England’s royal navy had been founded by Alfred of Wessex in 896. The Spithead naval review of that year was thus considered a fitting way to mark both the queen’s Diamond Jubilee and the millennium of the Royal Navy.

At the Spithead Review in 1897, the Lords of the Admiralty could proudly review a Royal Navy that was at about the summit of its power and (at least as yet) unrivalled by either Germany, France, the USA, Russia, or anyone else, even when in a combination of two other powers together. But that same Diamond Jubilee Review was also to be an occasion for some embarrassment in senior Naval circles.

Charles Parsons, the inventor of the modern steam turbine, had foreseen its potential to power ships, and to develop this he built an experimental vessel, Turbinia, which he launched in 1894. The ship's turbine engine itself performed very well, but initial ship trials were disappointing until Parsons discovered the new problem of cavitation (a hydrodynamic problem which only really becomes apparent with very high speed propellors) ... and which Parsons solved by increasing the overall number of propellors by increasing the number of propellor shafts: Turbinia, small though she was, eventually had a total of nine propellors carried on three shafts. At top speed Turbinia could do 34 knots (39 mph) which was then unheard of for a steamship - although, even then, her actual power efficiency was quite small when compared to modern ships - indicating just how much room for further improvement there was.



The Admiralty had been kept informed of all developments but they seemed reluctant to finance Parsons' ongoing research. So with Parsons at the helm, Turbinia turned up unannounced at the Spithead Navy Review on 26 June 1897. In front of the Prince of Wales, foreign dignitaries and the Lords of the Admiralty, Turbinia raced between the lines of navy ships easily evading the fastest naval launches sent to pursue her and even threatening to swamp them with her wash as she turned.



After further high speed trials attended by the Admiralty, Parsons set up the Turbinia Works at Wallsend on Tyne, which then constructed the engines for two prototype turbine-powered destroyers for the Navy. Both vessels were lost to accidents in 1901, but although their losses slowed the introduction of turbines, the Admiralty had been convinced. In the meantime, while waiting for the Admiralty's support Parsons' company built the first turbine-powered merchant vessel, TS King Edward, which was launched in 1901.

In 1905 the Admiralty (probably in large part through the far-sighted support of Admiral John 'Jackie' Fisher) confirmed that all future Royal Navy vessels were to be turbine-powered: and in 1906, the first turbine-powered battleship, HMS Dreadnought, was launched. 1905 also saw the launch of HMS Hindustan, the first battleship to be built, engined and armed by a private firm (John Brown Ltd. of Clydebank) in a record construction time of just two years and eight months; and making it first major RN warship to pass into commission direct from the private builder. Then, just two years later, the massive ocean liner RMS Mauretania (built for Cunard by Swan Hunter's shipyard on the Tyne and just a bit downstream of the Parson's marine-engine works), further confirmed the reputation of turbine engines when on her maiden voyage in 1907 she won the Blue Ribband for the fastest Atlantic crossing up to that date.

In the early 20th century it was innovation, driven as much by business interests, that made the Royal Navy such a formidible global force, rather than simple numbers of ships.

Loved the painting of water in this pic. As a former dinghy racer - and in a busy port dodging huge container ships honking in horror this brought it home again; nice perky force 4 and the aqua translucency .... those were the days.