The Pacific series that brought home the horrors of that conflict in WW11, showed naval pounding of islands to little effect of entrenched enemy positions. And, unseemingly high ups not learning much from each failure either in the series of island conquests with horrendous losses at each beach head landing on islands I had never heard of. And this week films about Gallipoli told much the same tale of naval pounding an army that sat awaiting the ill fated landings. I have read of others and have begun to wonder if it ever actually worked to soften up conditions?

Naval bombardment is surely the only way, other than by aerial bombing, by which to deploy high explosives in support of amphibious landings of troops. The question then is how effective is any bombardment against entrenched defences?

The prolonged stalemate of the WW1 trenches and the difficulty in tackling a succession of fixed defences in the WW2 Italian campaign, such as at Monte Cassino - which was still vigorously defended even when completely flattened by shelling and bombing - would suggest that a well dug-in defence is a very tough nut to crack. Tanks of course were specifically developed to attack and surmount trenches, barbed-wire, and blockhouse defences ... but in amphibious assault they take time to land and deploy, whether island-hopping in the Pacific or landing at Anzio or the D-Day beaches in Europe, and in assault they work best in open country, rather than jungle or mountains. And of course they were not available at Gallipoli.

..... And naval bombardment isn't necessarily just to soften-up the fixed defences. For D-Day the naval bombardment started before dawn targeting the area behind the coast. Along with aerial bombing, the naval shelling was aimed at roads, railway lines, and command centres, to disrupt communications and reinforcement. Although a naval bombardment, the range of the big guns on the battleships like Nevada, Texas, Ramillies and Warspite, was such that they could reach at least 25km inland. Only an hour before scheduled time for the landings, just as it was getting light and specific targets could be seen, did the naval guns shift to target the immediate coastal defences, and in this bombardment, being fired from essentially stable artillery platforms their accuracy was considerably better than bombs dropped from aircraft.

I've read that, in Normandy, German tanks were blown over by the blast of heavy naval guns.

..................................................................................

At the moment, I'm reading a book about start of the American Revolution, and during the Battle of Bunker Hill the British used an ammunition type known as a "Carcass" to set fire Charlestown;



Drawing of a carcass shell;

USS New Jersey was brought out of retirement to provide fire support during the Vietnam War;

Naval guns aren't best suited to shore bombardment, actually - particularly against trenches, because they have a relatively flat trajectory. Hence ABC's use of half-charges at Gallipoli to "lob" 4" shells into Turkish positions, and the Turks fitting large calibre howitzers in at least one of their old battleships. I suppose the ultimate shore bombardment was in the Falklands, where 2-ton Seaslug missiles were used to attack a shore-based radar, and to try to obstruct the use of Stanley airport runway after "black buck" Vulcan raids conspicuously failed to do that.

Triceratops wrote:

I've read that, in Normandy, German tanks were blown over by the blast of heavy naval guns.

..................................................................................

At the moment, I'm reading a book about start of the American Revolution, and during the Battle of Bunker Hill the British used an ammunition type known as a "Carcass" to set fire Charlestown;



Drawing of a carcass shell;

"Carcase" incendiaries were in use from the middle ages, amongst other pyrotechnics, particularly in siege warfare (the Great Siege of Malta being a prime example).

Gilgamesh of Uruk wrote:

Naval guns aren't best suited to shore bombardment, actually - particularly against trenches, because they have a relatively flat trajectory.

And so in the days of sail was developed the 'bomb ketch', also known as a bomb ship, or simply a bomb. These were ships designed specifically for shore bombardment because, as Gil says, that was a function normal ships of the line were not at all good at. Bomb ships were smallish warships but with heavily reinforced hulls and armed with just one or two massive mortars. They were usually classed as ketch-rigged because of the unusual positioning and rigging of the masts that was necessary to accommodate the two centreline, topdeck-mounted, heavy guns firing upwards ... hence the usual RN name 'bomb-ketch'. These guns fired explosive shells at a high angle so as to lob the missile over walls and other defences, to strike from above. Since they were designed to fire fused explosive projectiles - rather than the usual solid shot of ships of the line - RN bomb ketches usually had "firey" names such as Firedrake, Salamander, Vesuvius, Volcano, and Sulphur.

Being rather specialized vessels they were expensive to fit out and maintain - indeed some of the rigging had to be made from chain rather than rope, to resist the blast of the mortars. But since they were built with extremely strong hulls to withstand the recoil of the mortars, in the peace following the Napoleonic wars several were adapted for Arctic or Antarctic exploration, a role in which they would be liable to encounter icebergs and pack-ice. The famous British exploratory ships HMS Erebus and HMS Terror both started life as bomb ketches.

It was the naval bombardment with congreve rockets and mortar shells fired from the RN bomb-ships Erebus, Terror, Volcano, Meteor, Devastation and Aetna, onto Fort McHenry during the War of 1812, that prompted Francis Scott Key to jot down the poem that later provided the lyrics for "The Star-Spangled Banner":

O say can you see by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming,
Whose broad stripes and bright stars through the perilous fight,
O'er the ramparts we watched, were so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there;
O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave,
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?

.... and as the lyrics say, after nearly 27 hours of bombardment the damage to the fortifications was light and the "flag was still there".

This is a later HMS Terror - WWI vintage, served also in WWII. The height of the mounting is a result of the use of one of the "surplus" twin 15" mountings (technically "turntable barbettes" rather than "turrets") released when the 6th and 7th "R" class battleships were reworked to become the battlecruisers "Repulse" and "Renown", and the third Weird Sister, Furious, was completed with a single '15" B' (18", actually) gun.

One of the few WWI surviving warships is also a monitor - and currently being restored at Pompey for the anniversary of the Gallipoli landings as she is the Gallipoli Memorial Ship - HMS M33
see http://esender.cosmic.org.uk/t/r-79A7E0B5585DA4592540EF23F30FEDED

The Royal Navy's WWI 'M-Class' submarines were initially intended for coastal bombardment, although by the time they entered service their role had been switched to surface combat (the idea being that torpedoes were ill-suited to engaging warships), to which end they were fitted with a single 12in gun.  Three were built, though the M1 was the only one launched in time for the war (but never saw action).  M2 was converted into a seaplane carrier, and M3 into a minelayer, but neither saw active service.

Naval bombardment could also have a psychological impact.  Prior to the Parliamentarian invasion of Jersey in 1651, Admiral Blake bombarded the Royalist positions on two or three occasions.  It had little physical effect (as noted above, like most warships in the age of sail his frigates' guns were intended for a fairly flat trajectory, and the impact was largely absorbed by sand dunes) but reportedly severely damaged the moral of the defenders.

Good to see you here, AN. Moral breaking - horrible but probably effective - but not in the Pacific war where the notion of dying for nation was instilled.

Thank you!  I know I say this every time, but I really must come here more often... At least I've moved the forum further up my 'favourites' list now, which hopefully will be more of a reminder!

Blake's morale-sapping was cunningly done.  He doubtless knew the majority of the population of Jersey were Puritans and therefore more inclined towards Parliament in any case.  There had also been enough time since Charles II's defeat at Worcester for it to have become known in the Island.  His flagship, the Happy Entrance, had been specially selected as it had previously been captained by the Royalist commander in Jersey, Sir George Carteret.  Blake spent a couple of days sailing up and down the coast whilst the local militia tried to keep up, occasionally bombarding the enemy (the initially barrage lasted four hours, which must have been horrendous for the defenders!) and/or making feint attacks.  All of this was done in miserable weather.  By the time the landing finally took place at 11pm, the Royalists were exhausted, soaked, hungry and no-doubt thoroughly fed up.  When Carteret spotted the Parliamentarian landing barges looming out of the dark he rushed back to collect his troops and found that only around 200 of his force - out of around 1,500 - still remained!  Needless to say they were no match for the 2,600 veteran New Model troops storming the beach.

Triceratops wrote:

Meles meles wrote:

..... And naval bombardment isn't necessarily just to soften-up the fixed defences. For D-Day the naval bombardment started before dawn targeting the area behind the coast. Along with aerial bombing, the naval shelling was aimed at roads, railway lines, and command centres, to disrupt communications and reinforcement. Although a naval bombardment, the range of the big guns on the battleships like Nevada, Texas, Ramillies and Warspite, was such that they could reach at least 25km inland. Only an hour before scheduled time for the landings, just as it was getting light and specific targets could be seen, did the naval guns shift to target the immediate coastal defences, and in this bombardment, being fired from essentially stable artillery platforms their accuracy was considerably better than bombs dropped from aircraft.

I've read that, in Normandy, German tanks were blown over by the blast of heavy naval guns.

There was quite a bit of talk about this around the time of the 60th anniversary in 2004. In the decades following the Second World War there had been the view that the Americans on the western beaches of Utah and Omaha were much fresher and more gung-ho than the more timid and war-weary British and Canadians on the eastern beaches of Sword, Juno and Gold. This, it was said, accounted for why the Americans were able to break out early and sweep down the Cotentin peninsula and into Brittany while the British and Canadians were still bogged down on their narrow Normandy bridgeheads. That view generally held for decades until it emerged that the British and Canadian lack of progress had actually been deliberate.

Allied intelligence and psychological analysis had deduced that, following an Allied landing on the Normandy beaches, the German High Command would react in a predictable manner. The mindset of the Wehrmacht at the time was such that it would decide that the best course of action would be to immediately counter-attack the Allies at the closest point of contact and using the best troops available to them. The German military leadership in the West, from Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt to General Erwin Rommel downwards, would react in only one way. They would seek to hurl the Allies back into the sea at the earliest opportunity. Any delay would simply favour the Allies. In practice, therefore, this meant attacking the Allied beachheads on the east (the closest point of contact to Paris and Germany) with the best German troops available and containing the western beachheads with lesser forces. The Germans hoped to contain the Allies and roll them back off, beach by beach, east to west.

Intercepted German intelligence traffic immediately after the landings confirmed this to Allied Supreme Headquarters. Commander in Chief British General Bernard Montgomery had suggested a plan to Supreme Commander American General Dwight D. Eisenhower which was accepted and implemented. The British and the Canadians on the eastern beaches would take the brunt of the German assault. In doing so they would seek to lure the Germans into a 'killing zone’ no further than a few miles from the coast. The reason for this was that the approaching German armour would be decimated if not annihilated by the guns of the Allied ships offshore. The British and Canadians in the vicinity of Caen etc were under orders not to break out into open country but to keep the attacking German forces, especially the armoured reserves, within range of the ships' guns (15-20 miles).

These armoured reserves were essentially the Fifth Panzer Army, the 1st (SS) Panzer Division, the Second Panzer Division, the 2nd (SS) Panzer Division, the Ninth Panzer Division, the 9th (SS) Panzer Division, the Eleventh Panzer Division, the 12th (SS) Panzer Division, the 17th (SS) Panzer Division, the Nineteenth Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division the 116th Panzer Division and (last but by no means least) the elite 130th Panzer Division. And indeed the majority of these were sent in (as had been anticipated) against the British and the Canadians on the eastern beaches. Gerd von Rundstedt later said:

‘... The enemy had deployed very strong Naval forces off the shores of the bridgehead. These can be used as quickly mobile, constantly available artillery, at points where they are necessary as defence against our attacks or as support for enemy attacks. During the day their fire is skilfully directed by . . . plane observers, and by advanced ground fire spotters. Because of the high rapid-fire capacity of Naval guns they play an important part in the battle within their range. The movement of tanks by day, in open country, within the range of these naval guns is hardly possible.’

Another German report wrote:

‘Even more disastrous than the material effect was the moral effect of the rapid and precisely firing naval guns. Even when not reinforced by continuous air bombing, the drum fire inspired in the defenders a feeling of utter helplessness, which in experienced recruits caused fainting or even complete paralysis. The supporting fire of the warships was extremely accurate and made the movement of strategical reserves impossible within range of their guns.’



(56-ton German Tiger tank blown upside down near Caen in July 1944)

A public spat developed between American General George C. Patton (commander of the U.S. Third Army in Brittany) and Montgomery. This even made the editorials of some American newspapers criticising the British for being too cautious and still being bogged down at Caen a month after D-Day, whereas the Americans had broken out in the west. Patton suggested that the Americans had more fire in their bellies while the British and Canadians were more jaded. Thus a myth was born which was repeated many times thereafter including in Thames Television’s famous 1973 documentary series The World At War. In reality, however, the ‘public spat’ was almost certainly deliberately choreographed as disinformation for German consumption.

It wasn’t all one-way traffic though. German shore artillery managed to sink the American destroyers USS Corry and USS Glennon and the Free French destroyer Mistral as well as severely damaging and putting out of action the British light cruiser HMS Glasgow. They also sunk many landing craft. And a much larger number of Allied ships and landing craft were sunk by mines, bombs, torpedoes and guided missiles from German aircraft, ships, fast boats and submarines etc. The crucial role played by the Allied battleships, cruisers and destroyers off the Normandy coast in the month or so after D-Day is one of the great unsung stories of the Second World War.

T/O.

Nval bombardment is a bit like the "curates egg"...

If you could ask Nelson he would have called you a fool to attack a fort. At Gallipoli,yes the pre-dreadnoughts were limited by the elevation of their guns and yes HMS Queen Elizabeth had to fire over the peninsula to hit her target. However there are two things to bear in mind in regards to Gallipoli.

Firstly Admiral Milne did Turkey a great favour by expressing his anger about losing the Goeben by demolishing fortifications outside the Dardenelles. This proved to be a bit of awake up call.

Secondly the RN and French were nobbled not by the guns but by mines. The "Sweepers" the RN deployed weren't manned by the RN - they were manned by civilians who had no experience of being under fire. One officer said that "they had as much chance of clearing the mines as the Grand Fleet would have being sent out to the Atlantic to fish".

In actuality at the point the RN turned back the Turks had run out of shells.Fine lines sometimes.


In regards to D-Day the RN's BB's basically made the first 16 miles from the beach a bit of a "no go" area. They certainly did cause mischief and "took out" a German generals headquarters I believe.

They were certainly missed when the battle went beyond the range of their guns. 



In regards to Monitors I thoroughly recommend Ian Buxtons book on them. Its an interesting game of oneupmanship - The RN use old 12 inch mounts,the German deploy guns that can outrange them. So the RN produce 15inch Monitors and again the Germans respond to the challenge. They then go to 18 inch on HMS Lord Clive which managed to demolish a bridge at 29000 yards. No mean feat in 1918.


The US brought back the New Jersey class for the Vietnam war, along with several "classic" gun cruisers specifically for the purpose of shoe bombardment. Why ? Well because whilst aircraft could fly to a target and drop their payload, they have to return home. If they miss then they have to sortie again.

A battleship or cruiser can sit 10 miles off the coast and pummel shells from 600lb to 2700lb repeatedly without having to move and have fall of shot reported by air. 

Of course this only works if you have air and sea superiority. Anything less ends up in a massacre. 

Like Savo Island and the initial naval actions off Guadalcanal and the "cactus airfield "did for 2 Japanese battleships.

VF wrote:

A battleship or cruiser can sit 10 miles off the coast and pummel shells from 600lb to 2700lb repeatedly without having to move and have fall of shot reported by air. 

Was that the reason why at the start of the Falklands War work began on recommissioning HMS Tiger which, although she had been converted in the 70s to a helicopter cruiser, still had her two forward 6-inch guns and so was eminently suitable for shore bombardment? Or was it a case of just needing as many ships as possible, especially those with helicopter flight decks? In the event of course work stopped on Tiger as it would have taken too long to get her ready for action.

Meles meles wrote:

VF wrote:

A battleship or cruiser can sit 10 miles off the coast and pummel shells from 600lb to 2700lb repeatedly without having to move and have fall of shot reported by air. 

Was that the reason why at the start of the Falklands War work began on recommissioning HMS Tiger which, although she had been converted in the 70s to a helicopter cruiser, still had her two forward 6-inch guns and so was eminently suitable for shore bombardment? Or was it a case of just needing as many ships as possible, especially those with helicopter flight decks? In the event of course work stopped on Tiger as it would have taken too long to get her ready for action.

A good question. I suspect both - she still had a rapid fire 6 inch turret as well as an even quicker 3 inch mount and of course with the barn plonked on the back she could carry 4 Sea kings.

Both ships were at Chatham at the time and both surveyed and found to be in good condition. As you point out, as they couldn't be readied in time, any work was stopped (I believe that she needed new bricks for her boilers as well as other bits and pieces that had been removed for other ships).

That said there were other reasons I've read from those who were around at the time..

i) The RN didn't have the manpower. Both these vessels needed just shy of a 1000 men to operate them,plus you would need people who understood the 6 inch and 3 inch mounts. Now these mounts were apparently fantastic when they worked but were maintenance heavy. 

ii) The ammunition no longer existed. This one perplexes me a little as effectively they would have sailed to the South Atlantic with nothing more than SeaCat missiles and chaff. If this was the case then its a sign of desperation and it would be interesting to know whether they surveyed HMS Bulwark first (which was pretty much a derelict) and realised that if they wanted more flight decks then the 2 Tigers were the only option.

The "no ammunition" is a bit of a puzzle. I've heard that "some civil servant had sold all the 6" ammo", but it was really only suited to their guns, so I'm not sure that's very convincing. Yes, they surveyed the "Rusty B", and she, too, could have been refitted - but wouldn't have been ready before "Lusty" was in service. "Liger" (so much of Lion's fittings had been used to keep her running that she was widely referred to as such) was a better bet, but aiui "Blake", which had a more reliable 6" mounting was regarded as the prime candidate. In the role I've heard they were intended for - pit stops for the Shars, the  6" wouldn't have been critical, though the automatic 3" twin forward was a formidable antiaircraft weapon. and at 90 rpm/gun, 10 mile max range and a 15lb shell, being on the wrong end of a bombardment would scarcely have been pleasant. The County-class destroyer "Norfolk" was also surveyed and found to be worth reactivating (she was iirc being prepared for sale to Chile as "Capitano Prat". In the end only a couple of type 81 Tribals made it back into active service.

Green George wrote:

The "no ammunition" is a bit of a puzzle. I've heard that "some civil servant had sold all the 6" ammo", but it was really only suited to their guns, so I'm not sure that's very convincing. Yes, they surveyed the "Rusty B", and she, too, could have been refitted - but wouldn't have been ready before "Lusty" was in service. "Liger" (so much of Lion's fittings had been used to keep her running that she was widely referred to as such) was a better bet, but aiui "Blake", which had a more reliable 6" mounting was regarded as the prime candidate. In the role I've heard they were intended for - pit stops for the Shars, the  6" wouldn't have been critical, though the automatic 3" twin forward was a formidable antiaircraft weapon. and at 90 rpm/gun, 10 mile max range and a 15lb shell, being on the wrong end of a bombardment would scarcely have been pleasant. The County-class destroyer "Norfolk" was also surveyed and found to be worth reactivating (she was iirc being prepared for sale to Chile as "Capitano Prat". In the end only a couple of type 81 Tribals made it back into active service.

Bulwark was afloat but that's about as good as it got. She had suffered a fairly substantial boiler room fire in 1979 which was never repaired and another fire that damaged the hanger and some of her mess decks which also received little or no repair. She then went into unmaintained reserve. She was completely (insert own expletive)! 

I've heard that towing her to the Falklands was mooted but even that was ruled out presumably because she may not have made it! How she ever made it till 1984 I don't know.

I suspect that she was kept as there were fittings and machinery of a certain age that could be used in the older ships of the RN still in existence (such as the early Type 12's) or ex RN vessels serving in other navies.



RE the 6 inch ammunition - your spot on. It was class specific, completely incompatible with earlier marks of 6 inch gun seen in the Colony class vessels for example.

One particular half-sister of the Bulwark was, of course, one of the mainstays of the operation, the Hermes.

Green George wrote:

One particular half-sister of the Bulwark was, of course, one of the mainstays of the operation, the Hermes.

 Absolutely. In retrospect its probably why she lasted till 1984 - as a source of spares for Hermes to keep her nominally an active unit (and more saleable) post Falklands. From memory wasn't she placed in reserve in 1984 before being refitted for sale to India in 1986?

Alarm at the build up of French military power in the late 1850s, and the effective use of this power by Napoleon III, which had seen French victories over the Russians at the Battle of the Tchernaya and over the Austrians at Solferino, saw the formation of a Royal Commission into the defence of the British Isles.
The Commission first sat in November 1859. That same month, the new French ironclad Gloire slid down the slipway at Toulon and with a further two French ironclads on the stocks, there a sense of urgency at the suddenly antiquated appearance of the Royal Navy.
The Report issued on the 7th February 1860 concluded that the British armed forces would have trouble dealing with any invasion, and recommended a massive programme of fortifications should be carried out. It being impossible to fortify the whole coastline most at risk, ie the bit facing France, it was decided to fortify the most important ports and naval bases.
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston presented a Bill for these fortifications before Parliament in July 1860, an appropriation of £2 million was voted immediately with £9 million to follow.

In the event, France was becoming increasingly more concerned about the increasing power and ambitions of Bismarck's North German Confederation. No French invasion took place and the extensive a expensive fortifications became known as "Palmerston's Follies"

Horse Sand Fort in the Solent protecting the sea approaches to Portsmouth. The Fort was not completed until 1880, long after the Second Empire had ceased to exist:



Should an invader choose to land at an undefended coastline and move on Portsmouth overland, forts were built to protect the city on the landward side:

Fort Nelson built on the Portsdown Hills between 1860 -1867:



Fort Tregantle to the west of Plymouth:

It's always puzzled me this fear of a French invasion in the 1860s. GB and France were on largely good terms throughout Napoleon III's reign and the Royal Navy was thought more than capable of deterring an invasion, yet all these forts were built.

Generally the two countries were on good terms. In fact, when the Fortifications Bill was introduced, it was opposed by Richard Cobden and William Ewart Gladstone who had concluded a Free Trade agreement, the Cobden - Chevalier Treaty, with France in January 1860. 

 This commercial treaty lasted until 1892, when France introduced a protectionist treaty.

The technical innovations of the 1860s meant that although it was likely the RN could guarantee against invasion , it was by no means a certainty. Both navies built up their Ironclad units, remember France had a lead in this department, and by the end of 1865 both Navies had 11 ironclads.

EDIT: The Orsini Conspiracy of 1858 did cause a degree of tension between the two countries. 
A group of Italian nationalists based in London planned to assassinate the Emperor, largely due to his perceived lack of action in supporting the unification of Italy.. At the time it was British policy to provide asylum to political exiles.
The attempt failed and Orsini had a short, sharp meeting with Madame Guillotine.

Priscilla wrote:

The Pacific series that brought home the horrors of that conflict in WW11, showed naval pounding of islands to little effect of entrenched enemy positions. 

I've been re-watching The World at War and one of the episodes I saw last night was the island hopping campaign in the Pacific, with a focus on two of the landings, namely Tarawa and Iwo Jima.

Tarawa, though the actual island is Betio, is tiny and was hammered by heavy gunfire and bombing attacks, at about 3:50 in the film, the narrator mentions not expecting to find many Japanese left alive after the bombardment.
They were alive, lots of them and the battle for this piece of real estate lasted 3 days. The Japanese garrison of had a strength of 2,600 men. Only 17 were captured , the rest were killed. Of 2,200 Korean and Japanese construction workers on the island only 129 Koreans survived. The Marines lost 1,000 killed and twice that number wounded.
Given the losses and the size of the terrain, Tarawa must be one of the most concentrated battle zones of WWII.

That's one of the problems with heavy bombardment, whether from warships or aircraft - the infantry that subsequently move in to try and take the positions are hampered by the roughed-up terrain and the piles of rubble are often more easily defended than they were before being "softened up", as was also the case at Monte Casino in Italy (1944) or Berlin (1945), and as the Russian army seems to be discovering at the moment.

During the Campaign for Guadalcanal, the Japanese were seriously hampered as their principle air support was at Rabaul, over 600 miles from the battlefield, while the Americans had an air base on Guadalcanal itself. The Japanese decided to level the playing field by levelling Henderson Field. The chosen instrument for this, would be the big guns of their battleships, so, to this end, on the night of the 13/14th October 1942, Haruna and Kongo, plus escorts, commanded by Rear Admiral Kurita were sent down New Georgia Sound ("The Slot") to eliminate the US air base.

The two big ships arrived off Henderson Field just after 1.30am, Kongo opened fire at 1.33 followed two minutes later by Haruna. Along with their standard ammunition (Type 0 high explosive and Type 1 armour piercing), the Japanese included the Type 3 shell, Sanshikidan, originally developed as a an anti-aircraft shell, when it detonated the 14-inch version released 470 sub munitions, incendiary and shrapnel, ideal for area bombardment.

Japanese float planes dropped flares to illuminate the target, while on Mt Austen, Naval Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Funashi Masatomi, observed the fall of shot.

The men on Kurita's ships the scene described the shelling:

" The ensuing scene baffled description as the fires and explosions from the 36-cm shell hits on the airfield set off enemy planes, fuel dumps and ammunition storage places. The scene was topped off by flare bombs from our observation planes flying over the field, the whole spectacle making the Ryogoku fireworks display seem like mere child's play. The night's pitch dark was transformed by fire into the brightness of day. Spontaneous cries and shouts of excitement ran throughout the ships"


For the Americans on the receiving end, the experience was much different. 

Captain Joe Foss " It seemed as if all the props had been kicked from under the sky and we were crushed underneath"


While for Private Robert Leckie "The Americans were passing thru an agony not to be repeated in World War II. It was a terror of the soul. It was as though the roar of colliding planets was exploding in their ears. Self-control was shattered, strong faces went flabby with fear, men sobbed aloud or whimpered, others put pistols to their heads. It was not possible to pray"


The ordeal ended at 2.13am. The two battleships had fired 973 shells. 48 of the 90 US planes on Guadalcanal had been wrecked, the fuel stores destroyed and the runway cratered.

Delighted by the scenes of destruction, at 5.00am Admiral Yamamoto signalled that US air power had been suppressed. It therefore came as something of a shock to the Japanese on Mt Austen when at 5.40am they observed a pair of Dauntlesses take of for a dawn patrol.

The Japanese would make further attempts to use their battleships against Henderson Field during the month of November. These, however, would be thwarted by the US Navy in savage, close quarter surface actions.

Henderson Field on Guadalcanal;

Ten minute video from the BBC 1964 series, The Great War, featuring the naval attack on the Dardanelles, 18 March 1915:

Most people only think of the Dardanelles/Gallipoli as the battle on the beaches, the naval action the month before is little known, far less the French involvement.

I'd always thought that the allied naval bombardment preceding the landings on the Dardanelles peninsular was conducted from ships out in the Aegean Sea, however I recently discovered that during the initial naval operations the allied battleships and cruisers actually entered the outer basin of the straits behind the peninsular to bombard the shore defences at close range. At their entrance between Cap Helles and Kum Kale the straits are barely 5km wide, they then widen to at most 8km, before narrowing again to just 3km wide at Canakkale 24km from the entrance (making this lower end of the straits roughly the size of Lake Geneva). During the main naval operation on 18 March three lines of allied battleships, cruisers and accompanying mine-sweepers sailed into this relatively constricted space to shell the forts and attempt to clear the mines (and bear in mind that the biggest of these battleships needed a lot of room to maneuver having a turning radius typically many times their length).


The Dardanelles defences in February and March 1915 showing the main forts and the lines of mines.

Just how close to the shore the allied ships were can be seen by these pictures:


The British battleships Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion and Ocean bombarding the forts guarding the entrance to the straits.


The French battleships Gaulois, Charlemagne, Bouvet and Suffren heading north-east up the straits.


The French battleship Bouvet sinking after striking a mine about two km off the Asiatic shore.

Mind you for a really close range naval bombardment - and a very sneaky one at that - I reckon there's not much to beat that of the German pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Schleswig-Holstein at Gdansk, Poland, in 1939. Towards the end of August she had moored in the inner harbour of Gdansk under the guise of a friendly ceremonial visit. But in the early hours of the morning on 1 September, without warning and before the formal announcement of hostilities (which came a few hours later that morning), she suddenly opened fire (the very first shots of WW2 in Europe), shelling the adjacent shore installations from a range of just a few hundred metres. It was so close in fact that the initial bombardment was not very successful as the heaviest shells did not have time to arm themselves in flight and so most failed to explode on impact. However when she started shelling the city behind the immediate port facilities the effects were devastating. Nevertheless the Poles managed to hold off the simultaneous German land assault for several days, until finally forced to surrender the city on 7 September.

Meles meles wrote:

I'd always thought that the allied naval bombardment preceding the landings on the Dardanelles peninsular was conducted from ships out in the Aegean Sea, however I recently discovered that during the initial naval operations the allied battleships and cruisers actually entered the outer basin of the straits behind the peninsular to bombard the shore defences at close range. At their entrance between Cap Helles and Kum Kale the straits are barely 5km wide, they then widen to at most 8km, before narrowing again to just 3km wide at Canakkale 24km from the entrance (making this lower end of the straits roughly the size of Lake Geneva). During the main naval operation on 18 March three lines of allied battleships, cruisers and accompanying mine-sweepers sailed into this relatively constricted space to shell the forts and attempt to clear the mines (and bear in mind that the biggest of these battleships needed a lot of room to maneuver having a turning radius typically many times their length).


The Dardanelles defences in February and March 1915 showing the main forts and the lines of mines.

The minefield which did for the Bouvet, Irresistible and Ocean as well as damaging the Inflexible is the one marked number 11 on the map, running parallel to the Asiatic shore in Erin Keui Bay.
This was a new minefield which had been laid on the night of 8th March by the minelayer Nusret under the direction of Lt-Colonel Geehl  It came as a complete surprise to the Allies, the area having been swept several times prior to the 8th was thought to be secure. Furthermore a seaplane had overflown the area the day before and had not observed any mines.(tests carried out at Tenedos had shown aircraft could spot mines at a depth of 18 feet in the clear waters of the Mediterranean)

  Observations of Allied ship movements during earlier bombardments had led to the Turks planning this mine trap.

The 365 ton Nusret, surely one of the most cost effective warships in maritime history:

Warships attacking coastlines had experienced underwater explosives devices during the American Civil War. By Summer 1864, the port of Mobile in Alabama was the Confederacy's last remaining major port on the Gulf of Mexico and that August came under attack by Federal forces.

Mobile was defended by Fort Morgan & Fort Gaines, a minefield ( in the vernacular of the day, these were referred to s "torpedoes" ) and the ironclad Tennessee, backed up by three wooden gunboats. 

The Federal fleet, commanded by D G Farragut ( ironically enough born in Tennessee ) forced its' way through these defences on the morning of 5th August, the ironclad monitor Tecumseh, leading the port side column, ran into a torpedo and sank. Determined to press the assault, Farragut is reputed to have said "Damn the torpedoes, full steam ahead" The Federal fleet passed through the minefield, Farragut having guessed that the mines had been underwater for too long and ( mostly) were ineffective.


USS Tecumseh sinks after striking a torpedo, as the Union fleet steams passed Fort Morgan. Waiting to engage them are the CSS Tennessee and gunboats: