Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Sun 13 Jan 2019, 22:00
Since I first started in 2002 on the BBC board, I did research about that pact and over these 16 years I learned a lot about it. My interest was sparked for the first time by a small booklet in Dutch: The Nazi-Sovjet Pact, obviously written by a true Communist (in my opinion someone, who sticks to the original Marx thoughts). (I mentioned him several times on the BBC and can I suppose it still find back) There I learned about Poland not wanting to let the Red Army through there country, even under pressure of Britain and France. That was all in August 1939. Then the "slow boat" to Leningrad instead of a plane direct to Moscow of the British-French allies all in these crucial three weeks before the German invasion in Poland on first september. The British delegate even not having the right papers as accredited person or was it the French Doumenc? A real blame for Stalin.And in all that Ribbentrop was handling via a secret connection with Stalin, a Stalin distrusting the allies after the dishonest Czechoslovakian adventure, where the stupid Polish Beck was pacified with a piece of Czechian soil. And after all those years I saw this afternoon a French documentary which is a complete résumé of all what I learned through the years. It is very well made and in my opinion better than the nowadays BBC stuff, which has the enerving custom, as there German counterparts on Arte, to include some played stories with nowadays persons (which cost a lot of money for nothing, or is it to please a not to intellignet vieuwers public?), which don't add anything to the history and destroy even in my opinion the narrative... As an introduction the wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact After reading the wiki I see now that the documentary differs greatly from the wiki. The wiki seemingly defending the actions of the allies...and also from research of myself...
It is with French subtitles and I tries with English direct translation and the translation is in real English, while in the German one, the direct English subtitles are not that good, of course the German subtitles are real ones.
I hope, as I know Triceratops and MM and perhaps Vizzer and why not Tim or Dirk, will be interested and ask some questions that I can aswer then...
Comments on Hallifax, Antony Eden, Chamberlain, Churchill, Maiski tomorrow...
Kind regards from Paul.
Last edited by PaulRyckier on Sat 23 Jan 2021, 13:17; edited 1 time in total
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Tue 15 Jan 2019, 22:29
First to start with comments on
Ivan Maisky the best and most competent figure that emerged in the whole story. I rather take this Guardian article as lead than the wiki while it says more. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/20/the-miasky-diaries-review "Rarely has a foreign diplomat written such lively reports of his professional meetings in London. And what a world they cover. As well as meeting the top politicians of the day, from Halifax to Eden to Churchill, for regular tete-a-tete talks, Maisky made friends with figures such as David Lloyd George, by 1932 an elder statesman but still hugely influential. He also lunched with Lord Beaverbrook, the Astors and newspaper editors, as well as City tycoons and luminaries of the left, from HG Wells and George Bernard Shaw to John Maynard Keynes." Also a time picture of the British community of that time: "The era he records is only 80 years ago, yet the publicly articulated racism, antisemitism and snobbery that he encountered seems medieval today. When Maisky informs Beatrice Webb that Churchill told him “Better Communism than Nazism”, she shrugs and says this attitude is not typical of the British elite, before adding: “Churchill is not a true Englishman, you know. He has negro blood. You can even tell from his appearance.”" And one who can be potentially arrested at any moment by the Soviet Secret Police has to be careful what he writes to Stalin or Litvinov "He sometimes failed to inform Moscow faithfully about British policy-makers’ thinking. Only at the last minute did he tell his masters about Eden’s warnings to him in June 1941 that Hitler was only days away from attacking the Soviet Union. Maisky was less concerned about the impending invasion than that he would be blamed for treating earlier British warnings as provocations designed to turn Russia against Germany and for not having alerted the Kremlin."
Here is an extract of Maisky visiting Winston Churchill at home on 4 September 1938, on the eve of Chamberlain’s meeting with Hitler to decide the fate of Czechoslovakia: "I visited Churchill on his country estate. A wonderful place! Eighty-four acres of land. A huge green hollow. On one hillock stands the host’s two-storey stone house – large and tastefully presented. The terrace affords a breath-taking view of Kent’s hilly landscape, all clothed in a truly English dark-blue haze.[…] Churchill took me to a pavilion-cum-studio with dozens of paintings – his own creations – hanging on the walls. I liked some of them very much. Finally he showed me his pride and joy: a small brick cottage, still under construction, which he was building with his own hands in his free time.
While I read that Godoretski was handed over the Maisky diaries, there was a rememberance of the BBC board's time of a Suvorov with whom I had endless discussions and by him learned about the Soviet offensive controversion (perhaps was it the real Suvorov, who was on the BBC board and not his nickname (we had it on the BBC board witht eh real author of the Wellington-Blücher controversy)) I put hours and hours in the discussion with the BBC Suvorov till the end in 2012)
starting from page 44 Decision about the Polish garantee
20 or 21 March:Hallifax discarded the USSR proposal for a five power conference, perhpas in Bucharest. Exclusion of the USSSR by Hallifax and Chamberlain... for fear of Poland that was abhorrent of the USSR? The army in favour of the alliance with the USSR
Q3: Read sources 2 and 3. Explain why Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill held different views on forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. Can you think of any other reasons for Chamberlain not wanting to do a deal with Stalin. A3: Winston Churchill (source 3) believed that an alliance with the Soviet Union would help block Hitler in his desire to take back land as a result of Germany's defeat in the First World War. Churchill argued that such an agreement would "confront Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop, Goebbels and co. with forces the German people would be reluctant to challenge".
Kind regards from Paul.
Last edited by PaulRyckier on Sat 12 Sep 2020, 19:28; edited 1 time in total
nordmann Nobiles Barbariæ
Posts : 7223 Join date : 2011-12-25
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Wed 06 Feb 2019, 09:12
PaulRyckier wrote:
Pehrpas is it interesting too for nordmann to make a comparison with todays decision making
What's interesting regarding C.J. Hill's Oxford thesis from 1978 is what it reveals of presumptions about decision making within top-level British politics at the time he wrote it, immediately prior to Thatcher, in that they could still at that point naively include some very traditional notions without fear of automatic gainsay, such as a rather simplistic "ex ante" basis of reasoning that whoever holds power and how it is transmitted within Britain will always be ascertained within a strict framework of democratic principles, represented by and enshrined in the structure of the greater governmental machine, the workings of which are robust and virtually immune to corruption - a cosily simplistic and quaint notion in which peripherals such as public opinion and the press are simple "influences", in which an "unwritten constitution" can still be assumed to exist to a point that it actually is a "constitution" guaranteeing rights, liberties, and sound law-making, and in which corporate and financial paymasters stay firmly in the shadows, omitted from the analysis altogether rather than contemplate an actual role for them even in historical analysis, which - as we now know all too well - when examined tends to invalidate every presumption about democracy as it is commonly presumed to exist.
More innocent times indeed, and as C.J. Hill's thesis otherwise reveals some good intelligence and insight on the author's part one can only presume that he/she has since revised their assumptions considerably. It would be interesting to read how they would tackle analysis of British foreign policy in the late 30s now, 40 years after their last attempt. The repeated reference within the thesis to an ambivalence concerning the true locus of power at any point in the period addressed is encouraging - the same sceptical prism applied to more modern politics would lead to rather less deferentially phrased a thesis, I imagine!
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Wed 06 Feb 2019, 22:15
Excuses nordmann, the whole evening more search about the Anglo-Soviet relations in 1939.
Thank you very much for your insightful reply (as I expected from you) that I read word for word to be sure that I understood it all rightly.
In April 1938, following the fall of the second Blum government, Bonnet was appointed Foreign Minister under Daladier as Premier (despite their quarrel in 1937, they had reconciled). Bonnet was a staunch supporter of the Munich Agreement in 1938 and was firmly opposed to taking military action against German expansion; for the most part, he preferred to follow a course of appeasement. In 1938–1939, there were three factions within the French government. One, led by Bonnet, felt that France could not afford an arms race with Nazi Germany and sought a détente with the Reich.[20][21] As an expert in financial matters and a former Finance minister, Bonnet was acutely aware of the damages inflicted by the arms race on an economy already weakened by the Great Depression. A second faction, led by Paul Reynaud, Jean Zay, and Georges Mandel, favored a policy of resistance to German expansionism. A third faction, led by Daladier, stood halfway between the other two and favored appeasement of Germany to buy time to re-arm.[20]
I will try to make a coherent résumé of it and to give my conclusions of what was possible about the Triple Alliance before the German-Soviet treaty in August 1939.
Kind regards from Paul.
Tim of Aclea Decemviratus Legibus Scribundis
Posts : 626 Join date : 2011-12-31
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Mon 11 Feb 2019, 17:17
Paul
I consider the political decision making of the UK government in the period up to the start of WW2 to have been an unmitigated disaster. In the first chapter of my book and as a background to the decision making with regard to the construction of the protected storage system, I do briefly deal with the failure of the government's appeasement policy which led to the Soviets deciding to sign the pact with the Nazis:
'On 7th March 1936, Adolf Hitler sent a small German force to reoccupy the German Rhineland with orders to withdraw if there were any opposition. There was none from the French army which was materially and psychologically equipped only for defence. In July of the same year, civil war broke out in Spain when General Franco tried to overthrow the Republican government. There was concern that this civil war could spread throughout Europe.'
'On 12th March 1938 Hitler invaded Austria. The invasion did not run at all smoothly with, for example, the 2nd Panzer division neither having enough fuel nor proper maps for the 200 mile journey to Vienna. The panzers had to use Baedeker tourist guides to Austria, borrowed trucks for tankers and stopped off at petrol stations to refuel. In addition large numbers of panzers suffered mechanical failures and the roads were littered with abandoned tanks. Despite this clear failure of ‘German efficiency’, Britain and France did nothing concrete to oppose Germany and, with support from the great majority of the Austrian population, the country was annexed to the German Reich.'
'Following the annexation of Austria, Hitler began planning for the destruction of the state of Czechoslovakia and the absorption of the Sudetenland Germans into the Reich. With the threat of war increasing the Air Ministry continued to escalate its storage requirements to 410,000 of aviation fuel and 26,000 tons of lubricating oil and then to 800,000 tons and 50,000 tons respectively. The Air Ministry had also managed to increase its actual reserve holding on commercial sites to 82,000 tons of aviation fuel and 6,000 tons of lubricating oil by June 1938. In September 1938, Czechoslovakia, which had a relatively well-equipped army of 36 divisions and powerful fortifications, mobilised its armed forces. It also had a defensive alliance with France and the support of the Soviet Union against a possible German attack. However, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was determined to avoid war with Germany at all costs. Britain and France, therefore, bullied the Czechoslovaks into accepting Hitler’s demands to occupy the Sudetenland. This left Czechoslovakia helpless against any further German aggression. Hitler, himself was contemptuous of Chamberlain and the French leader, Daladier, describing them at the time of the Munich agreement as ‘nonentities’ and later as ‘small worms’. '
'It was not until March 1939 that the first of the AFDDs were filled with aviation gasoline, a month that saw a dramatic change in Britain’s foreign policy. On 15th March, in defiance of the Munich agreement, Germany invaded and annexed the remaining Czech lands, while Slovakia became a German satellite state. Chamberlain was fearful that Poland, a military dictatorship which had taken part in the carve-up of Czechoslovakia, would now ally itself with Germany, offered the Poles an alliance. The British Government, which had previously tried to avoid a war with Germany at all costs, now committed itself, in theory, to support Poland , if it were attacked by Germany. Britain engaged in dilatory talks with the Soviet Union while trying to persuade Hitler of the benefits of peace. Meanwhile a limited form of conscription was introduced in Britain and more AFDDs became operational in June, July and August. On 23rd August Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and on 1st September Germany attacked Poland. The Poles called for the immediate assistance from their allies, but met with no immediate response from the British government. However, ‘the House of Commons forced war on a reluctant British government, and that government dragged an even more reluctant French government in their train.’
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Mon 11 Feb 2019, 20:25
Tim,
thank you very much for this excellent résumé, especially in the light of the fuel supply to the different armies. Apart from the fuel supply I did research about it during the last 16 years for the several boards and indeed what you write is conform to all what I found, thank you.
" However, ‘the House of Commons forced war on a reluctant British government, and that government dragged an even more reluctant French government in their train.’ " Tim, that is a bit new to me, I thought that it was Churchill, once voted for, who was the instigator once asked to form a cabinet? Have to check it all...
But perhaps the reluctance to go to war with Germany, was perhaps: both were democracies, and a general asking (learned this evening: not demand) for peace by the populations from both Britain and France, the responsabilities of both to their dominions and colonies, a strong opposition I guess to Communism in Britain?, but less in France?. But certainly in the Low Countries there was a groundswell among the population against Communism and for neutrality, which resulted among others a change to neutrality in Belgium from the treaty with France (as the Dutch had done in WWI).
"1. The takeover of Czechoslovakia shook the British from their appeasement mode, but that did not put them on a war mode. Rather, the thinking was to take action that would discourage the Germans from considerations of further expansion. At this stage it was to work with countries at risk - so the offers to Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey, with only Poland accepting a full guarantee. Interesting that Chamberlain was happy to accept the Polish and Romanian view that allowing Soviet troops through their countries ran the high risk of them staying. 2. Emerging information that the Germans were serious about invading Poland (end of March) pushed the British to sharing their information with the Soviets and considering their proposal for an alliance - that was rejected mainly because it was too strong an act for the "Peace Front" to discourage Hitler the British favoured at that time."
Yes, at that time, Chamberlain and Hallifax seemed still to be in a kind of appeasement mode, they still wanted a peace settlement and only to deter Hitler, they gave, in from what I read, a "non-binding"? guarantee. To hold all options open, thinking they had still time, not thinking yet immediately at war? But in March they had no time anymore and the consequence would be war. And if they wanted real chances on a preliminary peace with Hitler, they had better made an alliance with the Soviets, whatever the Soviets stood for? As the visionary Churchill saw it?
And yes under the thread of the Soviet-German negociations they started at the end the negociations with the Soviets, but as you have perhaps read also in the diplomatic process, Chamberlain gave it then to the full slow discussion of the parliament, instead of his trial for a quick decision making of the Polish guarantee? Yes of course that is the prerogative of dictators as a Stalin and a Hitler and that goes quite otherwise than in democracies...
"3. The change of Soviet Foreign Minister from Litvinov (generally pro-West) to Molotov (generally pro-German) raised the possibility of a Soviet German pact and increasing the likelihood of war, encouraged the British to consider a tripartite alliance with the Soviets favourably, to restrain Germany and prevent a pact between them (latter part of May)."
There seems to be controversy even there.... https://www.jstor.org/stable/260946?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents We will never know what played in the mind of Stalin, but I don't think in March Stalin had not yet decided to negociate with Hitler, after all the Alliance with France and Britain was the best military option I think. And even it can also be that the change Litvinov-Molotov can be as some member on this thread said a change for a more tough negociator versus the Litivinov, who was too soft against the British?
"So it is hard to answer the the question should the West have done more to develop an alliance with the Soviet Union. The last chance they had was to accept the tripartite alliance proposed by Mayskiy the Soviet Ambassador to London. By May 1939 Stalin had probably lost all confidence and trust in the West doing something constructive about the rising German threat.
The real problem in 1939 was misreading Hitler's intentions - and that was not just a problem in 1939. Its more a case of the West in wanting to avoid a war regardless of the unfolding reality , resulted in a clouding of its judgement of events and poor responses that eventually antagonised a party that may have helped to contain Germany. But the Soviet Union was an unknown quantity, and as Churchill quipped years later, it was a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma". How do yo deal with that?"
Yes Motorbike, you are completely right, and they had besides that also to reckon in alll their decisons with their dominions? And in the meantime they had also the Irish "difficulties"? But France was also not that quite peaceful in the time, not that much better than Britain? But then they had only to look to the "personality" of dictator Stalin,and not to the, in some eyes, abhorrent Communist ideology? In any case the pragmatic Hitler had no difficulty with it?
I will try to compare the four (and make first a list of them) about this particular question..."
And Tim today I start first with the four articles in one line to condense from the four about what is said about the question of the Tripartite Alliance:
I have now finally read all four articles, nearly books that I mentioned before.
My preliminary comments on the first sight...
First I only consider the appeasement of the British government as crucial in objecting the Soviet partnership, as France seems to be following always its British partner in all its decisions for the better or the worse, also in its relation with the Soviets, although they seem to have been more Soviet Alliance minded than their British counterparts?
I wasn't aware until now that there was such a broad anti-appeasers and pro Soviet Alliance front even from Munich on? And it culminated further in March after the invasion of rump Czechoslovakia into a pressure group to demand negociations with the Soviets from May on?
We will never know what was going on in the mind of Stalin, but it appears that the Soviet proposals were genuine in 1938, in March 1939 but then was the crucial moment when the Soviets started to think about alternatives, as German-Soviet negociations?
Throughout all this the only one, who sticked to his appeasement trials to Germany, ignoring for whatever reason the Soviet Union was Chamberlain?
I recommend for that the reading of the last thesis that I mentioned.
Kind regards, Paul.
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Sat 23 Jan 2021, 13:16
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Thu 06 May 2021, 19:55
There was a guy called "Suromov" or similar on the BBC boards who had a very Soviet view of all this. The gist was that the USSR was going to attack the Nazi's when the Nazi's launched "Barbarossa".
The Germany/USSR pact was the most unlikely alliance of modern history. Stalin must have read or known the content of Mein Kampf,which was basically a blue print of his ambition. Hitler must have known that to obtain world socialism Stalin would have to strike west.
Yet they put this aside to obtain certain materials they needed. The USSR supplied raw materials,Germany supplied technology - for example an unfinished cruiser. They were also after armoured plate and large calibre naval guns.
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Fri 07 May 2021, 20:22
VF wrote:
There was a guy called "Suromov" or similar on the BBC boards who had a very Soviet view of all this. The gist was that the USSR was going to attack the Nazi's when the Nazi's launched "Barbarossa".
The Germany/USSR pact was the most unlikely alliance of modern history. Stalin must have read or known the content of Mein Kampf,which was basically a blue print of his ambition. Hitler must have known that to obtain world socialism Stalin would have to strike west.
Yet they put this aside to obtain certain materials they needed. The USSR supplied raw materials,Germany supplied technology - for example an unfinished cruiser. They were also after armoured plate and large calibre naval guns.
Dear Virtual Fletch,
yes Suvorov...I commented him in my message of 15 January 2019:
"While I read that Gorodetski was handed over the Maisky diaries, there was a rememberance of the BBC board's time of a Suvorov with whom I had endless discussions and by him learned about the Soviet offensive controversion (perhaps was it the real Suvorov, who was on the BBC board and not his nickname (we had it on the BBC board with the real author of the Wellington-Blücher controversy)) I put hours and hours in the discussion with the BBC Suvorov till the end in 2012)" And yes there is also a real Russian general Suvorov: https://www.warhistoryonline.com/history/alexander-suvorov-great-generalissimo-never-lost-battle.html
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Fri 07 May 2021, 21:34
PaulRyckier wrote:
VF wrote:
There was a guy called "Suromov" or similar on the BBC boards who had a very Soviet view of all this. The gist was that the USSR was going to attack the Nazi's when the Nazi's launched "Barbarossa".
The Germany/USSR pact was the most unlikely alliance of modern history. Stalin must have read or known the content of Mein Kampf,which was basically a blue print of his ambition. Hitler must have known that to obtain world socialism Stalin would have to strike west.
Yet they put this aside to obtain certain materials they needed. The USSR supplied raw materials,Germany supplied technology - for example an unfinished cruiser. They were also after armoured plate and large calibre naval guns.
Dear Virtual Fletch,
yes Suvorov...I commented him in my message of 15 January 2019:
"While I read that Gorodetski was handed over the Maisky diaries, there was a rememberance of the BBC board's time of a Suvorov with whom I had endless discussions and by him learned about the Soviet offensive controversion (perhaps was it the real Suvorov, who was on the BBC board and not his nickname (we had it on the BBC board with the real author of the Wellington-Blücher controversy)) I put hours and hours in the discussion with the BBC Suvorov till the end in 2012)" And yes there is also a real Russian general Suvorov: https://www.warhistoryonline.com/history/alexander-suvorov-great-generalissimo-never-lost-battle.html
Ive got to be honest I didn't buy all of what he said. I get that it was a race to see who could get the first blow in first but I remain unconvinced that Stalin was on the cusp when Hitler launched Barbarossa. He had received a multitude of warnings from the perfidious British prior and if he really was going to strike he could have done it whilst the Nazi's prepared. He was caught flatfooted IMHO. He knew that at some point something would happen but I don't think that he thought it would be 1941. 1944 maybe.
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Sat 08 May 2021, 16:12
VF wrote:
Ive got to be honest I didn't buy all of what he said. I get that it was a race to see who could get the first blow in first but I remain unconvinced that Stalin was on the cusp when Hitler launched Barbarossa. He had received a multitude of warnings from the perfidious British prior and if he really was going to strike he could have done it whilst the Nazi's prepared. He was caught flatfooted IMHO. He knew that at some point something would happen but I don't think that he thought it would be 1941. 1944 maybe.
The author was first convinced that the Suvorov thesis was not right, but after some six years he got hesitating by new research and at the end he is still hesitating, as only the leaving of the ban on Russian documents can bring more clarity. In the following interview at the end Broekmeyer says that he is eager to see the minutes of the general meeting of 24 May 1941 were the last planning was mentioned to the generals... Of course that would be perhaps even today in the nowedays Putin Russia a bit embarrasing? A bit as I see now on French fora about their "famous" Napoléon... History intervenes many times in nowadays politics...especially with right-wing governments...as in my opinion for instance the nowadays Russian government...
My English is not good enough to make a résumé of it. Perhaps if Dirk Marinus has some time, as I think he has more practical experience of the English language...
My English is not good enough to make a résumé of it. Perhaps if Dirk Marinus has some time, as I think he has more practical experience of the English language...
Of course I am always willing to help out. What can I help you with?
Dirk
PaulRyckier Censura
Posts : 4902 Join date : 2012-01-01 Location : Belgium
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Mon 10 May 2021, 18:04
Dirk, I have again listened to the interview with Broekmeyer and read the comments of the "Historisch Nieuwsblad" and in my opinion it is difficult to summarize. Six years before that book, he was still not believing in the Suvorov thesis of the "Icebreaker".
I discussed the "icebreaker" nearly to death on the BBC in the time, with the guy with the "nom de plume" of Suvorov. If it wasn't the real Suvorov , it was certainly a Russian in my opinion due to details of his English language (I studied in the time some Russian and yes in conjunction with that a lot of Russian history)... And during nearly a year I checked all his arguments and I see that Broekmeyer in the interview uses all the arguments now of Suvorov.
For me and I ask what you think about it from the interview: as a summary Broekmeyer says that after six years (an he never mentions the name Suvorov in the interview) he found in his studies now that as I understand it, he now found that there are that many "aanwijzingen" (indications?) for this offensive preventive war. At the end he mentions also the general meeting of Stalin with the generals of 24 May, but the data aren't yet public for the moment. And yes that "nickname" Suvorov pondered also about that meeting of 24 May 1941 in which Stalin would have spoken about his thinking about an offensive war...
But nothing yet "concrete" in my opinion and until we have real fiable sources, it will be always a guessing. And for fiable sources in the Russia of nowadays Putin...?
Kind regards, Paul.
Dirk Marinus Consulatus
Posts : 300 Join date : 2016-02-03
Subject: Re: Road to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Mon 10 May 2021, 20:32
Paul,
Going back to the BBC forum and the member you named as Suvorov.
There is something in the back of my mind that he was actually an administrative employee at the Russian Embassy.
Home 
(we had it on the BBC board witht eh real author of the Wellington-Blücher controversy))
