The German Invasion of France and the Low Countries has been mentioned over on the Tumbleweed Bar, so I thought it might be worthwhile opening a thread of its' own.

As chance would have it, I am currently reading this book:



Despite the title, the first half of this 800 page opus deals with the events on the Continent during May and June 1940.
The unexpected route through the Ardennes, caught the Allies by surprise. Coincidentally, Churchill termed this initial phase,"The Battle of the Bulge", but unlike 1944, the French High Command was struck by paralysis and failed to react. Old age, most of them were in their 60s, being one reason Holland gives for this paralysis.

German paratroopers drop into the Netherlands, 10th May 1940:

Thanks Triceratops for the initiating, but too late today. Till tomorrow.

Your friend Paul.

The German Offensive was designed to draw the Allies forward into Belgium. To attack Belgium themselves, the Germans had to capture the powerful fort at Eben Emael on the Albert Canal:

The Western Allies, assuming the Germans were doing a variant of their 1914 Invasion Plan, pushed some of their best formations, the French 7th Army and the BEF forward to the River Dyle in Belgium to meet the German attack.

The main German attack force was meanwhile advancing through the Ardennes:

The Germans reached the River Meuse at Sedan on the 12th May.

Pre-war exercise had shown that France was vulnerable in this area:

wiki:
The French assessments were less credible in the light of military exercises carried out in 1938. That year, General André-Gaston Prételat took command of manoeuvres which created a scenario whereby the German Army launched an assault with seven divisions, including four motorised infantry divisions and two tank brigades (the type of the remaining three are not given). The "French" side's defences collapsed. "The result was a defeat of so comprehensive a nature that the wisdom of publishing it was questioned lest morale be damaged." As late as March 1940, a French report to Gamelin named the defences at Sedan, the last "fortified" position on the Meuse, and the last before the open country of France, as "entirely inadequate." Prételat had correctly identified the landscape as relatively easy terrain for armour to cross. At most, he concluded, the Germans would take 60 hours to reach the Meuse and take one day to cross it. This estimate to was to prove only three hours too late. The Germans achieved the Meuse crossing after just 57 hours.

Triceratops,

I did some research about the subject on the old BBC board. The Advanced google search don't work anymore, nor the own search device of the messageboard. So I had to search via clicking on my name and that is a Tantalos work. The thread: "Defending the French in their 1940 defeat" is on page 123 of the Wars and Conflicts in April 2006...
And it is odd to see all the messages from the contributors as a Caro, an Islanddawn a Vizzer who are still on this Res Historica...

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=8276765&skip=50
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=6389589&skip=100
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4074510
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4372563
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2359047
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=3521719
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2321509


See you tomorrow...

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops wrote:

Triceratops thank you very much for this documentary.

PS: When I said to Meles meles on the tumbleweet site: "a strange defeat" I was referring to the book of Marc Bloch "l'étrange défaite"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Bloch
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/theoryandpractice/2015/08/marc_bloch_strange_defeat_1944.html
He was captured and shot dead in 1944 by the Gestapo.
But I don't find for the moment, but I know it, he has written the book "strange defeat" while in German captivity after Fall Gelb

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

I found this excellent summary from the BBC. I will use it as backbone for my comments on Fall Gelb. And when you comment or when neccesary for my comments , I will use quotes from the several threads on the old BBC messageboard...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml


And to start with about your map.
There were several delays of the start of the campaign, 11 if I remember it well, mostly to bad weather. But most notorious was the crashlanding of the German plane in Maasmechelen with the campaign plans of Fall Gelb. it were essential the old doctrine Schlieffen plans. von Manstein had already the Ardennes breakthrough proposed, but with this incident Hitler already hesitating backed the von Manstein plan.
The evolution in the maps:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/1939-1940-battle_of_france-plan-evolution.jpg
enlarge the picture to 150% to better see it:


 Kind regards, Paul.

Paul, I couldn't get some of the links to work. Some of them did...... Stalti and Buckskinz from 11 years ago.

Short film showing the breakthrough to Abbeville, and Case Red, the Invasion south of the Somme:




Battle of Abbeville

Triceratops wrote:

Paul, I couldn't get some of the links to work. Some of them did...... Stalti and Buckskinz from 11 years ago.

Short film showing the breakthrough to Abbeville, and Case Red, the Invasion south of the Somme:




Battle of Abbeville

Thanks for the documentary again Triceratops.
Stalti and Buckskinz...where are the times....
In the beginning he wrote as: "stalteriisok" I sais once to him: "Is that a Russian name" (I studied a bit of Russian...in fact three years in evening school) and then he said to me: "No, no, it is our local football equipe: "Stalteri". From there Stalteri is OK
He thanked me because I did research for the enigma of the 100,000 French, who were shipped to Britain in operation Dynamo.
And I found it all...they nearly immediately returned to France to fight on in the "redoute bretonne" and nearly the rest returned after the armistice after Churchill had shown at Mers-el-Kebir that if he said he would fight on he meant it...so de Gaulle had only a mere three thousend men in London. I remember that that was one of my first questions from an honourable member of the board in 2002: How was it possible that de Gaulle only remained with some thousand, while there were some 100,000 French evacuated to Britain? But in that time I wasn't not yet that clever and had no access to the mighty nowadays internet. What an evolution in only 15 years.
There is a lengthy thread on "Passion Histoire" about the new film "Dunkirk", with pros and contras . And even our Belgian WWII historian is talking about the non-existence of the Belgians in the film...and he said (have yet to search for it) that some Belgian group of soldiers from Ypres fought on even after the capitulation to hold the Germans under Liège and so retarded the advance to the Channel, which was also good for Dunkirk....The French say that you can't even see Germans in the film .

Yes, Buckskins, I said once to him that his nom de plume was in our dialect: buksvel ("buk" a male rabbit and "vel" skin, hence the skin of a male rabbit) If I remember it well he started here too as harry bloodaxe or something like that or was it on Historum?
He once ridiculized me completely on the BBC board for my polite approach: warm regards and all that. And who defended me on the boards even to a Buckskins: The Nordmann...If Priscilla was already then on the BBC board...

NORDMANN WHERE ARE YOU???

Kind regards from your friend Paul.

Triceratops,

"Paul, I couldn't get some of the links to work. Some of them did...... Stalti and Buckskinz from 11 years ago."

You can view them on the BBC history messageboard:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811

I think I started somewhere on page 122 or so in April 2006: With the thread: "Defending the French in their 1940 defeat"
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2359047
I think I am gone then for the recenter threads, but I am not sure. If you have difficulties I can you guide to the particular thread. Ask for it. But I guess I will need them all during the debate and will comment them then automatically.
It's all in this thread my message 8
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=3521719

 Kind regards, Paul.

Having reached the Channel, the Panzers now turned North towards Boulogne & Calais;

Battle of Boulogne

Paul,
I saw the new Dunkirk film on Saturday. I thought it was OK as a cinema experience. The history I' m not so sure about. eg the film starts in Dunkirk with a group of British soldiers being fired on by machine guns and rifles. Now I'm fairly sure there were no Germans in Dunkirk until the 4th June, by which time all the British had been evacuated.
And just how much ammunition did those Spitfires have? Seemed a lot more than the 14 seconds worth they had in real life.
I watched the 1958 version on Sunday afternoon and frankly thought it( the 1958 film) was a better film all round.

This one I've never seen. French film from 1964, A Weekend at Dunkirk;

Triceratops wrote:

Paul,
I saw the new Dunkirk film on Saturday. I thought it was OK as a cinema experience. The history I' m not so sure about. eg the film starts in Dunkirk with a group of British soldiers being fired on by machine guns and rifles. Now I'm fairly sure there were no Germans in Dunkirk until the 4th June, by which time all the British had been evacuated.
And just how much ammunition did those Spitfires have? Seemed a lot more than the 14 seconds worth they had in real life.
I watched the 1958 version on Sunday afternoon and frankly thought it( the 1958 film) was a better film all round.

This one I've never seen. French film from 1964, A Weekend at Dunkirk;

Triceratops,

thanks for the map and site about the battle of Boulogne.
About the film:

Splendid film with great French stars. I saw it nearly immediately after 1964 while my boss in the factory drow my attention to it. The original French title is: "Week end à Zuydcoote"
http://www.allocine.fr/video/player_gen_cmedia=19371657&cfilm=40626.html

The full film in French, but here you have to give your birthday, because it is an "adult" film and I don't trust such stuff
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsOzw1w81S8
About the actors:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seQ8vMKN3fg
I am a bit disappointed that I can see it for free, or one had to pay a small amount or have to subscribe what I don't trust too.
I searched for a free version of the English version but there it was the same.
But I think Triceratops if you want to see it you will find a method...it is certainly worthwhile...it is unbelievable good...
BTW about Zuydcoote it is in French Flanders and all the names of the former county of Flanders there are in Dutch...a bit Frenchisized...as Zuydcoote...pronounced a bit as "swittkoate" with the "oo" as in "coast"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zuydcoote
And in Dutch:
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zuidkote
"Zuidkote komt van de Nederlandse woorden zout en kot. Letterlijk zou het dus als Zouthut moeten vertaald worden"
"zouthut" "zout en kot."
about the ethymology: from zout (salt) and kot (the translate in my dictionary with "hovel" and "pen") and "hut" the translate as "hut"
I would rather chose for "Zuid" (south) but who am I
It is besides Braydunes better pronounced than our Bredene (near Ostend) (broad dunes?)
And I learned from the Dutch wiki for the first time in my life:
Robert Merle schreef in 1949 de roman Week-end à Zuydcoote, een verhaal uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog over een Franse soldaat die probeert per schip in Engeland te raken, maar tegelijk probeert zijn leven door te brengen tussen de Duitsers. Het verhaal werd in 1964 verfilmd door Henri Verneuil.
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Merle
Born in Algeria 1908. "Merle studeerde er filosofie en Engels. Hij maakte een doctoraatsthesis over Oscar Wilde. Hij ging lesgeven in Bordeaux, Marseille en ten slotte in Neuilly-sur-Seine, waar hij kennis maakte met Jean-Paul Sartre, die er filosofie doceerde."
Author of the novel "Weekend at Zuydcoote" in 1949. Film in 1964 by Verneuil


Kind regards, Paul.

Sorry Triceratops the whole evening busy with the Leopold thread on Historum against "deaf tuner"...

Kind regards, Paul.

The Allies were not the only ones with generals still thinking in WW1 terms. The Panzers and Mechanised Divisions may have been motoring across the French countryside, but the bulk of the German Army was still on foot and horse and were advancing at 1914 speeds. Concerned that his Armour was becoming isolated, von Rundstedt issued a halt order to the Panzers at 8pm on the 23rd May. The order was confirmed by Hitler the following day.
This was met by incredulity by the forward divisions. Guderian's Panzers had reached the River Aa, just 10 miles west of Dunkirk by the morning of the 24th and were closer to the port than the bulk of the BEF which was still to the east at Arras.
For the BEF, it provided time to rush Divisions back to block the German advance on it's southern flank.
Wounded and non combat personnel had begun evacuating as early as the 19th, on the evening of the 25th, the British C-in-C, Lord Gort, took the decision to pull the BEF back to the coast.

This link is to James Holland's blog and contains excerpts from his book:

The Halt Order

Triceratops wrote:

The Allies were not the only ones with generals still thinking in WW1 terms. The Panzers and Mechanised Divisions may have been motoring across the French countryside, but the bulk of the German Army was still on foot and horse and were advancing at 1914 speeds. Concerned that his Armour was becoming isolated, von Rundstedt issued a halt order to the Panzers at 8pm on the 23rd May. The order was confirmed by Hitler the following day.
This was met by incredulity by the forward divisions. Guderian's Panzers had reached the River Aa, just 10 miles west of Dunkirk by the morning of the 24th and were closer to the port than the bulk of the BEF which was still to the east at Arras.
For the BEF, it provided time to rush Divisions back to block the German advance on it's southern flank.
Wounded and non combat personnel had begun evacuating as early as the 19th, on the evening of the 25th, the British C-in-C, Lord Gort, took the decision to pull the BEF back to the coast.

This link is to James Holland's blog and contains excerpts from his book:

The Halt Order

Ah, Triceratops, das Haltbefehl.

I read I think some 1000 pages about it...
This one in English from Frog (a Frenchman also contributing to Passion histoire but less and less) on Historum.
I haven't read it in full as I had already read that much pages that it became boring...
http://historum.com/war-military-history/44268-haltbefehl-24th-may-27th-may-1940-debate-theories.html

The German take essential based on the book of Frieser:
https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/article141471075/Warum-Hitler-die-Briten-entkommen-liess.html

http://www.delpla.org/article.php3?id_article=615

François Delpla commenting Frieser. François is a bit isolated with his point of view that Hitler halted Guderian because he had in mind a peace deal with Britain. He would have said to General von Blumentritt that he decided because of a political point of view.
I think I stopped reading the subject at Delpla after some 700 pages if I recall it well...
Another thread initiated by François on the subject and counteracted by my French tank expert Alain Adam on Le monde en guerre:
https://www.39-45.org/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=23180&start=3440
I said it some thousands of pages
If I have time I will make a résumé of the main theories about the reason's of the Hitler Haltbefehl.

Kind regards, Paul.

Article on the Dunkirk Evacuation;

Operation Dynamo

This is a link to a BBC site showing the shrinking of the Dunkirk perimeter;

Dunkirk Maps

Thank you for the links of yesterday Triceratops.
About the footage. there too I thank you for.
Coincidentally I had some two newsreels in English with some rare footage about Dynamo, but sadly in my hurry I didn't put them in my favourites and now I don't find them back.
During the research I found this:


You can say it is propaganda of the time, but nevertheless it is "real" footage of that time.
I watched during years "Histoires parallelles" (parallel histories) from Marc Ferro and it was ceratinly at the level of "The World at War" (Meles meles I forgot to comment on your mentioning of the World at War on another thread)
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1413-77042014000100216
https://www.slideshare.net/EUscreen/jean-christophe-meyer-histoire-parallledie-woche-vor-50-jahren-lieu-de-mmoire
Have a look to the slideshow, especially slide 17. It is a pity that this excellent series is not available to the general public, there is so much drivel on the net and this, a real worthy series isn't available, but solely through the INA or through another specialized institution...sigh...There was a time that one could look in the archive of ARTE, but that too is gone if I recall it well. But I think that you can buy it on DVD from ARTE.

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

I am not forgotten you, but such a lot of interesting subjects for the moment on several fora, so busy...
Perhaps you are in holidays now and when the "factory" is open again you will reappear...

Kind regards from your friend Paul.

I've been busy with other things, Paul.

Meantime here is the map of the opening German attack south of the River Somme:

Triceratops,

thanks for the map and all on the battle of France

And you are already at Fall Rot, I haven't done yet Fall Gelb

Some points I want to speak about:
Fierce resistance from the French soldiers, they fought as lions, also if I recall it well the tactic of the eagle defense pockets. Most casualties of the French soldiers were then.
About la redoute bretonne
The famous Maginot line taken from the back...
It is of course a what-if:
What if the BEF and especially the French had not sent their best troops in Belgium and more important their best army corps into The Netherlands. Stayed in France and then a quick move to the Sedan pocket when the German tanks pushed through the Ardennes?

I solemnly promise to start my comments tomorrow evening...oops...have to go to dinner...but certainly the day after

Kind regards from your friend Paul.

PaulRyckier wrote:

Triceratops wrote:

Triceratops thank you very much for this documentary.

PS: When I said to Meles meles on the tumbleweet site: "a strange defeat" I was referring to the book of Marc Bloch "l'étrange défaite"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Bloch
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/theoryandpractice/2015/08/marc_bloch_strange_defeat_1944.html
He was captured and shot dead in 1944 by the Gestapo.
But I don't find for the moment, but I know it, he has written the book "strange defeat" while in German captivity after Fall Gelb

Kind regards, Paul.

 Triceratops,

saw now the entire documentary:

interesting documentary and well brought with each time a map of the situation.

Some minor remarks:
In the film they speak about an armistice of Leopold III, while in my opinion it was a capitulation. For the interested ones it is quite a difference. I had some days ago a big discussion with a, I suppose, Belgian French speaking one,  on Historum, Deaf Tuner about Leopold III and many items remain still "hot" even 75 years after the war. It can be that Leopold III asked an armistice to the Germans, but I don't know how he could do that with the Belgian government in France and against surrender. In fact the Germans required an unconditional surrender, which is in my opinion a capitulation.
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Capitulation.aspx

"Accordingly, the obligation to surrender is the essential content of an agreement on capitulation and not the surrender itself. The surrender is executed only on the basis of this agreement....
"Capitulation can be concluded with or without conditions. Conditional capitulation would occur when the capitulating party obtained for itself more favourable conditions than from a simple surrender. Any other capitulation is unconditional, that is, a capitulation in which the capitulating party accepts all the obligations issuing from the general laws of war in case of capitulation, as well as in the case when graver conditions are accepted through these obligations which are imposed by the other party. Unconditional surrender is concluded when the defeated party which wishes to surrender, expresses the wish to the other side to make an agreement about the surrender, without laying down any terms, that is, under the general conditions provided by the laws of war for such a situation, assuming that the other side accepts this."
On wiki they say "armistice" in the text and then show a photo of the negociating of Leopold III with the Germans about the "capitulation"
Thus not the same as the armistice of Pétain!

Second minor remark: They speak from 25,000 French evacuated. Or was that only the last day? There were some 100,000 French evacuated and they were nearly immediately transferred again from Britain and redeployed in Brittany to fight further...

Kind regards from Paul.

PaulRyckier wrote:

Triceratops,

I did some research about the subject on the old BBC board. The Advanced google search don't work anymore, nor the own search device of the messageboard. So I had to search via clicking on my name and that is a Tantalos work. The thread: "Defending the French in their 1940 defeat" is on page 123 of the Wars and Conflicts in April 2006...
And it is odd to see all the messages from the contributors as a Caro, an Islanddawn a Vizzer who are still on this Res Historica...

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=8276765&skip=50
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=6389589&skip=100
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4074510
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4372563
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2359047
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=3521719
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2321509


See you tomorrow...

Kind regards, Paul.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=8276765&skip=50

Wise words from Mutatis Mutandis on 18 September 2011
"But between the defeat in the northwest, which sealed the fate of the French army, and the 17th, the French soldiers had for the most part fought tenaciously. In part because of new, more sensible tactical instructions promulgated by the new C-in-C Weygand, German casualty rates were actually rising. German commanders were impressed by the fierceness of the resistance on the Somme and Aisne, although they were confident of victory: As French mobile reserves had already been destroyed, the French army was no longer able to plug the gaps were the Germans broke through. Weygand had no illusions.

There was a qualitative difference, as Hitler himself remarked: The core of 65 "active" divisions of the French conscript army fought hard, but the additional reserve divisions mobilized in time of war lacked training, and were often very weakly officered. It was the French misfortune that what turned out to be a crucial sector of their front, the center near Sedan, was thinly held by armies of mostly reserve divisions: It collapsed under the German assault.

There were two decisive factors in the French defeat in 1940. The major one was the foolishness of the operational plan embraced by the Allies, combined with the risky but intelligent decision of the Germans to shift the focus of their attack from their right flank to the center. This settled the military fate of the Allied armies, which were not inferior in numbers and firepower (and on occasion won tactical victories) but were trapped in a classic envelopment. The minor one was the distrust the French generals, for the most part of a right-wing conservative cut, felt towards their own population. Many seem to have feared that, as in 1871, the defeat would trigger a revolution or an attempted revolution; they became more concerned with maintaining "law and order" than with fighting the Germans."

And my reply:
"Mutatis mutandis,

thank you very much for this message. Couldn't agree more with it.
About the battle of France:[url=http://books.google.be/books?id=3IeGuqVcUGIC&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=1940+BATTLE+OF+FRANCE+french+soldiers+killed&source=bl&ots=CzKUVSfRwh&sig=WVfIP7jjMKAAI9titOy4krrSgG0&hl=nl&ei=L1t2Tqm0F4yg-wbN2pjDDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CD4Q6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=1940 BATTLE OF FRANCE french soldiers]books.google.be/book...[/url]
from the book: "from 4 June to 18 June, when one would have expected the French troops to have entirely demoralized, it rose to almost 5,000 (casualties) per day"
That coincides with all what I read from other "honest" sources....

About the right wing attitudes you mention I remember an episode confirmed from other sources. Pétain? I have to search for confirmation (in any case a right wing politician) said that (at Limoges? (have to confirm that too)) that the left wing was occupying Paris. A simple phone call from Reynaud to the head of police of Paris confirmed that nothing had happened at Paris. Just to say that Pétain was more considered with the inner social attitudes than with the war. Will try to confirm that all exactly tomorrow. I read it first some years ago in the collapse of the third republic from William Shirer but it was confirmed in other books I read later."

And read once message 68   of my friend Raph, who also writes or wrote on Historum and Passion Histoire...

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=6389589&skip=100




My message from 17 July 2009
Addendum to message 140.

about the worth of an extension of the Maginot line till Dunkirk.

First about the Maginot line and its worth:
www.historylearnings...
www.axishistory.com/...
I have read a lot from David Lehman and he is a Frenchman and an expert in WWII, especially about tanks. And all what I read from him was well researched and up to now I haven't found anomalies in what he said (I agree it can be due to my poor knowledge of the events).

At the end of the Maginot line there was hard resistance at La Ferté
forum.axishistory.co...

From that to say that if the Maginot line would have extended under the Ardennes, there wouldn't have been a breaktrough near Sedan is in my opinion difficult to say. By the way I read, but have to seek it back, that there was an extension to Dunkirk of light armoured bullworks

I make now a survey of what I read in a hurry, but will not let it rest before I know more about the topic.
Most observers think that as with Eben Emael the Germans would have sought the weakest point around some bullwork, have destroyed that bullwork and get through that gap, securing that line of fortifications from behind.

No in my opinion there were two main reasons for the defeat.

First of all the different tactics:

For instance the tank battle of Hannut: The Germans had good radio connections between their tanks and they moved in "spear point". There was also good coordination between the airforce, artillery and infantery.
Rommel during the crossing of the Meuse at Houx gave directives from the cupola of his tank.

For instance, and the Germans used everywhere that tactic, to divide the front in trunks, at the Albertcanal they used parachuted troops to attack the bunkers from behind and to desorientate the Belgian occupants of these bunkers. The same at Deinze at the Lys, when they had fierce resistance in the town they crossed the Lys some miles further and felt on the hard core of the resistance from the flank.

My Swedish friend, Hasse, said it already some years ago on these same boards: the German army was quite otherwise organized as the French one. They let the initiative to the fieldcommanders even to the lowest echelon. And that combined with the coordination and tactics "made the day" (to use one of Hasse's favourite expressions).

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4074510&skip=50
My message 61 from April 2007
"Jozef,

"went around the Maginot Line and trough Belgium. That was expected, but not trough the Ardennes. And it was confirmed by the plans fallen in Belgian hands after the crash-landing of the German plane at Maasmechelen. And these plans were genuine, an adapted von Schlieffen plan. The original atack was by that postponed and Guderian by other "lucky" (from what side you see it) postponements had the occasion to come to interest Hitler with his Ardennes plan. And Hitler as a gambler immediately approved the plan, while he was not lucky with his other generals.

There was the conspiracy of some German generals to delay the attack too, known by Canaris. It is worthwhile to mention that the German "esprit de corps" in the army was that high that although many generals were in favour of Hitler and knew about the complots never have betrayed their fellow army commanders.

So the best French troops, the first army if I remember it well were prepared to met the ennemy in the middle of Belgium, there was a strong French unit to move to Breda (The Netherlands) to take the Germans from the side together with the Dutch. In the Ardennes the Belgians had not foreseen the strongest part of the Army (have to seek it back) as the French the Ninth army, with a lot of non-trained conscripts at Sedan. And there you are right I think, Jozef. That was the difference with Poland, I think, these non-trained conscripts lacked the will and the fervour to fight. I think the same for Belgium. I am doing the research for the moment about Belgium for a French history messageboard.

And as I said to Englishvote, an interesting "what if" would be: What if the Germans had stuck to the original plan and attacked as foreseen in the documents captured at Maasmechelen?

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/NF2233811?thread=4372563

My messsage 11 from July 2007

""What if" for "some" reason the Belgians and the Netherlands kept fully to their neutrality and didn't made some strategy about the "ill prepared" Dyle plan together with the French and the British? No advance of the 7th French division to Breda, no 1st French division in the Ardennes and no BEF between Koningshooikt and Wavre.

The Belgians have to defend their own in the whole Belgium including the Ardennes. No difficulties between French and Belgian coordination in the Ardennes, nor between the Dutch and the French above Antwerp. The Chasseurs Ardennais, a Belgian elite-troup, can play a more important role in the Ardennes and they fight for their own region.

The BEF keeps to the Belgian border in their fortified positions prepared before 10 May. The first and seventh French division are in the left-rear for the front between Sedan and Givet on the Meuse. The Belgians keep one more day along the Semois to halt the Germans in the Ardennes. During that time the French are alerted and switch their 1st division behind the Meuse as support to the 9th division. The 7th division makes a broader front between the BEF on the line between Lille and Maubeuge/Hirson.

The Belgians hold the Dyle line longer, while they have not to reply to the Scheldt, while there is no crossing of the Meuse yet. As the Belgian military is more confronted in Namur and Hainnaut, they reply to the French border in the corner between the Sambre and the Meuse and along the Canal between Sambre, Scheldt and Lys. Antwerp, Ghent and Brussels are earlier given up and they defend along the line Courtrai,Roulers, Dixmude, Ostend.

The Belgian government is able to persuade the Belgian King to retreat with the Belgian troops into the British and French lines.

While as in real history the Allies are no match to the well coordinated German armies now together from the North and from the Ardennes, the Germans push the BEF and the French army on a broad front towards Paris and Lyon.

The BEF makes the whole retreat towards Britanny. Together with the French they escape from Britanny partly to Britain and partly to fight further on roughly a line from Bordeaux to Lyon.

The big difference with the real history: the French government retreat to North Africa together with a part of the British BEF and the French fleet to fight further against Hitler and there is not an "armistice" but a "capitulation" on the French mainland, the same as the Netherlands did, and a further fight from the Colonies."

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbhistory/F2233811?thread=2321509

See my message 76 about the battle of France and about the deficiencies of the French tank weapon and the airforce
There was a link from the American Kirkland: The French airforce in 1940. Was it defeated by the Luftwaffe or by politics?
It is evey where on the several fora mentioned, but when you click on the link you come each time to the same air force univeristy in Alabama. And seemingly the link don't exist anymore. Did more than an hour research on the net yesterday...last year it was still available...sigh...
It is perhaps for the experts and erudites, but I researched it in depth.
I made a translation of the article on Le Monde en Guerre: (and there it is still nearly integral present in English)
https://www.39-45.org/viewtopic.php?f=126&t=33165&start=40
Page 5 my message 41, page 7 my message 69 (the link that I mentioned is in message 42 from Marc 91).
For instance from the article:
The Germans had 4 take offs of their planes in the same time as the French for 1.
The French planes could fire through the propeller and they had special bullets, which could pierce the thickest armour of the German tanks, but on the crucial moment this specific ammunition wasn't available
Then the coordination of the French aviation against the German one...concentration and the French lack of concentration...


By all that research I found an interesting site which compares the German, French and British air power approach (I will copy it now before it disappears again )
And the British seems to be no better than the French on the contrary...Just the Germans had the right approach...
http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Harmon32.pdf


Triceratops, I agree it is expert stuff about the battle of France and it is perhaps for history freaks...but so is detailed history...

Kind regards, Paul.

PS: Only this! thread is broadened out of the normal frame and I made not any broad https, I am sure, I checked.
And we have no Norman available to correct the thing. If Nordmann, by some occasion is looking from above to this board, a bit as a god...I beg him to correct the thing...

Triceratops wrote:

Short film showing the breakthrough to Abbeville, and Case Red, the Invasion south of the Somme:




Battle of Abbeville

Thank you very much Triceratops for these two links. I looked at it and read it all. Especially the film is well made.

Kind regards, Paul.

Paul, thanks for the links.

As regards the sortie rate of 4:1 for the Luftwaffe, this would backfire later in the year when the German air crews were reaching exhaustion point by late summer, at the very height of the Battle of Britain.

The Germans were more efficient in refuelling their tanks. French armoured units were accompanied by fuel bowsers which refuelled each tank in succession, whereas the German had their fuel delivered to all tanks by truckloads of the ubiquitous Jerrican, which the crews then used to fuel the tanks themselves.

The point about the German Army allowing comparatively junior officers to make major decisions, wasn't new. They had been doing this in WW1 as well.

And the success of Case Yellow came as much as a surprise to the Germans as everyone else. In military planning, something, somewhere, always goes wrong, Usually quite a few things go wrong, but in this instance everything worked for the Germans. Hitler took a gamble with Manstein's plan because it was the only one which held out the chance of a quick victory, since he was aware that in a war of attrition, Germany would lose, just like 1914/18.

Triceratops,

thanks for the reply.

"And the success of Case Yellow came as much as a surprise to the Germans as everyone else. In military planning, something, somewhere, always goes wrong, Usually quite a few things go wrong, but in this instance everything worked for the Germans. Hitler took a gamble with Manstein's plan because it was the only one which held out the chance of a quick victory, since he was aware that in a war of attrition, Germany would lose, just like 1914/18."

Surprise to the Germans...I am not sure if the Germans even with their secret service knew, how badly the French army was organized in the chain of command and the lack of communication by flawed links, even field telephone as in 14-18. And the generals were present directly on the front in the German army during action while most of the French were in a "chateau" far from the front and even not rightly connected by radio with that front. I think the trick of the Germans was concentrating their tanks in one hugue spearhead to pierce in the battle line of the ennemy on the weakest point and supported by strong close air support.
But therefore they had to be masters in the air...and they were masters as I explained in my latest message and why...
And about the tanks of the French, as for instance the B1, nearly unvulnerable by their thick panzer. The personel had a multi task and the turret moving needed a lot of energy, so high fuel consumption and the fuel supply was many times not available due to military action...and the tank units were everywhere spread, so that they couldn't act in unity as the Germans. Contrary to what General Estienne and de Gaulle had propagated. (the same problem with the planes too, and if I recall it well they hadn't also not radio contact) And I heard from a Frenchman, heard from his father, that if they had radios most of the time they were broken and very complicated)
If I recall it well it was de Gaulle, who tried to hurt the flank of the German spearhead with tanks that he had concentrated in a unit and he asked strong air support, but by lack of communication the planes were one day too early or too late at the place. So that de Gaulle stood there idle with his tanks (it was not Montcormet).

Yes the defeat was foreseeable, but only with hindsight, not when the action was developing...

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

"I found this excellent summary from the BBC. I will use it as backbone for my comments on Fall Gelb. And when you comment or when neccesary for my comments , I will use quotes from the several threads on the old BBC messageboard...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml"

"The 'Maginot Line' replaced the crude trenches in which so much of the 1914-18 war was fought. It consisted of a sophisticated series of fortifications, which were confidently expected to protect France's frontier with Germany, although crucially the line did not cover the Franco-Belgian frontier. In general, the slow-tempo, attritional fighting of World War One heavily influenced French military doctrine at the outbreak of World War Two."

Even if the Maginot Line would cover the Franco-Belgian frontier (and that was not possible due to the huge cost), the Germans would have sought the weakest point and would pierce it with an even bigger tank concentration than those from the Ardennes and then isolate and assault the line from behind. And would in the case of an allied line as in real history from Breda-Namur, have used the Sickelschnitt for isolating the Allies from the Franco-Belgian frontier...and then evacuation from Ostend instead of from Dunkirk?

"The attack began on 10 May 1940, with German air raids on Belgium and Holland, followed by parachute drops and attacks by ground forces. The two beleaguered nations were hastily added to the anti-German ad-hoc coalition that included France and Britain, but this only served to further complicate Allied command and control arrangements.
The Germans seized the initiative, capturing the key Belgian fort of Eban Emael with a daring airborne operation. The speed of the German advance and the brutality of the air raids gave them a huge psychological advantage, and on 14 May the Dutch surrendered.

"The two beleaguered nations were hastily added to the anti-German ad-hoc coalition that included France and Britain, but this only served to further complicate Allied command and control arrangements."

Also in Holland where the Dutch colour of of uniforms of soldiers was not that far from the German Feldgrau. I think in the time Dirk Marinus from this board has spoken to me about that bad coordination in The Netherlands (he was there as youngster).
The same in Belgium as in the Ardennes where the French units met the Belgian units. There was a whole thread on a French forum about that, where I also contributed to.

"The British and French had responded to the original attack by putting into operation a plan to advance to the River Dyle, in Belgium. The Allies pushed their best forces, including the British, into Belgium. Although the initial stages went reasonably well, a French force advancing towards Breda, in Holland, was pushed back.
It soon became clear that by advancing into the Low Countries the Allies were dancing to Hitler's tune. On 13 May, the first German forces emerged from the Ardennes near Sedan, on the River Meuse. In a two-day battle, the Panzers crossed the river, despite some surprisingly stiff resistance from the second-class French defenders, and near-suicidal attacks by Allied aircraft"


Parachute drops and behind the lines...that was one of the factors to fluster both soldiers and population. And they used even dummies to maximize the effect. It became as my parents said a real hystery. One saw nearly everywhere "parachutisten"...Especially at the Albertcanal the soldiers were disorientated as the Germans seemed to be everywhere, in front of them and behind them...from that: panic reactions and loss of combativity.

"That the German forces failed to press their attack on Dunkirk was largely thanks to grim defence of the Dunkirk perimeter by British and French troops, and the efforts of the much-depleted RAF.
Although as Churchill, who had become Prime Minster on 10 May rightly commented, 'wars are not won by evacuation', Dynamo was a victory of incalculable importance for the BEF. The return of the troops, even without much of their equipment, gave Britain a basis on which to rebuild the Army, sheltering behind the Navy and the RAF. It also strengthened the credibility of Churchill's insistence that Britain would fight on, thus influencing the neutral USA at a time when American aid was vital."

There is not spoken of the much discussed "Haltbefehl", which saved the BEF. That's a minus for the BBC article...and the resistance of the second-class 9th at Sedan is ceratinly overrated too by the BBC. It was the same with the second-class (nearly "civil") regiments in Belgium too, even first class (civil) regiments too. It were only the Chasseurs Ardennais, who were "real" soldiers. Although to be honest even among the "civil" consript regiments, you had also big exeptions in combativity.

"It also strengthened the credibility of Churchill's insistence that Britain would fight on, thus influencing the neutral USA at a time when American aid was vital"

Yes and on the occasion of Mers-el Kebir showed Churchill it even more to the French, to Hitler and to the Americans that the Brits would fight on...

That was "case yellow" for me Triceratops. As for "case red" I will first re-enter in Temperance's Plato thread. Perhaps as it is not that long, I will first comment "Operation Seelöwe"...

Kind regards from Paul.

Triceratops,

"I found this excellent summary from the BBC. I will use it as backbone for my comments on Fall Gelb. And when you comment or when neccesary for my comments , I will use quotes from the several threads on the old BBC messageboard...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml"

"The 'Maginot Line' replaced the crude trenches in which so much of the 1914-18 war was fought. It consisted of a sophisticated series of fortifications, which were confidently expected to protect France's frontier with Germany, although crucially the line did not cover the Franco-Belgian frontier. In general, the slow-tempo, attritional fighting of World War One heavily influenced French military doctrine at the outbreak of World War Two."

Even if the Maginot Line would cover the Franco-Belgian frontier (and that was not possible due to the huge cost), the Germans would have sought the weakest point and would pierce it with an even bigger tank concentration than those from the Ardennes and then isolate and assault the line from behind. And would in the case of an allied line as in real history from Breda-Namur, have used the Sickelschnitt for isolating the Allies from the Franco-Belgian frontier...and then evacuation from Ostend instead of from Dunkirk?

"The attack began on 10 May 1940, with German air raids on Belgium and Holland, followed by parachute drops and attacks by ground forces. The two beleaguered nations were hastily added to the anti-German ad-hoc coalition that included France and Britain, but this only served to further complicate Allied command and control arrangements.
The Germans seized the initiative, capturing the key Belgian fort of Eban Emael with a daring airborne operation. The speed of the German advance and the brutality of the air raids gave them a huge psychological advantage, and on 14 May the Dutch surrendered.

"The two beleaguered nations were hastily added to the anti-German ad-hoc coalition that included France and Britain, but this only served to further complicate Allied command and control arrangements."

Also in Holland where the Dutch colour of of uniforms of soldiers was not that far from the German Feldgrau. I think in the time Dirk Marinus from this board has spoken to me about that bad coordination in The Netherlands (he was there as youngster).
The same in Belgium as in the Ardennes where the French units met the Belgian units. There was a whole thread on a French forum about that, where I also contributed to.

"The British and French had responded to the original attack by putting into operation a plan to advance to the River Dyle, in Belgium. The Allies pushed their best forces, including the British, into Belgium. Although the initial stages went reasonably well, a French force advancing towards Breda, in Holland, was pushed back.
It soon became clear that by advancing into the Low Countries the Allies were dancing to Hitler's tune. On 13 May, the first German forces emerged from the Ardennes near Sedan, on the River Meuse. In a two-day battle, the Panzers crossed the river, despite some surprisingly stiff resistance from the second-class French defenders, and near-suicidal attacks by Allied aircraft"


Parachute drops and behind the lines...that was one of the factors to fluster both soldiers and population. And they used even dummies to maximize the effect. It became as my parents said a real hystery. One saw nearly everywhere "parachutisten"...Especially at the Albertcanal the soldiers were disorientated as the Germans seemed to be everywhere, in front of them and behind them...from that: panic reactions and loss of combativity.

"That the German forces failed to press their attack on Dunkirk was largely thanks to grim defence of the Dunkirk perimeter by British and French troops, and the efforts of the much-depleted RAF.
Although as Churchill, who had become Prime Minster on 10 May rightly commented, 'wars are not won by evacuation', Dynamo was a victory of incalculable importance for the BEF. The return of the troops, even without much of their equipment, gave Britain a basis on which to rebuild the Army, sheltering behind the Navy and the RAF. It also strengthened the credibility of Churchill's insistence that Britain would fight on, thus influencing the neutral USA at a time when American aid was vital."

There is not spoken of the much discussed "Haltbefehl", which saved the BEF. That's a minus for the BBC article...and the resistance of the second-class 9th at Sedan is ceratinly overrated too by the BBC. It was the same with the second-class (nearly "civil") regiments in Belgium too, even first class (civil) regiments too. It were only the Chasseurs Ardennais, who were "real" soldiers. Although to be honest even among the "civil" consript regiments, you had also big exeptions in combativity.

"It also strengthened the credibility of Churchill's insistence that Britain would fight on, thus influencing the neutral USA at a time when American aid was vital"

Yes and on the occasion of Mers-el Kebir showed Churchill it even more to the French, to Hitler and to the Americans that the Brits would fight on...

That was "case yellow" for me Triceratops. As for "case red" I will first re-enter in Temperance's Plato thread. Perhaps as it is not that long, I will first comment "Operation Seelöwe"...

Kind regards from Paul.

Double post because there was no end to the waiting, ceratinly more than two minutes. when I then returned the site said someone has entered a new message..(of course my own),then do you want to modify or save. Clicking on save a double was the result

PaulRyckier wrote:

Surprise to the Germans...I am not sure if the Germans even with their secret service knew, how badly the French army was organized in the chain of command and the lack of communication by flawed links, even field telephone as in 14-18. And the generals were present directly on the front in the German army during action while most of the French were in a "chateau" far from the front and even not rightly connected by radio with that front.

Yes, General Gamelin chose the medieval Chateau de Vincennes, east of Paris, as his headquarters. In 1940 it was still essentially the same fortress that Henry V of England would have recognised (he died there in 1422). In 1940, as you say, it had no established radio communications but rather relied on a few telephone lines and on hourly motorcycle despatch riders. It was described, by contemporary French officers, as "a submarine without a periscope". Needless to say whatever great defensive plans might have been devised therein, they were inevitably hopelessly out of date once communicated to the outside world and the front-line troops.  On 18 May 1940 the 68-year-old Gamelin was replaced by the 73-year-old Maxime Weygand who crucially proved to be even more hesitant and cautious.

French preparations for the next phase of the campaign;

wiki:
Weygand line
The French armies had fallen back on its lines of supply and communications and had closer access to repair shops, supply dumps and stores. About 112,000 evacuated French soldiers were repatriated via the Normandy and Brittany ports. It was some substitute for the lost divisions in Flanders. The French were also able to make good a significant amount of their armoured losses and raised the 1st and 2nd DCr; De Gaulle's division—the 4th DCr—also had its losses replaced; morale rose and was very high by the end of May 1940.

Morale improved because most French soldiers only knew of German success by hearsay; surviving French officers had gained tactical experience against German mobile units and had increased confidence in their weapons after seeing their artillery (which the Wehrmacht post-battle analysis recognised as technically very good) and tanks perform better in combat than the German armour. The French tanks were now known to have heavier armour and bigger guns. Between 23 and 28 May, the French reconstituted the Seventh and Tenth armies. Weygand decided on hedgehog tactics, which were to implement defence in depth operations and use delaying tactics, to inflict maximum attrition on German units. He employed units in towns and small villages, which were prepared for all-round defence. Behind this, the new infantry, armoured and half-mechanised divisions formed up, ready to counter-attack and relieve the surrounded units, which were ordered to hold out at all costs.

Dewoitine D520 the best French built fighter of the War was just coming into service in 1940 and was not present in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome;

Triceratops,

yes the hedgehogs defence in depth. I mentioned them already in one of my previous messages. I hope I ddn't say "eagle" positions , while in dutch "hedgehog" is "egel" (and I didn't know the English word for "egel"...In the Belgian 18days campaign it was also very effectif. One unit near Liège held out till one day after the capitulation gaining time for operation Dynamo.

"Dewoitine D520 the best French built fighter of the War was just coming into service in 1940 and was not present in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome;"

Yes after the armistice the French had more modern fighters than before the war, even with the loss of all the machines lost in battle. And the new American planes were arriving each day too. Lucky that Jean Monnet, the father of the European Union, could divert the new arriving ones to Britain after the armistice. And the most modern ones were in Algeria and flewn over the last of the war to there too.
And the French had the intention to fight on from AFN (remember the governement wanted to move to Algiers (the history of the Massilia. Will explain it later)
But then "abdicated" Reynaud and was so stupid to ask Pétain. Pétain, who wanted a new France based on the triptique: "travail, famille, patrie" (work, family, fatherland) instead of "liberté, égalité, fraternité"



Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

studied now Case Red, Fall Rot, Plan Rouge in depth (on internet )

Have to say that I found nearly nothing in English languages sites.

A book, but there is no access to the text as many times with Amazon
https://www.amazon.com/Case-Red-Collapse-Robert-Forczyk/dp/1472824423

I give now some links to comment them tomorrow:
http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Battle_of_France
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0968344507075873?journalCode=wiha
https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=140163

In French:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataille_d%27Amiens_(1940)

Two British regiments who took part in the battle of Amiens
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/51e_division_d%27infanterie_(Highland)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_(United_Kingdom)_Division
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9fense_de_la_Loire
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataille_de_la_vall%C3%A9e_du_Rh%C3%B4ne_(1940)


Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

the links in English I will not review as they mosstly give the same as Wiki English...
http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Battle_of_France
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0968344507075873?journalCode=wih

The link with the Axis forum from David Lehman (btw: a Frenchman writing in English that I met on many fora and very knowledgeable) is too specific (although quite interesting as for the fierce resistance of the French during case red) to discuss here...

https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=140163

Follow now the defence lines on the map. The line of the battle of Amiens is not on the map


The battle of Amiens:
 https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataille_d%27Amiens_(1940)

La ligne Weygand est un front défensif établi au sud sur la Somme, le canal Crozat, l'Ailette et l'Aisne durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale en mai 1940.

Bilan humain et matériel

• La résistance des troupes française fut payée chèrement, les pertes humaines furent nombreuses et des prisonniers furent assassinés de façon effroyable : 50 tirailleurs sénégalais blessés du 1^er bataillon du 24^e RTS furent achevés à Aubigny. 86 corps furent retrouvés au Saut-du-Loup, et une centaine d'hommes du 12^e Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (RTS) furent brulés vifs dans une grange par des soldats allemands.
  
• 196 blindés allemands (Panzer III et IV) furent détruits lors de la bataille.
  

The resistance of the French army was paid dearly, the losses of human lives were high and prisoners were assasinated on a dreadful way: 50 Senegalese sharpshooters were shot on the spot, 86 corpses were found at Saut-du-Loup, and a 100 Senegalese sharpshooters were burned alife in a barn. (it reminds me of the atrocities at Deinze, Meigem, Vinkt commited by Germans when they didn't came through at the Canal bridge in Deinze 25 May 1940.)
But at the other side 196 German Panzers were destroyed during that battle.

The battle of the Loire
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9fense_de_la_Loire

La défense de la Loire est un épisode de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, quand les cadets de Saumur (du nom donné aux élèves officiers de réserve de l’École d’application de la cavalerie, à Saumur) et d'autres éléments de l'Armée française, s’opposent, en juin 1940, à l’avancée allemande sur la Loire. Les principaux affrontements eurent lieu à Saumur et à Gennes.
Cette résistance, qualifiée d'héroïque, opposa pendant deux jours près de 2 500 soldats français, sous-équipés et inexpérimentés, à la 1^re division de cavalerie de l'armée allemande, alors même que le maréchal Pétain venait d’annoncer la demande d'armistice et d’appeler à cesser le combat. Ce faisant, les cadets de Saumur sont parfois considérés comme les premiers résistants, avec les derniers défenseurs de la ligne Maginot.

Triceratops I will tomorrow translate the episode of the Cadets of Saumur and comment it.

Kind regards, Paul.

Addendum to the previous message.

"La défense de la Loire est un épisode de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, quand les cadets de Saumur (du nom donné aux élèves officiers de réserve de l’École d’application de la cavalerie, à Saumur) et d'autres éléments de l'Armée française, s’opposent, en juin 1940, à l’avancée allemande sur la Loire. Les principaux affrontements eurent lieu à Saumur et à Gennes.
Cette résistance, qualifiée d'héroïque, opposa pendant deux jours près de 2 500 soldats français, sous-équipés et inexpérimentés, à la 1^re division de cavalerie de l'armée allemande, alors même que le maréchal Pétain venait d’annoncer la demande d'armistice et d’appeler à cesser le combat. Ce faisant, les cadets de Saumur sont parfois considérés comme les premiers résistants, avec les derniers défenseurs de la ligne Maginot.
The defence of the Loire is an episode of WWII, when the Cadets of Saumur (name given to the student officers of the reserve from the application school of the cavalry in Saumur and other elements of the French army opposed in June 1940 the German advance on the Loire.
The mean confrontations took place at Saumur and Gennes. nearly
This resistance, qualified as heroic, opposed during two days , under equiped and inexperienced, to the 1st division of the cavalry of the German army, even at the same moment that the Maréchal Pétain just announced the armistice and asled to stop the fighting. Doing that, are the Cadets of Saumur often (tiens, that's nearly the same as the German "oft", many times I doubt if "often" is German or English) considered as the first resitants together with the last defenders of the Maginot line

French:
Soit environ 2 500 hommes armés (armed men)de 24 blindés (tanks), 5 canons de 75 mm, 13 canons antichars (antitank) et 15 mortiers pour tenir (hold) 40 km de front.
Germans:
Les troupes allemandes sont composées de:40 000 hommes, 300 pièces d'artillerie, 150 blindés et de plusieurs éléments de la Luftwaffe (many planes)

I wasn't aware of this episode till I read a complete discussion on a French forum.
It proves in my opinion that the French army hadn't yet lost its combativity and that all the rethoric of a Pétain was only directed in a political way to the population and not to the army, where it were only the higher command,which was listening to him. A higher command were many were of the same rightwing political thinking as him.
Reading about Weygand the last days, I have a bit of a negative impression of him. For instance one day sejourning in Paris before looking to his task. In the most crucial days for France, no command for nearly two days.
I mentioned even on the old BBC forum and on other forums, it is also in the French links that I provided here:
Weygand wanted not a capitulation ( a stop of the fighting in the field) not for the fate of the French Republic, but for the shame of capitulating in the field of the illustrious French army. Of course that was fully appreciated among the clique around Pétain.
The difference with an armistice was that the government could move to Algiers and from there could fight on from the AFN together with the British...
Yes Reynaud asked Pétain as a reinsurance for the French population and saw him as an icon of WWI. He seemingly had no inside information of the "party around Laval", where Pétain was also included.

Triceratops I end here temporarily and will give first the links that I further want to discuss.

Kind regards, Paul.

Addendum with links (liens) for further discussion:

Armistice or capitulation?

https://www.reseau-canope.fr/cndpfileadmin/pour-memoire/les-annees-noires-1940-1945/des-annees-noires-pour-la-iiie-republique/armistice-ou-capitulation/
The Massilia affair
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260148?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://books.google.be/books/about/The_Massilia_Affair.html?id=wRQ8cgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y
http://bordeaux3945.forumaquitaine.com/t177-le-massilia-en-juin-1940-les-passagers

The documentary: "Juin 1940, le piége (trap) du Massilia" don't work It is on Daily motion; will seek for another one

Addendum with links (liens) for further discussion:

Armistice or capitulation?

https://www.reseau-canope.fr/cndpfileadmin/pour-memoire/les-annees-noires-1940-1945/des-annees-noires-pour-la-iiie-republique/armistice-ou-capitulation/
The Massilia affair
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260148?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://books.google.be/books/about/The_Massilia_Affair.html?id=wRQ8cgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y
http://bordeaux3945.forumaquitaine.com/t177-le-massilia-en-juin-1940-les-passagers

The documentary: "Juin 1940, le piége (trap) du Massilia" don't work It is on Daily motion; will seek for another one

Sorry some three hours reading in French about "the trap of the Massilia" June 1940. Also recherched for links in English, but almost nothing about these crucial hours of the Third French Republic before it was abolished by Pétain with the "Plein pouvoirs"

Regards, Paul.

Triceratops,

from my message of 21 August 0h21
I mentioned even on the old BBC forum and on other forums, it is also in the French links that I provided here:
Weygand wanted not a capitulation ( a stop of the fighting in the field) not for the fate of the French Republic, but for the shame of capitulating in the field of the illustrious French army. Of course that was fully appreciated among the clique around Pétain.
The difference with an armistice was that the government could move to Algiers and from there could fight on from the AFN together with the British...
Yes Reynaud asked Pétain as a reinsurance for the French population and saw him as an icon of WWI. He seemingly had no inside information of the "party around Laval", where Pétain was also included.
In the link I provided the day before yesterday:
https://www.reseau-canope.fr/cndpfileadmin/pour-memoire/les-annees-noires-1940-1945/des-annees-noires-pour-la-iiie-republique/armistice-ou-capitulation/

Un débat s’organise à partir du 10 juin 1940 entre les militaires et le gouvernement français replié en Touraine puis à Bordeaux : armistice ou capitulation ? Le président du Conseil Paul Reynaud souhaite que le généralissime Weygand signe la capitulation pour la métropole, permettant ainsi au gouvernement de continuer le combat en Afrique du Nord ou à l’étranger. Outre que cette solution ne protège pas les Français des exactions éventuelles des Allemands, elle attribue la responsabilité de la défaite à l’armée française, ce que Weygand et de nombreux officiers supérieurs refusent. La capitulation n’arrête pas le conflit entre la France et l’Allemagne, mais marque la reconnaissance par les militaires de la perte d’une bataille. En revanche, l’armistice attribue la responsabilité de la défaite à la classe politique. En effet, elle est signée par le gouvernement et marque l’arrêt des combats sur tous les territoires, avant la signature d’une paix séparée. Elle protège les populations, mais oblige Paul Reynaud, qui avait passé un accord avec les Britanniques le 28 mars 1940 rejetant toute paix séparée, à renier sa parole. Le 13 juin, le maréchal Pétain, vice-président du Conseil, menace de démissionner si l’armistice n’est pas demandé. Appelé le 18 mai 1940 par Paul Reynaud parce qu’il est respecté à droite comme à gauche et qu’il incarne le sursaut contre l’envahisseur, Pétain défend pourtant l’idée de l’armistice comme « condition nécessaire de la pérennité de la France éternelle ». Selon lui, les causes de la défaite sont politiques. Paul Reynaud démissionne brutalement le 16 juin : il n’était pas mis en minorité au Conseil des ministres mais il semble qu’il ait estimé que Pétain ou Weygand pesaient plus lourd que lui dans les décisions. Pétain lui succède. L’armistice est signé le 22 juin et le 25 juin à 0 h 35, il entre en vigueur sur tous les fronts français.


A debate started from 10 June 1940 between military and the French government retreated at Tourraine and later at Bordeaux: armisitice or capitulation? Paul Reynaud wanted that generalissimus Weygand signed a capitulation for mainland France, allowing the government in that way to fight on in Northern Africa (AFN) or elsewhere abraod. (as by the way the Dutch have done and reluctantly, the tandem Pierlot/Spaak (the Belgian government in exile) too...)

Outre que cette solution ne protège pas les Français des exactions éventuelles des Allemands, elle attribue la responsabilité de la défaite à l’armée française, ce que Weygand et de nombreux officiers supérieurs refusent. La capitulation n’arrête pas le conflit entre la France et l’Allemagne, mais marque la reconnaissance par les militaires de la perte d’une bataille. En revanche, l’armistice attribue la responsabilité de la défaite à la classe politique. En effet, elle est signée par le gouvernement et marque l’arrêt des combats sur tous les territoires, avant la signature d’une paix séparée. Elle protège les populations, mais oblige Paul Reynaud, qui avait passé un accord avec les Britanniques le 28 mars 1940 rejetant toute paix séparée, à renier sa parole. Le 13 juin, le maréchal Pétain, vice-président du Conseil, menace de démissionner si l’armistice n’est pas demandé. Appelé le 18 mai 1940 par Paul Reynaud parce qu’il est respecté à droite comme à gauche et qu’il incarne le sursaut contre l’envahisseur, Pétain défend pourtant l’idée de l’armistice comme « condition nécessaire de la pérennité de la France éternelle ». Selon lui, les causes de la défaite sont politiques. Paul Reynaud démissionne brutalement le 16 juin : il n’était pas mis en minorité au Conseil des ministres mais il semble qu’il ait estimé que Pétain ou Weygand pesaient plus lourd que lui dans les décisions. Pétain lui succède. L’armistice est signé le 22 juin et le 25 juin à 0 h 35, il entre en vigueur sur tous les fronts français.

Beyond the fact that this solution didn't protect the French from eventual exactions of the Germans, it attributes the responsability of the defeat to the political class. In return, the armistice attributes the responsability of the defeat to the the political class. In fact, it is signed by the government and marks the stop of the fighting on all the territories before the signature of a separated peace. It protects the populations, but obliges Reynaud, who had made an agreement with the British on 28 March 1940, which rejected any unilateral peace, to abjure his given word. 13 June threatens marechal Pétain to resign if an armistice is not demanded. Asked by Paul Reynaud on 18 Mai 1940, because he is respected by the right as by the left and while he incarnates a shock to the invaders, Pétain defends nevertheless the idea of an armistice as "necessary condition for the continuation of the eternal (sic) France". According to him are the causes of the defeat political. Paul Reynaud resigns without warning on 16 June: he was not put in a minority in the Counsel of ministers, but it seems that he thought that Pétain and Weygand had a bigger weight in decision making than he. Pétain succeeded him. On 22 June the armistice is signed and on 25 June 0h35 it becomes working on all the French fronts.

A comment from me;
When on 17 June Pétain asked the French soldiers to end the war, the discipline was gone and many soldiers asked to be prisoner of war. It was perhaps that that Pétain wanted...

Thus the fighting on the Rhône was only a fight anymore from the disciplinated soldiers as from the army of the Alpes fighting against the Italians and on the Rhône.

Kind regards, Paul.

Triceratops,
La Bataille du Rhône

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataille_de_la_vall%C3%A9e_du_Rh%C3%B4ne_(1940)
Dès le 15 juin, le général Olry commandant l'Armée des Alpes a dû prélever des forces, notamment de l'artillerie pour préparer un second front, devant la menace allemande. En effet, le 15, les Allemands sont à Dijon. Il crée le groupement du général Cartier, avec des unités de bric et de broc, une division coloniale qui servait de réserve d'armée, des marins, quelques chars, de l'infanterie qui se sont repliées depuis le Nord-Est. Ce groupement est équipé avec du matériel de récupération. Les 30 000 hommes qui le composent vont être chargés de tenir sur trois lignes de défense successives : le Rhône, l'Isère, la Durance.
Devant l'avance allemande sur les deux rives de la Saône (le pont de Neuville-sur-Saône étant notamment resté intact), les soldats français prennent position dans le village de Chasselay et établissent des défenses. Les trois routes conduisant au bourg sont pourvues de chicanes^[4].
Les 19-20 juin, les soldats du 25^e régiment de tirailleurs sénégalais (RTS) commandés par le colonel Bouriand reçoivent l'ordre de « résister sans esprit de recul » et de défendre la route nationale 6 au nord de Lyon. Les Allemands de la Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland et de la 3^e Panzerdivision SS Totenkopf, déferlent sur leurs positions, à 100 contre 1. Les tirailleurs sénégalais, à court de munitions, se rendent, non loin de Chasselay. Ils sont regroupés dans des champs près de la ville et sont massacrés de sang froid par les mitrailleuses de deux chars allemands^[6]. Le 21 juin, quarante-huit Sénégalais furent inhumés par les habitants de Chasselay, une quinzaine de blessés furent recueillis et pansés^[4].
Le 22 juin 1940, l'armistice est signé entre le gouvernement Philippe Pétain et les Allemands, mettant fin aux hostilités.
L'Armée des Alpes continue en effet le combat avant qu'un armistice ne soit également signé avec l'Italie de Mussolini dans la villa Incisa à l'Olgiata près de Rome, prenant effet le 25 à 0 heure 35^[8].

From 15 June on, general Orly, commander of the army of the Alpes, had to take unities, namely artillery to ptrepare a second front, in defence of the Gemans. In fact the Germans were at Dijon on 15 June. He created the group of general Cartier with unities from odds and ends, a colonial division, which served as reserve, navy people, some tanks and infantery retreated from the Nord-Est. They had only recupeterated material. These 30,000 men will have to hold three successive fronts: the Rhône, the isère and the Durance. The Germans advanced on the two banks of the river Saone, they were gone over the Saone at Neuvill-sur-Saone. The French took position in the village of Chasselay and prepared the defence.
Note from me: The Saone comes from the Nord and flow in the Rhône at Lyon. Thus Chassselay is before the Rhône in the immediate neighbourhood of the Saone.

Le 22 juin 1940, l'armistice est signé entre le gouvernement Philippe Pétain et les Allemands, mettant fin aux hostilités.
L'Armée des Alpes continue en effet le combat avant qu'un armistice ne soit également signé avec l'Italie de Mussolini dans la villa Incisa à l'Olgiata près de Rome, prenant effet le 25 à 0 heure 35^[8].
The 19-20 June, the soldiers of the 25th regiment of Senegalese sharpshooters, commanded by colonel Bouriand received order "to resist without thinking at retreat", defending the road to Lyon , North of it. The Germans of the Tank Division Grossdeutschland and the 3rd Tank Division SS Totenkopf, deployed to their positions, at 100 to 1. The Senegalese at least without munition surrendered not that far from Chasselay. They were grouped near the city and cold-blooded shot dead with the machine guns of two tanks. On 21 June the inhabitants of Chasselay burried 48 Senegaleses and some 15 wounded ones were cared for.
Note that all this passed after Pétain has asked on 17 June to lay down the weapons, the same on 17 June for the heroic defence of the Cadets of Saumur.



On 22 June 1940, the armistice was signed between the Pétain government and the Germans making an end to the hostilities.
The army of the Alpes fought on till the armistice was signed with the Mussolini Italy in the villa Incisa at Olgata near Rome, coming in effect at 25 June at 0h35.

PS: What I experienced during the translation from French to English, that nearly all the words were the same ...

That was the end of Fall Rot, Triceratops.
I make a separate message about a part of the French government, in fact the whole government, which was ordered to leave for Northern Africa as it occasioned with the Masssilia.

Kind regards, Paul.